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That's Entertainment?

Hollywood's Contribution to Anti-Americanism Abroad

Michael Medved

"THINK AMERICA: WHY THE HOLE WORLD HATES YOU?"

THIS MESSAGE, proudly proclaimed in a hand-lettered sign held aloft by a scowling, bearded Pakistani protestor during one of the angry demonstrations that followed September 11, continues to challenge the world's dominant power. In responding to such disturbing questions about the origins of anti-Americanism, glib commentators may cite the imperial reach of U.S. corporations, or Washington's support for Israel, or sheer envy for the freedom and prosperity of American life. But they must also contend with the profound impact of the lurid Hollywood visions that penetrate every society on earth. The vast majority of people in Pakistan or Peru, Poland or Papua New Guinea, may never visit the United States or ever meet an American face to face, but they inevitably encounter images of L.A. and New York in the movies, television programs and popular songs exported everywhere by the American entertainment industry.

Those images inevitably exert a more powerful influence on overseas consumers than they do on the American domestic audience. If you live in Seattle or Cincinnati, you understand that the feverish media fantasies provided by a DMX music video or a *Dark Angel* TV episode do not represent everyday reality for you or your neighbors. If you live in Indonesia or Nigeria, however, you will have little or no first-hand experience to balance the negative impressions provided by American pop culture, with its intense emphasis on violence, sexual adventurism, and every inventive variety of anti-social behavior that the most overheated imagination could concoct. No wonder so many Islamic extremists (and so many others) look upon America as a cruel, Godless, vulgar society—a "Great Satan", indeed.

During violent anti-American riots in October 2001, mobs in Quetta, Pakistan specifically targeted five movie theaters showing U.S. imports and offered their negative review of this cinematic fare by burning each of those theaters to the ground. "Look what they did!" wailed Chaudary Umedali amid the smoking ruins of his cinema. He said that a thousand rioters smashed the doors of his theater and threw firebombs inside because "they didn't like our showing American films." Ironically, the last movie he had offered his Quetta customers was *Desperado*—a hyper-violent, R-rated 1995 shoot-em-up with Antonio Banderas and Salma Hayek, specifically designed by its

Michael Medved, author of *Hollywood Vs. America* and *Saving Childhood*, hosts a nationally-syndicated, daily radio talk show focusing on the intersection of politics and pop culture.

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Texas-born director Robert Rodriguez for export outside the United States (in this case, to worldwide Hispanic audiences).

Even the President of the United States worries publicly about the distorted view of this embattled nation that Hollywood conveys to the rest of the world. In his eloquent but uncelebrated address to students at Beijing's Tsinghua University on February 22, George W. Bush declared: "As America learns more about China, I am concerned that the Chinese people do not always see a clear picture of my country. This happens for many reasons, and some of them of our own making. Our movies and television shows often do not portray the values of the real America I know."

Ironically, the President assumed in his remarks that the Beijing students he addressed felt repulsed by the messages they received from American entertainment—despite abundant evidence that hundreds of millions of Chinese, and in particular the nation's most ambitious young people, enthusiastically embrace our pop culture. During the tragic Tiananmen Square rebellion more than a decade ago, pro-democracy reformers not only seized on the Statue of Liberty as a symbol of their movement, but indulged their taste for the music and fashions identified everywhere as part of American youth culture. American conservatives may abhor the redoubtable Madonna and all her works, but the youthful activists who brought about the Velvet Revolution in Prague reveled in her cultural contributions.

This contradiction highlights the major dispute over the worldwide influence of Hollywood entertainment. Do the spectacularly successful exports from the big show business conglomerates inspire hatred and resentment of the United States, or do they advance the inevitable, End-of-History triumph of American values? Does the near-universal popularity of national icons from Mickey Mouse to Michael Jackson represent the power of our ideals of free expression and free markets, or do the dark and decadent images we broadcast to the rest of the world hand a potent weapon to America-haters everywhere?

Telling It Like It Isn't

OF COURSE, apologists for the entertainment industry decry all attempts to blame Hollywood for anti-Americanism, insisting that American pop culture merely reports reality, accurately reflecting the promise and problems of the United States, and allowing the worldwide audience to respond as they may to the best and worst aspects of our society. During a forum on movie violence sponsored by a group of leading liberal activists, movie director Paul Verhoeven (author of such worthy ornaments to our civilization as *Robocop* and *Basic Instinct*) insisted: "Art is a reflection of the world. If the world is horrible, the reflection in the mirror is horrible." In other words, if people in developing countries feel disgusted by the Hollywood imagery so aggressively marketed in their homelands, then the problem cannot be pinned on the shapers of show business but rather arises from the authentic excesses of American life.

This argument runs counter to every statistical analysis of the past twenty years on the distorted imagery of American society purveyed by the entertainment industry. All serious evaluations of movie and television versions of American life suggest that the pop culture portrays a world that is far more violent, dangerous, sexually indulgent (and, of course, dramatic) than everyday American reality. George Gerbner, a leading analyst of media violence at the Annenberg School

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of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania, concluded after thirty years of research that characters on network television fall victim to acts of violence *at least fifty times more frequently* than citizens of the real America.

If anything, the disproportionate emphasis on violent behavior only intensifies with the export of American entertainment. For many years, so-called action movies have traveled more effectively than other genres, since explosions and car crashes do not require translation. This leads to the widespread assumption abroad that the United States, despite the dramatically declining crime rate of the last decade, remains a dangerous and insecure society. On a recent trip to England, I encountered sophisticated and thoughtful Londoners who refused to travel across the Atlantic because of their wildly exaggerated fear of American street crime—ignoring recent statistics showing unequivocally that muggings and assaults are now more common in London than in New York. On a similar note, a recent traveler in rural Indonesia met a ten-year old boy who, discovering the American origins of the visitor, asked to see her gun. When she insisted that she didn't carry any firearms, the child refused to believe her: he knew that all Americans carried guns because he had seen them perpetually armed on TV and at the movies.

The misleading media treatment of sexuality has proven similarly unreliable in its oddly altered version of American life. Analysis by Robert and Linda Lichter at the Center for Media and Public Affairs in Washington, DC reveals that on television, depictions of sex outside of marriage are nine to fourteen times more common than dramatizations of marital sex. This odd emphasis on non-marital intercourse leads to the conclusion that the only sort of sexual expression frowned upon by Hollywood involves physical affection between husband and wife. In reality, all surveys of intimate behavior (including the famous, sweeping 1994 national study by the University of Chicago) suggest that among the more than two-thirds of American adults who are currently married, sex is not only more satisfying, but significantly more frequent, than it is among their single counterparts. One of pop culture's most celebrated representatives of the "swinging singles" lifestyle today, Kim Cattrall of *Sex and the City*, recently published a best-selling book full of revealing confessions. In *Satisfaction: The Art of the Female Orgasm*, Cattrall describes a life dramatically different from the voracious and promiscuous escapades of the character she portrays on television. In the intimate arena, she felt frustrated and unfulfilled—as do nearly half of American females, she maintains—until the loving ministrations of her husband, Mark Levinson, finally enabled her to experience gratification and joy.

Even without Cattrall's revelations, anyone acquainted with actual unattached individuals could confirm that *Friends* and *Ally McBeal* hardly represent the common lot of American singles. On television and at the movies, the major challenge confronted by most unmarried characters is trying to decide among a superficially dazzling array of sexual alternatives. The entertainments in question may suggest that these explorations will prove less than wholly satisfying, but to most American viewers, single or married, they still look mightily intriguing. To most viewers in more traditional societies, by contrast, they look mightily decadent and disrespectful.

Consider, too, the emphasis on homosexuality in contemporary television and movies. In less than a year between 2001 and 2002, three major networks (NBC, HBO, MTV) offered different, competing dramatizations of the murder of Matthew Shepherd—the gay Wyoming

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college student beaten to death by two thugs. No other crime in memory—not even the murder of Nicole Brown Simpson—has received comparable attention by major entertainment companies. The message to the world at large not only calls attention to homosexual alternatives in American life, but focuses on our brutal and criminal underclass.

The Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLAAD) publishes an annual scorecard in which it celebrates the number of openly gay characters who appear regularly on national television series, and recently counted more than thirty. This trendy fascination with homosexuality (as illustrated by the worshipful attention given to Rosie O'Donnell's hugely publicized "coming out") obviously overstates the incidence of out-of-the-closet gay identity; all scientific studies suggest that less than 3 percent of adults unequivocally see themselves as gay.

For purposes of perspective, it is useful to contrast the pop culture focus on gay orientation with media indifference to religious commitment. A handful of successful television shows such as *Touched By An Angel* and *Seventh Heaven* may invoke elements of conventional faith, if often in simplistic, childlike form, but ardent and mature believers remain rare on television and at the movies. The Gallup Poll and other surveys suggest that some 40 percent of Americans attend religious services on a weekly basis—more than four times the percentage who go to the movies on any given week. Church or synagogue attendance, however, hardly ever appears in Hollywood or television portrayals of contemporary American society, while mass media feature gay references far more frequently than religious ones. This is hardly an accurate representation of mainstream America, and the distortion plays directly into the hands of some of our most deadly enemies. In October 2001, an "official" press spokesman for Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda terror network summarized the struggle between Islamic fanatics and the United States as part of the eternal battle "between faith and atheism." Since the United States represents by far the most religiously committed, church-going nation in the Western world, this reference to the nation's godlessness gains credibility abroad only because of Hollywood's habitual denial or downplaying of the faith-based nature of our civilization.

The ugly media emphasis on the dysfunctional nature of our national life transcends examples of widely decried, tacky and exploitative entertainment, and pointedly includes the most prodigiously praised products of the popular culture. In recent years, some 1.5 billion people around the world watch at least part of Hollywood's annual Oscar extravaganza, and in April 2000 they saw the Motion Picture Academy confer all of its most prestigious awards (Best Picture, Best Actor, Best Director, Best Screenplay) on a puerile pastiche called *American Beauty*. This embittered assault on suburban family life shows a frustrated father (Kevin Spacey) who achieves redemption only through quitting his job, lusting after a teenaged cheerleader, insulting his harridan wife, compulsively exercising and smoking marijuana. The only visibly loving and wholesome relationship in this surreal middle class nightmare flourishes between two clean-cut gay male neighbors. The very title, *American Beauty*, ironically invokes the name of an especially cherished flower to suggest that all is not, well, rosy with the American dream. If the entertainment establishment chooses to honor this cinematic effort above all others, then viewers in Kenya or Kuala Lumpur might understandably assume that it offers a mordantly accurate assessment of the emptiness and corruption of American society.

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Explaining Media Masochism

THIS PROMINENT example of overpraised artistic ambition suggests that the persistent problems in Hollywood's view of America go far beyond the normal pursuit of profit. While *American Beauty* director Sam Mendes and screenwriter Alan Ball might well aspire to critical acclaim, the movie's producers always understood that this tale of suburban dysfunction probably would not be a slam-dunk box office blockbuster (though the Oscars ensured that it did quite well commercially). The most common excuse for the ferocious focus on violence and bizarre behavior—the argument that the "market made me do it" and that public demands leave entertainment executives with no choice—falls apart in the face of the most rudimentary analysis.

Every year, the American movie industry releases more than 300 films, with a recent average of 65 percent of those titles rated "R"—or adults only—by the Motion Picture Association of America. Conventional wisdom holds that the big studios emphasize such disturbing, edgy R-rated releases precisely because they perform best at the box office, but an abundance of recent studies proves that the public prefers feel-good, family fare. A recent comprehensive analysis confirms the conclusions on this point in my 1992 book, *Hollywood Vs. America*. Two economists, Arthur DeVany of the University of California at Irvine and W. David Walls of the University of Hong Kong, summarized their research: "This paper shows that Medved is right: there are too many R-rated movies in Hollywood's portfolio. . . . We show that, as Medved claimed, R-rated movies are dominated by G, PG and PG-13 movies in all three dimensions of revenues, costs, return on production cost, and profits."

The other argument in defense of the entertainment emphasis on troubled aspects of American life involves the inherently dramatic nature of social dysfunction. According to the celebrated Tolstoyan aphorism, "All happy families are the same; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." This logic suggests an inevitable tendency to highlight the same sort of unpleasant but gripping situations so memorably brought to life by eminent pre-cinematic screenwriters like Sophocles and Shakespeare. Divorce and adultery offer more obvious entertainment value than marital bliss; criminality proves more instantly compelling than good citizenship. In an intensely competitive international marketplace, the dark—even deviant—obsessions of the present potentates of pop culture may seem to make a crude sort of sense.

This approach, however, ignores the striking lessons of Hollywood's own heritage and the wholesome basis on which our star-spangled entertainment industry came to conquer the world. In the 1920s and 1930s, the American movie business faced formidable competition from well-developed production centers in Italy, France, Germany, England and even Russia. Obvious political disruptions (including the brutal intrusion of fascist and communist tyranny) helped U.S. corporations triumph over their European rivals, and drove many of the most talented individuals to seek refuge across the Atlantic. But even more than the historic circumstances that undermined America's competitors, Hollywood managed to dominate international markets because of a worldwide infatuation with the America it both exploited and promoted. Without question, iconic homegrown figures such as Jimmy Stewart, Mae West, Henry Fonda, Shirley Temple, Clark Gable, Jimmy Cagney and John Wayne, in addition to charismatic imports like Charlie Chaplin, Cary Grant and Greta Garbo, projected qualities on screen that came to

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seem quintessentially, irresistibly American. As film critic Richard Grenier aptly commented during a March 1992 symposium:

> Aside from the country's prominence, there seems to have been an irresistible magnetism about a whole assemblage of American attitudes—optimism, hope, belief in progress, profound assumptions of human equality, informality—often more apparent to foreigners than to Americans themselves, that the outside world has found compelling. Over many decades these attitudes became so entrenched in world opinion as 'American' that in recent times, when certain Hollywood films have taken on a distinctly negative tone, America has still retained its dramatic power, Hollywood, as it were, living on its spiritual capital.

Corbis/Bettman

The Sound of Music, 1965

In other words, in its so-called Golden Age, the entertainment industry found a way to make heroism look riveting, even fashionable, and to make decency dramatic. In contrast to the present day, when most of the world watches American pop culture with the sort of guilty fascination we might lavish on a particularly bloody car crash, people in every corner of the globe once looked to our entertainment exports as a source of inspiration, even enlightenment. As the English producer David Puttnam revealed in an eloquent 1989 interview with Bill Moyers, he cherished the days of his childhood when

> the image that was being projected overseas was of a society of which I wanted to be a member. Now cut to twenty years later—the image that America began projecting in the 1970s, of a self-loathing, very violent society, antagonistic within itself—that patently isn't a society that any thinking person in the Third World or Western Europe or Eastern Europe would wish to have anything to do with. America has for some years been exporting an extremely negative notion of itself.

The change came about in part because of a change in the people running the major studios and television networks. As movie historian Neal Gabler perceptively observed in his influential book, *An Empire of Their Own*, Hollywood's founding generation consisted almost entirely of East European immigrant Jews who craved American acceptance so powerfully that they used celluloid fantasies to express their ongoing adoration for their adopted country. Their successors, on the other hand, came from far more "respectable" backgrounds—in some cases as the privileged children and grandchildren of the founders themselves. In the 1960s and 1970s, they sought to establish their independence and artistic integrity by burnishing their countercultural credentials. To illustrate the magnitude and speed of the change, the 1965 Academy Award for Best Picture went to the delightful and traditionally romantic musical, *The Sound of Music*. A mere four years later, that same coveted Oscar went to *Midnight Cowboy*—the gritty story of a

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Photofest

American Beauty, 2000

down-and-out male hustler in New York City, and the only X-rated feature ever to win Best Picture.

From the beginning and through to the present day, the leaders of the entertainment community have felt a powerful need to be taken seriously. The creators of the industry were born outsiders who earned that respect by expressing affection for America; the moguls of the later generations have been for the most part born insiders who earned their respect by expressing their alienation. This negativity naturally found an eager international audience during the Vietnam War era and in the waning years of the Cold War with the widespread dismissal of the "cowboy culture" of Reaganism. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Empire, anti-Americanism remained fashionable among taste-setting elites in much of the world, appealing with equal fervor to critics from the Right and the Left. In Afghanistan in the 1980s, for example, the beleaguered Russian Communists and the indefatigable *mujaheddin* might agree on very little—but they both felt powerful contempt for the freewheeling and self-destructive mores of American culture as promoted everywhere by the Hollywood entertainment machine.

Even as post-Cold War globalization enhanced the economic power and political influence of the United States, it helped the entertainment industry sustain its anti-American attitudes. With the removal of the Iron Curtain, vast new markets opened up for Hollywood entertainment, with developing economies in Asia and Latin America, too, providing hundreds of millions of additional customers. Between 1985 and 1990, inflation-adjusted revenues from overseas markets for U.S. feature films rose 124 percent at a time when domestic proceeds remained relatively flat. As a result, the portion of all movie income derived from foreign distribution rose from 30 percent in 1980 to more than 50 percent in 2000. James G. Robinson, influential chairman of Morgan Creek Productions, was right to have predicted to the *Los Angeles Times* in March 1992: "All of the real growth in the coming years will be overseas."

The fulfillment of his forecast has served to further detach today's producers from any sense of patriotic or parochial identification, encouraging their pose as Americans who have nobly transcended their own Americanism. A current captain of the entertainment industry need not ask whether a putative project will "play in Peoria"—so long as it plays in Paris, St. Petersburg and Panama City. As I argued in the pages of *Hollywood Vs. America* in 1992: "While the populist products of Hollywood's Golden Age most certainly encouraged the world's love affair with America, today's nihilistic and degrading attempts at entertainment may, in the long run, produce the opposite effect, helping to isolate this country as a symbol of diseased decadence."

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Why Do They Watch It?

WITH THAT isolation increasingly apparent after the unprecedented assault of 9/11, the question remains: Why does so much of the world still seem so single-mindedly obsessed with American entertainment, for all its chaotic and unrepresentative elements?

The most likely answer involves what might be described as the "*National Enquirer* appeal" of Hollywood's vision of life in the United States. While waiting in the supermarket checkout lines, we turn to the scandal-ridden tabloids not because of our admiration for the celebrities they expose, but because of our uncomfortable combination of envy and resentment toward them. The tabloids compel our attention because they allow us to feel superior to the rich and famous. For all their wealth and glamor and power, they cannot stay faithful to their spouses, avoid drug addiction, or cover up some other guilty secret. We may privately yearn to change places with some star of the moment, but the weekly revelations of the *National Enquirer* actually work best to reassure us that we are better off as we are.

In much the same way, Hollywood's unpleasant images of America enable the rest of the world to temper inevitable envy with a sense of their own superiority. The United States may be rich in material terms (and movies and television systematically overstate that wealth), but the violence, cruelty, injustice, corruption, arrogance and degeneracy so regularly included in depictions of American life allow viewers abroad to feel fortunate by comparison. Like the *Enquirer* approach to the private peccadilloes of world-striding celebrities, you are supposed to feel fascinated by their profligate squandering of opportunity and power.

In this sense, American pop culture is not so much liberating as it is anarchic and even nihilistic. Our entertainment offerings do not honor our freedom and liberty as political or cultural values so much as they undermine all restraints and guidelines, both the tyrannical and the traditional. As Dwight Macdonald wrote in his celebrated 1953 essay, "A Theory of Mass Culture": "Like 19th century capitalism, Mass Culture is a dynamic, revolutionary force, breaking down the old barriers of class, tradition, taste, and dissolving all cultural distinctions." Amplifying Macdonald's work, Edward Rothstein of the *New York Times* wrote in March 2002: "There is something inherently disruptive about popular culture. It undermines the elite values of aristocratic art, displaces the customs of folk culture and opposes any limitation on art's audiences or subjects. It asserts egalitarian tastes, encourages dissent and does not shun desire." It should come as no surprise, then, that even those who embrace the symbols and themes of American entertainment may feel little gratitude toward a force that casts them loose from all traditional moorings, but offers no organized system of ideas or values by way of replacement.

Patriotism and Profit

IN 1994, I participated in an international conference on the family in Warsaw and listened to the plaintive recollections of a troubled Polish priest. He recalled the days of the Cold War, "when we listened in basements to illegal radios to Radio Free Europe so we could get a little bit of hope, a little bit of truth, from the magical land of America." After the collapse of Communism, however, America's message seemed dangerous and decadent rather than hopeful. "All of a sudden, we're struggling against drugs and free sex and AIDS and crime—and all of that seems to be an import from America. It's like the message of freedom

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that we heard before was only the freedom to destroy ourselves."

On a similar note, an American businessman of my acquaintance traveling in Beirut struck up a conversation with the proprietor of a falafel stand who announced himself an enthusiastic supporter of the radical, pro-Iranian terrorist group, Hizballah. Ironically, his small business featured a faded poster showing a bare-chested, machine-gun toting Sylvester Stallone as Rambo. My friend asked about the place of honor provided to an American movie hero. "We all like Rambo", the Hizballah supporter unblushingly declared. "He is a fighter's fighter." But wouldn't that make the Lebanese dissident more favorably inclined toward the United States, the visitor inquired. "Not at all", was the response. "We will use Rambo's methods to destroy the evil America."

This love-hate relationship with Hollywood's twisted imagery also characterized the 19 conspirators who made such a notable attempt to "destroy evil America" with their September 11 atrocities. During their months and years in the United States, Mohammed Atta and his colleagues savored the popular culture—renting action videos and visiting bars, peep shows, lap dancing parlors and Las Vegas—immersing themselves in Western degradation to stiffen their own hatred (and self-hatred?) of it.

In response to the terrorist attacks and to the onset of the war that followed, leaders of the Hollywood community expressed some dawning awareness that they may have indeed contributed to some of the hatred of America expressed around the world. Beyond a brief flurry of flag-waving, and the generous contributions to the 9/11 fund by leading celebrities from Julia Roberts to Jim Carrey, members of the entertainment elite showed a new willingness to cooperate with the defense establishment. Working through the Institute for Creative Technologies at USC (originally created to enlist Hollywood talent for shaping virtual reality simulators for military training), creators of movies like *Die Hard*, *Fight Club* and even *Being John Malkovich* brainstormed with Pentagon brass. Their purpose, according to several press reports, involved an attempt to concoct the next possible plot that might be launched against the United States, and then to devise strategies to counteract it.

In a sense, this unconventional program acknowledged the fact that violent, demented, anti-social and conspiratorial thinking has come to characterize a major segment of the entertainment establishment. How else could an objective observer interpret the idea that the military turned first to millionaire screenwriters in order to understand the thought processes of mass-murdering terrorists?

Beyond this strange collaboration, top show business executives met with Karl Rove, political representative of President Bush, in an attempt to mobilize Hollywood creativity to serve America in the war against terror. The well-publicized "summit" discussed public service ads to discourage bigotry against Muslims in America and additional productions to give the United States a more benign image in the Islamic world. A handful of top directors, including William Friedkin (*The French Connection*, *The Exorcist* and the excellent *Rules of Engagement*) expressed their willingness to drop all their pressing projects and enlist full-time to help the American war effort. In this determination, these pop culture patriots hoped to follow the example of the great Golden Age director Frank Capra, who served his country during World War II through the creation of the epic *Why We Fight* series.

Alas, the White House and the Pentagon failed to take advantage of the self-sacrificing spirit of the moment, or to

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pursue the entertainment industry opportunities that presented themselves after September 11. As the trauma of terrorist attacks gradually recedes into memory and the nation loses focus on its sense of patriotic purpose, the popular culture is displaying few long-term changes. Perhaps a more positive attitude toward the military may be the chief legacy of the deadly attacks—an attitude publicly celebrated so far in a handful of movies (*Behind Enemy Lines*, *Black Hawk Down*, *We Were Soldiers*), incidentally, all produced before the September 11 catastrophe. More significant changes, involving a new sense of responsibility for the images of America that pop culture transmits around the world, never even merited serious discussion in Hollywood. For the top entertainment conglomerates, this may count as an unseized opportunity for public service, but also a missed chance for corporate profit.

In his February speech in Beijing, President Bush held the Chinese students transfixed with a picture of America that departed dramatically from the visions they had received from made-in-USA music, movies and television. "America is a nation guided by faith", the President declared. "Someone once called us 'a nation with the soul of a church.' This may interest you—95 percent of Americans say they believe in God, and I'm one of them." Bush went on to appeal to the family priorities that have characterized Chinese culture for more than 3,000 years: "Many of the values that guide our life in America are first shaped in our families, just as they are in your country. American moms and dads love their children and work hard and sacrifice for them because we believe life can always be better for the next generation. In our families, we find love and learn responsibility and character."

If Hollywood's leaders placed themselves within the context of the wider American family, they might also learn responsibility and character—and discover that a more wholesome, loving and balanced portrayal of the nation they serve could enhance rather than undermine their worldwide popularity. □

What Love's Got to Do With It

Upon every other stage the universal agent is love, by whose power all good and evil is distributed, and every action quickened or retarded. To bring a lover, a lady, and a rival into the fable; to entangle them in contradictory obligations, perplex them with oppositions of interest, and harrass them with violence of desires inconsistent with each other; to make them meet in rapture and part in agony; to fill their mouths with hyperbolical joy and outrageous sorrow; to distress them as nothing human ever was distressed; to deliver them as nothing human ever was delivered; is the business of a modern dramatist. For this probability is violated, life is misrepresented, and language is depraved.

—Samuel Johnson, "Preface to Shakespeare" (1765)

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After Guantanamo

The War Over the Geneva Convention

Jeremy Rabkin

BRITISH TABLOIDS blasted the story around the world: The Americans had removed Al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners to a secret torture camp in Cuba! Photographs showed prisoners gagged and shackled, and crammed into cells exposed to the elements. Amnesty International demanded immediate access to the scene of these abuses. Mary Robinson, the UN Commissioner for Human Rights, chimed in, along with other prominent human rights advocates and a supporting chorus of left-wing politicians in Europe. Unwilling to be left behind, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), self-declared "guardian" of the Geneva Convention on the treatment of war prisoners, weighed in with its own expressions of outrage.

The furor died down in less than a week as the facts became known. The prisoners, some of whom had been involved in a violent prison revolt in Afghanistan, had been restrained in transit but not within their prison cells in Guantanamo. Officials from the ICRC who visited the site soon confirmed that prisoners were receiving adequate food and medical attention, and that their makeshift prison offered no less protection from the elements than the hastily constructed facilities set up for their American guards.

It was left only to wrangle about legal details. The ICRC, along with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, insisted that the prisoners deserved the full protections accorded prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions. After some initial verbal clutter, the Bush Administration maintained that terrorists were not technically prisoners of war, but that they would nevertheless be treated by the standards set down in the Geneva Conventions whenever possible. This did not satisfy the ICRC. "There are divergent views between the United States and the ICRC", officials in Geneva reported, vowing to "pursue dialogue" on the legal issues even as they acknowledged that there was no humanitarian crisis at Guantanamo.

The whole episode could be chalked up to typical European carping at American "unilateralism", enabled, if not created, by irresponsible slash-and-burn journalism. But the fracas says something important about the changing character of international law. This episode should warn the wise that ambitious new versions of international law are likely to become a continuing source of mischief in the world, and much trouble to the United States.

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Whence the Laws of War?

THE IMMEDIATE source of law in the Guantanamo dispute is the third Geneva Convention of 1949, which concerns the treatment of war prisoners. Three other conventions were launched at the same time (on the treatment of wounded and sick combatants in the field; on the treatment of wounded, sick and shipwrecked combatants captured in naval war; and on the protection of civilians in occupied territory). The provisions in these four treaties were for the most part clarifications and elaborations of the Geneva Conventions of 1929, which in turn sought to elaborate and clarify standards agreed at The Hague Peace Conferences of 1906 and 1899. The underlying impulse for all of this is usually traced to the Geneva Convention of 1864, the first treaty to recognize a specially protected role for Red Cross medical services in wartime. (The International Red Cross had been established in Geneva only shortly beforehand and was instrumental in convening the 1864 conference.)

The dispute over the Guantanamo prisoners, then, is a dispute about treaty law—but treaty law with a history. It is worth our while to briefly review that history, for only in its light can we see how inventive the ICRC's current interpretation of the law really is.

That history indeed goes back further than the 19th-century conferences that gave formal recognition to restraints in the conduct of war. Yet restraint had not always been accepted practice. In medieval Europe, the sacking of towns and fortresses was regarded as a necessary reward for soldiers after the rigors of a siege, and a useful warning to the next target to surrender short of a siege. As late as the 16th century, Spanish theologians claimed to be applying the principles of St. Thomas Aquinas in justifying massacre and rape as an acceptable form of punishment for those who took the wrong side in a just war.

But unrestrained war of this kind seemed safely in the past by the mid-19th century. Wars had long since come to be the undertakings of professional armies, funded and directed by well-organized states that were generally eager to minimize injury to private property and ongoing commerce. It was widely accepted that states should respect certain limits and proprieties in war, especially in their treatment of captive enemy soldiers and civilians, well before the treaty conferences in Geneva and at The Hague. The prevailing conception of war was so gentlemanly that both Hague Conventions acknowledged the customary practice of releasing enemy officers on "parole"—that is, their word as gentlemen not to escape or return to fighting, but be neutralized by their capture.

Indeed, by the 19th century, neutrality itself had achieved a considerable degree of moral prestige, as neutral powers were conceived by most European statesmen and jurists as standing aloof from the political intrigues and calculations of petty marginal advantage in the foreign ministries of warring states. The neutral power could thus be identified with the higher claims of humanity at large. Geneva and The Hague were thus thought to be especially appropriate sites for conferences on the laws of war precisely because Switzerland and Holland were neutral states.

The same conferences that polished up humanitarian standards for captives also sought to lay down broader limitations on the conduct of war—for example, against the use of submarines to sink merchant ships even of the enemy power. Restrictions were also negotiated on the size of artillery shells and the types of rifle bullets permissible in war. Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan, one of the American del-

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egates to the 1899 Hague conference, cautioned (regarding a ban on dropping bombs from aerial balloons) that improved weapons, by "localizing at important points the destruction of life", might well "diminish the [overall] evils of war and [so] support the humanitarian considerations we have in view."[1] But he was ignored by Europeans eager to experiment with what we would now call arms control.

Most of these experiments in mutual restraint were promptly abandoned amid the pressures of the First World War. The Germans ignored restrictions on submarine warfare in their determination to starve Britain of aid and supplies. The Allies imposed their own naval blockade to starve Germany and Austria of supplies—including food for civilians. World War II was still worse. Disregarding interwar agreements that sought to revive limits on submarine warfare, the American and British navies adopted a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare against Japanese merchant shipping. Disregarding agreements on the protection of civilians, British and American bombers devastated the cities of Germany and Japan from the air, with little pretense of focusing on "military" as opposed to "civilian" targets. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died, even before the culmination of these efforts at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Such ferocity could be defended as lawful reprisal for enemy aggression or for treaty violations by the enemy, releasing the Allies from their own commitments. But the truth is that Western governments were not much concerned about legal niceties in the midst of all-out war.

The hallowed idea of neutrality just barely survived World War II. In a struggle that was seen so clearly as a battle of good against evil, nobody on the winning side expressed admiration for states that had remained neutral. For several years the Soviets objected to admitting Ireland to the United Nations; members were required to be "peace-loving" and the Irish refusal to join the war against Hitler showed, said the Soviets, that Ireland was not reliably in favor of peace. Traditionally neutral states that had been overrun without serious resistance—Holland, Norway and Denmark—were chastened by the experience and readily joined the Atlantic Alliance after the war. Even Switzerland was condemned for trading with the Nazis rather than admired for holding itself aloof.

And yet some laws of war did survive, notably those covering the treatment of prisoners. Neither Stalin's Soviet Union nor the Japanese warlords professed to be bound by the 1929 Geneva Convention and neither expected any mercy from their enemies. But Germany remained a signatory and did honor its obligations toward fellow signatories—though not out of any sense of reverence for international legality. American and British (including British Commonwealth) prisoners were, with some exceptions, reasonably well treated by the Germans, even as their non-"Anglo" prisoners—and all prisoners of the Japanese—were horribly abused (or simply murdered). The reason for the restraint in the case of the Anglo-American war with Germany was a sense of reciprocal obligation and thus mutual deterrence. General Alfred Jodl testified at Nuremberg that Hitler had demanded the

[1]The State Department cautioned American delegates in these terms: "The expediency of restraining the inventive genius of our people in the direction of devising means of defense is by no means clear and considering the temptations to which men and nations may be exposed in a time of conflict, it is doubtful if an international agreement to this end would prove effective." See Calvin DeArmond Davis, *The United States and the First Hague Peace Conference* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

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execution of captured Allied airmen in 1943 in retaliation for the devastating incendiary bombing of German cities. But Hitler's military staff evaded and finally buried this directive, fearing that it would trigger retaliation in kind against German prisoners in Allied hands.

Thanks to this history, it did not seem altogether hopeless to restore the Geneva Conventions after World War II. Indeed, it seemed only prudent—and so, by 1949, it was done. The 1949 conventions were not honored by the North Koreans or the Chinese in the Korean War, nor by the Hanoi government in the Vietnam conflict. But even in these wars, communist authorities did not massacre American prisoners *en masse*. If they held them as bargaining chips, rather than as vessels of sacred humanity, communist governments still saw mutual restraint as being in their interest, much as the Nazis had recognized during World War II.

The same logic of reciprocity and restraint pertains today, but do circumstances allow that logic to function? It is certainly in America's interest to adhere to these conventions when others also do so. But where does that leave us in a war with terrorist organizations and states that nurture them? Can humanitarian laws of war function with enemies who disdain the very idea of humanitarian restraint?

Practical Matters

THE OFFICIAL position of the U.S. government is that prisoners at Guantanamo are not "prisoners of war" in the sense of the Geneva Convention, and they are not therefore entitled to claim the protection of every provision in the convention. The International Committee of the Red Cross and leading human rights groups, however—and, as of April 28, the British government, as well—insist that they are prisoners of war or should at least have the presumption of such status, with denials of such status to be determined on the basis of individual trials.[2] Since the U.S. government insists that it will treat the prisoners humanely—and the ICRC has confirmed that it is doing so—this dispute may seem a pointless quibble.

But it is not pointless, and it is more than a quibble. The designation of being a prisoner of war carries a certain sense of respectability. A prisoner of war is not a criminal, because soldiering is not inherently criminal. We may not want to say the same about terrorist forces, and there is clear precedent for this attitude. The Western Allies treated soldiers of the Wehrmacht as men who were simply doing their duty, while SS troops were treated as members of what was designated a "criminal organization"—and thousands were sentenced to postwar imprisonment on that basis or detained much longer than ordinary German POWs.

Clearly, then, apart from moral and symbolic issues, serious practical matters are at stake in the current war. Among the most important are the implications for the interrogation of prisoners.

As everyone recalls from old war

[2]Even those who advocate broader protections still want to make certain moral distinctions. In 1977, many governments agreed to an additional protocol to the Geneva Conventions (Protocol I) extending protections to fighters in national liberation struggles, even when not connected to a recognized state. At the insistence of Castro's Cuba, then assisting such struggles in Africa, "mercenary" troops were excluded from coverage. The Cubans wanted soldiers of fortune hired by the South African government excluded from protection, and they got their way. The United States has never ratified this protocol and, despite arguments advanced by some human rights advocates, cannot plausibly be bound by it—so it has no relevance to American policy toward "volunteers" in international terror campaigns.

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movies, prisoners of war are required only to give "name, rank and serial number"—or, as the 1949 Convention adds (as an alternate means of identification), "date of birth." Human Rights Watch insists that this limitation does not prevent prisoners from volunteering more information, nor prohibit prison officials from seeking more. But the convention expressly stipulates that prisoners of war may not be "threatened, insulted or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." The convention goes into considerable detail in trying to exclude unnecessarily "unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment." Prisoners of war, for example, are to have access to "canteens" where they "may procure foodstuffs, soap and tobacco and ordinary articles in daily use." They must be allowed to retain or receive money to buy such things, even if the money has to be provided by the detaining power as an advance on regular pay. Prisoners must also be allowed their own cooking facilities to make use of little extras they may acquire.

As it happens, no such facilities exist in Guantanamo, and this is objectively helpful. It makes the job of interrogators easier if such comforts are not provided as of right but can instead be used as bargaining chips to induce cooperation.

Similarly, the convention envisions that prisoners will be housed together and be allowed to participate as a group in recreational, cultural and religious activities. Prisoners who want to lead prayer services with fellow prisoners are guaranteed the right to do so. At Guantanamo, prisoners have been isolated in individual cells and the U.S. Army supplies its own Muslim chaplains for individual prayer sessions.

The problem is that when a prisoner is being questioned, it is useful for interrogators to suggest that others have already talked. It may make a big difference (both for psychological and practical reasons) for the prisoner to know whether this is so; there is a good reason that social scientists often invoke the "prisoner's dilemma" as a model for decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. As a matter of security, too, it is much harder to plot an uprising or a mass escape if you cannot communicate easily with fellow prisoners. In the makeshift cells at Guantanamo, it has not been possible to keep prisoners from communicating with each other by calling out from their open-air enclosures. But more permanent facilities may make fuller isolation feasible. It thus remains a serious issue whether respect for the Geneva Convention should be understood as a legal obstacle to such practices on the part of the prison administration.

Perhaps most importantly, the Geneva Convention requires that prisoners be "released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." It will not be easy to say when "active hostilities" have ceased where the opposing "power" is a non-state terrorist organization. Nor will it be a simple matter to say when it may be safe to return members of an international terrorist network to roam free again. The convention does allow for individual prisoners to be tried and punished for war crimes they may have committed prior to capture, such as direct participation in terror attacks on civilians. But it is very hard to assemble information about the past activities of individual prisoners captured with a terrorist force. It will be especially hard if, as the ICRC and human rights groups insist, prisoners are presumptively "lawful combatants" until individually proven otherwise, so that each may retreat to name, rank and serial number.

All such practical considerations are dismissed by the ICRC and most human rights groups, however. They argue that if the United States says it is making "war", then the prisoners it takes should be con-

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sidered, at least presumptively, prisoners of war until an individual can be shown by a competent judicial tribunal to be a terrorist. It should not matter, they say, whether Al-Qaeda or Taliban forces adhere to all or even any of the requirements of the Geneva Conventions so long as they are organized participants in what the United States itself regards as a war. To pick and choose among the protections we offer will "provide cover to other governments to ignore human rights standards", as Amnesty International argues, and, as Human Rights Watch warns, "put soldiers around the world at risk."

From Contract to Folly

THE UNDERLYING premise of such arguments is that the "humanitarian laws of war" are now part of general human rights law. In the mid-1990s, the United Nations published the Geneva Conventions in the same volume with the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Convention Against Torture, and some ninety other general human rights treaties adopted since World War II. No one says that these other protections can be suspended just because some signatories fail to uphold them. The ICRC insists, therefore, that the requirements of the Geneva Convention are "unilaterally binding."

This sounds sensible enough, but it makes the text and history of the conventions unintelligible. Each of the four conventions is proclaimed in the name of "the High Contracting Parties"—that is, the states that subscribe—and the provisions are expressly limited to "parties" on the understanding that the conventions are "contracts." So if "one of the Powers" engaged in a war is not a party to the convention, others in the war who are "parties" to the convention "remain bound by it in their mutual relations"—but not bound to it in relation to the non-party unless "the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereof." This is the original idea of a treaty. A treaty, as *The Federalist* (No. 64) explained in 1788, "is only another name for a bargain." At the heart of the Geneva Conventions is this bargain: fight according to these professional rules and we will treat you with professional respect.

The main rules for defining combatant status go back to The Hague Convention of 1899. They are not based on ancient ideas of rank and courtesy. Rather, the rules were drawn up at conferences at which military officers were not merely present as observers, but constantly at the elbow of the diplomats and lawyers as full participants for what they could provide by way of practical advice. The rules thus rest pre-eminently on practical considerations. The rules allow even "militias" or "other volunteer corps" to qualify for POW status—if they belong to a "party to the conflict"—even if not part of regular armies. But to qualify as a lawful combatant, an individual fighter must be "commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates." One obvious reason for this is that the opposing army, if it is going to treat a captive with all the courtesies of a prisoner of war, must be sure that the captive will behave like a prisoner rather than an infiltrator ready to attack his guards the moment they turn their backs. Surrender is reliable only when those claiming to give up actually answer to the command of a superior who has ordered them to lay down their arms.

So, too, a "lawful combatant" must "carry arms openly" and also carry a "fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance" (that is, a uniform or insignia). An opposing army cannot respect the claims of non-combatants if it cannot discern who they are. The other criteria are encompassed in the final requirement that all lawful combatants must "fulfill the conditions" of "conducting their

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operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war." Armies are not required to respect the "laws and customs of war" against enemies seeking special advantage by exempting themselves from those laws.

Historically, the most common categories denied the protections of POW status (apart from pirates and robber bands) were spies and saboteurs operating out of uniform. The U.S. Supreme Court hastily approved the conviction of German saboteurs by secret military commission in 1942. Death sentences were imposed, even though the half-hearted efforts of these saboteurs, landed by submarine on Long Island, did no damage in the United States. No one thought it strange that the two Germans who cooperated with investigators were spared execution as a reward for their cooperation. By the same token, postwar American war crimes tribunals dismissed charges against German officers who had executed Yugoslav partisans for sabotage efforts. It was held that because the partisans did not have clearly marked insignia, indicating their status as lawful combatants, killing them was not a war crime. Military courts were not willing to endorse the notion that saboteurs and secret partisans had the same status as lawful combatants.

The underlying bargain here rests most of all on the assumption that an organized army can be neutralized by its surrender. Valuable information might be gained by closely questioning surrendered troops, but armies have been willing to forego the right to pressure POWs into talking in order to assure respectful treatment when their own troops are taken prisoner. The calculus always looked different for bands of spies, saboteurs or secret agents operating behind enemy lines, where pressing for information seemed absolutely crucial because secrecy, more than massed formation, was the essential precondition for the success of such enemy activity.

If the protections of the Geneva Convention are regarded as reciprocal concessions by the "contracting parties"—the states sponsoring the forces in conflict—then systematic violations by one side release the other side from its obligations. The opposing side can rightly claim to be *strengthening* international standards by denying legitimacy to forces that systematically violate the laws of war. If the convention is seen as a statement of universal human rights standards, however, then every individual prisoner has some claim to these protections unless it can be shown that he was personally operating in violation of the rules.

The idea of universal human rights norms was certainly known to the diplomats and generals who gathered in Geneva in 1949. The year before, the United Nations General Assembly had, with much fanfare, proclaimed a "Universal Declaration of Human Rights" premised on the idea that the world recognized basic rights for all human beings. Most of the governments negotiating the 1949 Geneva Conventions no doubt regarded universal human rights as a fine idea, and wished well to the machinery established in the UN Charter to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war." But they did not regard these new projects as sufficient reason to sacrifice the more tangible benefits of the traditional rules of war. To this day, UN human rights norms have no means of enforcement. But the laws of war always had some means of enforcement through the natural and logical operation of reciprocity.

If the obligations are entirely binding, regardless of what the other side does, the whole scheme looks quite different. A reprisal or response then becomes as bad as the initial violation that provoked it. By that sort of reasoning, it would always be wrong to use terrible weapons or even threaten their use. So much, then, for

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deterrence. It is a view that makes sense, if at all, only to those who see themselves as standing entirely above or apart from the conflict, or as answering to some authority positioned above the actual forces in conflict. In other words, it demands the return of the old idea of neutrality.

That is, of course, precisely where the ICRC and human rights groups position themselves. As an official ICRC publication puts it, "the basic principles underlying [international humanitarian] law—humanity, impartiality and neutrality—are as valid as ever and certainly still of the utmost relevance."[3] That brings us to the deepest issues in the war on terrorism.

The Lightness of Neutrals

CONTEMPORARY human rights groups demand a neutral forum for adjudicating abuses, an international criminal court where the decision to press charges will be left entirely to an independent international prosecutor. Actually, it will not be left entirely to the prosecutor, for new procedural rules allow "victims" to appeal the decision of the prosecutor not to seek an indictment. This means that advocacy groups like the ICRC, mobilizing on behalf of victims, will have legal as well as political forums to press their views. As it happens, violations of the laws of war, including mistreatment of prisoners, are very much in the jurisdiction of the new court, so disputes like the one over the Guantanamo detainees may one day be pursued by a prosecutor at The Hague. The court would also have jurisdiction over crimes of "aggression" and broadly defined "war crimes", so American decisions to strike at terrorist bases or the countries harboring them could also trigger indictments.

Nobody imagined such a thing in the late 1940s when the current Geneva Conventions were negotiated. Certainly, nobody imagined that the ICRC would play a prominent role in arraigning offenders against the laws of war. The ICRC had never done that sort of thing before, and its wartime record did not suggest that it had either the inclination or the capacity to do so. During the war, the ICRC performed with reasonable efficiency in its traditional role, discreetly conveying inspectors' reports from prison camps to the opposing European powers. To win the trust of both sides, it reported abuses of prisoners to home states, but it did not trumpet its findings to the world. And it said precisely nothing about the Nazi extermination camps, though it had considerable information about them. Much has been made in recent years about the failure of the Vatican to protest the Nazi Holocaust. But the ICRC's conduct was no better and in some ways worse. Whatever may be said about Pope Pius XII, at least he did not voice public praise for the SS. From its headquarters in Geneva—a much safer place than Rome—the International Red Cross published commendations of the German Red Cross, even when the German chapter was directed by an SS doctor who conducted ghoulish experiments on concentration camp victims.

No doubt, the ICRC had its reasons. It did not want to compromise its role as a discreet go-between in the monitoring of prisoner-of-war camps. The Swiss government, with which the ICRC had always been closely associated, was itself eager to maintain good relations with Germany, and was fearful of being "swamped" by a "flood" of Jewish refugees. But whatever the reasons, the ICRC did not emerge from the war as an inspiring example of humanitarian achievement.[4] The Geneva

[3] Yves Sandoz, *The International Committee of the Red Cross as guardian of international humanitarian law* (Geneva: ICRC, 1998), p. 12.

[4] The record of the ICRC in World War II is reviewed in Caroline Moorehead, *Dunant's*

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Conventions acknowledge in passing the ICRC's role as a monitor, but they do not make cooperation with it mandatory and they certainly do not establish the ICRC as the definitive arbiter of compliance with the conventions.

Partly because the ICRC remained cautious about its own role until relatively recently, a new set of conflict monitors arose in the 1970s and 1980s and quickly achieved much more prominence. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and Médecins sans Frontières were much louder and more insistent in their denunciations of abuses because they were willing to provoke the hostility of governments. The ICRC has tried to reclaim leadership with public denunciations of its own in recent years, as in its very public and premature condemnation of American practices at Guantanamo.

But the prestige of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch owes much to the period in which they arose. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, much Western opinion inclined to the view that the United States was acting the role of a bully in Southeast Asia. During the 1980s, much Western opinion inclined to the same view regarding American involvement in the nasty guerrilla wars of Central America. In the 1990s, the collapse of communism in Europe seemed to leave much scope for reform and improvement, but no enemy deeply threatened the United States or the West as a whole. In such a world it was easy for human rights groups to maintain a lofty detachment and retain their prestige as neutral moral arbiters.

For most Americans, September 11 changed all that. President Bush speaks of terrorist networks and the regimes that sponsor or harbor them as "evil." Countries that are not "with us" are to be regarded as "against us." There is not much patience for neutrality in these formulations. But that is almost beside the point. In truth, those who planned the attacks on the World Trade Center and those who nurtured them have no interest in "humanitarian law." Islamist radicals do not think of war as a conflict between states from which ordinary humanity should, as much as possible, be spared. They think of war as an all-out contest between peoples, so that American civilians (or, in the counterpart struggle in the Middle East, Israeli civilians) are no less legitimate targets than uniformed soldiers. Neither age nor sex nor disability makes any difference. The aim is simply to punish a whole society for its sins. The preconditions for reciprocal restraint are wholly absent.

The United States must not sink to the level of its adversaries, of course. Regardless of whether our restraint is reciprocated, the United States will need to observe some restraints for the sake of its own self-respect. Nobody, for example, suggests that the prisoners at Guantanamo should simply be executed without trial. But in a war against barbarism, it is hard to operate at all times within the gentlemanly code of the Victorian peace conferences that codified the modern law of war. In World War II, when the United States conceived itself at war with total barbarism, American bombers reigned merciless destruction on the cities of Germany and Japan. Michael Walzer argued decades later that this tactic was morally indefensible, and a serious case can be made for his claim—though a strong case can also be made for the answering claim that, in the final analysis, American bombing (including the use of atomic bombs on Japan) hastened the enemy's surrender and so saved lives overall.[5] There is room for legitimate debate about the restraints that

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Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (London: HarperCollins, 1998).

[5]Walzer's views appear in *Just and Unjust Wars* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), which argues

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should be observed even in a war with a very dangerous and unrestrained enemy. But imagine how Americans would have reacted during World War II if "neutral" advocates of humanitarian restraint had set themselves up as official arbiters of American war policy. In fact, during the Battle of Britain, the ICRC did offer to monitor civilian damage inflicted by British and German bombers. Churchill rejected any such neutral monitoring role:

> It would simply result in a Committee under German influence or fear, reporting at the very best that it was six of one and half-a-dozen of the other. It is even very likely they would report that we had committed the major breaches. Anyhow, we do not want these people thrusting themselves in, as even if Germany offered to stop the bombing now, we should not consent to it. Bombing of military objectives, increasingly widely interpreted, seems at present our main road home.[6]

Today's ICRC would deny that it is neutral in quite the way it was during the war against Nazi Germany. The ICRC and other advocacy groups were certainly quick to denounce the bombing of the World Trade Center last fall. But they are also eager to maintain credibility with Islamic opinion and with the larger trend of leftist opinion that instinctively sides with "oppressed people" and assumes Western wrongdoing in every conflict with non-Western peoples. So, for example, both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch insist that "international law" requires that all Palestinians be assured the right to return to the places where their grandparents or great-grandparents may have lived in what is now Israel—a demand that even governments in Europe, which are very sympathetic to Palestinian claims, do not make. The ICRC has for decades allowed Islamic medical services to affiliate as "Red Crescent" rather than "Red Cross" services but refuses to acknowledge Israel's "Red Star of David" service because it lacks an authorized insignia. Meanwhile, during the recent fighting on the West Bank, the ICRC repeatedly condemned Israel for interfering with Palestinian Red Crescent ambulances—before finally warning the Palestinians not to use these vehicles to sneak weapons and fighters past Israeli checkpoints as they have continually done. Indeed, the ICRC is so receptive to Islamist opinion that last fall a staff officer in Geneva circulated within the organization a report that the attack on the World Trade Center had probably been organized by Israeli intelligence because Jews working at the WTC had stayed home from work on that day.

But the political inclination of individuals in these organizations is not the point. In a war on shadowy terror networks, human rights advocates simply cannot provide even-handed monitoring on both sides. One of the attractions of terror as a strategic weapon is that actual attacks involve very small groups whose support structure can be disguised: states that sponsor or cooperate with these networks can deny their involvement. Human rights groups do not have intelligence services that allow them to shed light on these connections. But they can publicize what they regard as American abuses, because the United States is much more open about most of its operations. Similarly, advocacy groups can hope to affect American opinion, while their influence on dictatorial states like Iraq is effectively nil.

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that the bombing of German civilians might have been justified, if at all, only in the early stages of the war to stave off Allied defeat, but not after 1942. For a defense of the strategic value of Allied bombing, see Richard Overy, *Why the Allies Won* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995).

[6]Churchill quoted in Martin Gilbert, *Winston Churchill, Vol. VI: Finest Hour, 1939–1941* (New York: Henry Holt, 1992), p. 832.

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What is true for the monitoring activities of such groups is even more true for the International Criminal Court. Having received strong support from European governments, the 1998 treaty for the Court has now received sufficient ratifications to take effect. It will start operations in July. The Court will not be able to apprehend any terrorist or anyone else on its own, and terrorists will obviously find it much easier to hide than travelling American (or Israeli) officials. Moreover, the moral onus of an indictment will surely have more political weight—to say the least—against democratic states. After all, would Saddam Hussein be more dismayed by an ICC indictment than by a Security Council condemnation? Would Al-Qaeda leaders care in the least?

Another problem is that the Court can only deal with those proven guilty of precise crimes. What if a leader of a terrorist operation is acquitted of the precise charges before the court because concrete evidence is insufficient for legal standards of proof? Will the terrorist then be released? Will his comrades and followers also be released on the same ground? It will not be easy to disarm terror networks if the detention of their operatives can only be continued when a judge in The Hague finds them guilty of precise crimes. But, like it or not, the ICC is now a fact, and it is likely to reinforce trends in European opinion that complicate American policy. Among other things, the existence of the ICC will strengthen the notion that there really is a higher law of humanity, binding on everyone, and that supposedly unbiased, neutral judges have the moral authority to enforce this law.

Meanwhile, the active role of advocacy groups is also a fact. In western Europe in particular, criticism of American policy from Amnesty International and the ICRC immediately won an attentive hearing. The United States must expect to be criticized. It has reason to cooperate with the ICRC, as it has in Guantanamo, to dispel slanders against actual American policy.

But the United States also needs to remind Europeans that wars cannot always be fought by gentlemanly rules—not when the enemy disdains all civilized restraint. Europeans may need reminding on this point because, the British excepted, most of them did not do much fighting in the last great war against barbarism—or did their fighting on the side of barbarism—and now regard actual war as something done only by other, less ennobled people. Contemporary Europe has reverted in many ways to the moral complacency characteristic of neutral Holland before each of the world wars.

APART FROM Britain and Turkey, European states are unlikely to be serious military allies for the United States. But to retain a place in the community of civilized states, European nations still need to remember those very important security obligations that they still can satisfy. Most of those directly involved in the September 11 attacks spent much time planning, consulting and training for their missions in European cities. And European governments remain reluctant to undertake arrests and investigations on the scale required to stop future terrorists from refitting and regrouping in Europe. Their devotion to unilateral and decontextualized standards of human rights has made Europe a haven for those who care least of all for such rights.[7]

Yes, constitutional states must respect certain limits. But as Justice Robert Jackson famously put it, a "constitutional bill of rights" cannot be interpreted as "a

[7]See Michael Radu, "The Problem of 'Londonistan': Europe, Human Rights and Terrorists", Foreign Policy Research Institute, April 12, 2002.

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suicide pact."[8] He wrote that only a few years after his return from service as chief U.S. prosecutor at the Nuremberg war crimes trials, which perhaps helped to clarify his perspective on what a constitutional state cannot do and what it must do. Yes, the United States owes "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind", as the American Declaration of Independence puts it. But the U.S. government remains responsible to its own people when deciding how to defend them. That is also in the Declaration of Independence.

We should do everything we can to encourage European cooperation in the struggle against terrorism. But we cannot delegate our own decisions about national defense to prosecutors in The Hague or moral monitors in Geneva any more than we would give final word on these matters to the spiritual admonitions of the Pope in Rome. The dispute about our detention policies in Guantanamo is a harbinger of serious emerging differences with our European friends. It is important to clarify the moral and legal grounds of the American position in that dispute. It is unlikely to be the last time in this war when we will have to assert our right to an independent policy. □

[8] *Terminiello v. Chicago*, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) at 37.

Talk Club

At the U.S. Army's interrogation school [in Fort Huachuca, Arizona] Staff Sgt. Giersdorf, a veteran intelligence-operative who speaks Arabic, Czech and Russian, is teaching new recruits to extract information from al Qaeda and other captive foes. The job, he tells his students, 'is just a hair's-breadth away from being an illegal specialty under the Geneva Convention.'. . . Soldiers study 30 techniques to make prisoners crack. One is the simple 'incentive approach.' Around the world, 'everyone smokes', Sgt. Giersdorf tells students. 'If you've ever talked to a captured Arab who hasn't smoked for two hours, a pack of smokes can get you a long way.'. . .

The students get a day's training in the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which govern the treatment of prisoners during wartime, and are cautioned that violating the treaty could bring prosecution. That means there are some lines they can't cross—no truth serum, or physical or mental coercion, according to Army lawyers.

On the other hand, even the International Committee of the Red Cross, which monitors compliance with the treaty, says there's room for interpretation. . . . Thus, Sgt. Giersdorf tells students, 'You can put a source in any position you want. You can chain his legs to the chair, you can handcuff his hands behind him', force him to stand at attention or have military police thrust him to the ground. 'If [a prisoner] says it hurts, is it torture?' he asks.

'Yes', say several students.

'No, it's not', the sergeant corrects. America's allies, he says, go farther, placing prisoners into what he calls 'stress positions' until they talk. Those aren't taught here, he is quick to add, but 'if you work with the Brits or the Dutch or the Germans, they can show you all about it.'

—Jess Bravin, *Wall Street Journal*, April 29, 2002

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The Political Roots of Poverty

The Economic Logic of Autocracy

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita & Hilton L. Root

THE EVENTS of September 11, 2001 have led, among many other things, to the revival of an old debate about the relationship between poverty and political extremism. To get at the root of apocalyptic terrorism, many new initiatives to reduce global poverty have been proposed. British International Development Secretary Clare Short advocates a massive international effort to stop poor countries from becoming breeding grounds for terrorism: "The conditions which bred their bitterness and hatred", she has said, "are linked to poverty and injustice." Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, has called for a fifty-year Marshall Plan that would disperse aid in exchange for an end to bad government, in his words, for "the developing countries pursuing corruption-free policies for stability, opening up trade and encouraging private investment." Some advocates call for spending targets to be directly linked to the GDP of donor nations, overlooking selectivity or effectiveness. Even more ambitious proposals call for an international tax to limit the adverse consequences of globalization by financing global public goods.

The presumed connection between poverty and terrorism raises general fears of global class warfare—but are these fears justified? The argument that poverty directly causes terrorism is simple-minded. A more compelling argument can be made that *rising* levels of material well-being, and with them expectations of social and personal empowerment, actually fuel political extremism and violence.[1] It cannot be refuted, however, that most of the countries incubating terrorism tend to be on the low end of the per capita income spectrum, nor that "poverty and injustice"—and these are *not* the same—fuel resentment of the powerful and wealthy to the extent that terrorism can attract admiration and even peripheral support. And it is certainly true that bad government is a problem so serious that no effort at poverty alleviation can succeed without facing it.

Whatever the motives or the depth of understanding underlying them, new efforts are afoot to tackle global poverty through greater funding of economic aid programs, and the Bush Administration is

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[1] See Daniel Pipes, "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?", *The National Interest* (Winter 2001/02).

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contributing to those efforts. Its proposals on development, if carried out, could represent a significant milestone in the way aid is allocated in the future. The President affirmed that "Poverty doesn't cause terrorism. Being poor doesn't make you a murderer. Most of the plotters of September 11th were raised in comfort." But he added that "persistent poverty and oppression can lead to hopelessness and despair, and when governments fail to meet the most basic needs of their people, these failed states can become havens for terror."[2] Thus, the administration has agreed to raise the level of U.S. foreign economic assistance considerably, but, at the same time, insists on conditions that can produce some reasonable assurance that the money will not be wasted. In a sense, the administration has adopted a kind of market-based aid program kindred in spirit to that of Gordon Brown's. It proposes, in essence, a contract with the governments of the world's poorest countries: Cease the practices that keep the vast majority of your people poor, and we will help you; persist in those practices and we will refuse to subsidize them—and you.

In general, this approach makes good sense because economic aid cannot truly succeed unless it prompts sound institutional reform. It is the irony of foreign aid that it is used best by the countries that need it least. But it does not solve the problem that many countries are poor because their governments resist such reform, and that such resistance will ultimately generate both humanitarian crises and havens for terrorism. How do we deal with cases in which conditions attached to U.S. economic aid are rejected or ultimately distorted?

This essay has two purposes. The first is to lay out some empirical evidence about the relationship between economic aid and systems of governance. The second is to address the problem of how the U.S. government should deal with difficult partners. On the first task there is a wealth of data that suggests some surprising connections between the length of political tenure, the nature of governance, and the role of aid money. That data and those connections, in turn, can help us to think through the second task.

Political Tenure and Economic Development

OUR STANDARD approach to economic policy reform typically assumes that leaders are rewarded politically if they help their nation improve its economic performance. In reality, politicians succeed by helping their constituents and, in the vast majority of poor countries, politically significant constituencies are not representative of the whole population. It makes perfect political sense for autocrats in poor countries to enrich the clique of supporters around them, even if it means keeping the majority of the population poor. In short, in such situations, political rationality and economic rationality are not in alignment. Under such conditions, external aid money will not help to alleviate poverty; it is more likely to buttress further what is already an economically dysfunctional arrangement.

The economic rationality of autocracy underlies a good deal of what we have learned over the past half century in the experience of giving, monitoring and evaluating foreign aid programs. Two lessons stand out.

First, the amount of aid a poor country receives does not directly correlate with how well it does. Getting external resources into a country, whether by public or private investment, is not the main factor. Second, conditionality—the linking of aid money to macroeconomic

[2]Remarks of the President at the Inter-American Development Bank, March 14, 2002.

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reform—does not work as advertised.[3] Aid to low-income African states has been significant, especially since the end of the Cold War, and nearly all of it has been conditional on macroeconomic policy reform. Excluding South Africa and Nigeria, the average African country received the equivalent of 12.3 percent of its GDP in Official Development Assistance, a sustained 5 percent increase in real terms between 1970 and 1995, before declining. This unprecedented international transfer far surpassed the Marshall Plan, which at its peak accounted for only 2.5 percent of GDP in France and Germany. If conditionality had worked, Africa would be the world's stellar performer. Instead of helping the reform process, however, substantial aid increases have allowed governments to avoid reforms that might have led to growth and peaceful political change. Aid allocation decisions often reward countries that least follow donor dictates, and it is all too easy to find examples of donor programs that have undermined the very objectives that donors wished to promote.

Put differently, we have the economics of foreign aid right, but we have got the politics wrong. There is a strong consensus about what sound economic policies are at various stages of economic development, and professionals in this field recognize in turn that external aid works best in a good economic policy environment. There is no consensus, however, about the delivery of results in poor policy environments. For example, how do we ensure that programs targeted at reducing infant mortality and making certain that children learn to read achieve their objectives when the "right policies" are missing in many of the poorest countries?

Many economists argue that better dissemination of their own ideas is the solution. In this spirit, Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist of the World Bank and Nobel laureate, started an international network "to ensure in one place a comprehensive catalogue of what is at issue, and what is the theory and evidence that underlies positions, so that those in the developing world are in a better position to make decisions for themselves." But with abundant technical assistance being provided by international agencies, the supply of good advice often exceeds the demand. Ignorance of sound economic policies is not really the issue.

Stiglitz does note, almost in passing however, that poor countries are poor because their leaders have only half-heartedly implemented sensible economic ideas. The real question, then, and one that economists alone are powerless to answer, is why that is so. Why have many governments rejected good economic advice that they have been paid to receive? The answer may be found in the economic logic of autocracy.

Just as we naturally consider successful those leaders who foster economic growth and prosperity for their citizens, we expect that leaders who produce famine, poverty and misery will earn a rapid retirement. *But the data show that leaders who produce poverty and misery through the systematic corruption that is characteristic of autocracy keep their jobs much longer than do those who enrich their countries.* Indeed, the eight countries consistently rated the most corrupt in the

[3]Much evidence exists that multilateral institutions have been ineffective at enforcing conditionality. See Paul Collier, "The Failure of Conditionality", Catherine Gwin and Joan Nelson, eds., *Perspectives on Aid and Development* (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1997); John Williamson, ed., *The Political Economy of Policy Reform* (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, 1994); and Dani Rodrik, "Understanding Economic Policy Reform", *Journal of Economic Literature*, XXXIV (1996).

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world—Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Sudan, Indonesia, Syria, Pakistan and Burundi—are those in which political leadership has been most secure, measured by the longevity of its tenure. (Only countries that have experienced a complete breakdown in social order can rival an entrenched autocracy in generating extreme levels of corruption.)

With rare exception, only autocrats—leaders who are unresponsive to the popular will and who exercise power unchecked either by law or other institutions—hold on to power for a long time. Over the past century, the only leaders who have remained in office for forty years or more have been autocrats. By contrast, nearly half of all democratic leaders—leaders who hold power at the pleasure of the voters or an elected legislature—are out of office within about one year of coming to power. Such a short tenure is true of only about one-third of autocrats, a remarkable difference in survivability. Virtually no democrats—but one-quarter of autocrats—stay in office for more than eight years, even though few democratic leaders are subject to term limits.

TO ELABORATE the point, one can divide the leadership structures of poorer countries into two groups: those who depend on a small group of backers, which may be called exclusive regimes, and those who rely on a relatively broad coalition of support, which may be called inclusive regimes. Exclusive regimes tend toward narrow autocracy and oligopoly; inclusive regimes tend toward what we normally think of as democracy. But there are many poorer countries short of reaching mature and genuine democracy that nonetheless exhibit inclusive characteristics—among these a decade or so ago were, for example, the East Asian tigers and Chile. In other words, there is a spectrum of governance structures, and the more inclusive side of it contains democratizing regimes as well as fully democratic ones. One may measure how broadly based a regime is by taking into consideration such factors as constraints on executive authority and the openness and degree of political competition.[4] A comparison of political survival rates between these two groups, based on economic performance, tells a depressing but important story.

Leaders who depend on a broadly inclusive coalition do better at staying in office only if they manage to promote exceptionally high growth rates. They do worse if, instead of growth, they promote rent-seeking opportunities of the sort that typify countries with vibrant black markets, often controlled by the friends and allies of the leadership. Inclusive leaders who promote growth stay in office, on average, 15 percent longer than those who do not.

The *reverse* is true for those who rule

[4]Our measure of inclusiveness or exclusiveness is based on four criteria. The first is regime type—military or hereditary leaders are considered less inclusive. Second, a regime improves on its inclusiveness if its executive recruitment process is competitive. Third, regimes are more inclusive when the opportunity to compete for leadership positions is broadly available to all citizens. Finally, inclusiveness is enhanced when there are few or no restrictions on the rights of citizens to organize to compete for political influence at the national level. The more of these criteria that a regime satisfies, the more inclusive its governing system. We consider a regime inclusive if it meets at least three of the four criteria; otherwise we treat it as exclusive. The analysis used here spans all countries, depending on the availability of data, from 1950 through 1992. This analysis is further developed in a forthcoming work: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow, untitled manuscript (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, expected 2003).

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at the pleasure of a small, exclusive group. Exclusive leaders who rely on black-market corruption have a better chance of staying in power than those who engender high rates of growth, staying in office, on average, 25 percent longer. Indeed, at all periods during their tenure in office, these leaders do much better at retaining their jobs if they promote black marketeering, corruption and cronyism—distorting the economy—than if they promote economic policies that lead to growth and prosperity (see table). Why does this perverse outcome occur? As suggested above, leaders who would keep their jobs must produce what their supporters want; when those supporters are unrepresentative of the country, autocrats will not pursue policies that encourage the creation of healthy, educated, prosperous citizens.

POLITICAL TENURE AND REGIME TYPE

Survival Probability	50%	25%	10%
Inclusive Government with Annual Growth of 6%	3.2 years	6.3 yrs.	10.1 yrs.
Inclusive Government with Black Market Exchange Rate Premium=4*	2.8 yrs.	5.4 yrs.	8.8 yrs.
Exclusive Government with Annual Growth of 6%	2.4 yrs.	6.5 yrs.	13.5 yrs.
Exclusive Government with Black Market Exchange Rate Premium=4*	3.2 yrs.	8.6 yrs.	17.7 yrs.

**Black Market Exchange Rate Premium=4 refers to a premium for currency exchange at least four times the official rate.*

Autocrats not only retain power by maintaining the loyalty of a relatively small group of supporters—which usually include those who control the military, the civil service, the communications and information infrastructure, as well as key economic levers—but they also have an interest in keeping that core group as small as possible. In a poor country, an autocrat faces personal political risks if he implements policies that dissipate resources away from the few upon whom he relies to those who have little say in ensuring his political survival. It is therefore politically irrational to implement transparent economic policies aimed at protecting and promoting property rights, rule of law, a broadly educated population, low taxes and free trade, if they enable challenges to the incumbent. It is not in an autocrat's interest that people have ways to enrich themselves that he does not control.

This is why autocrats face their highest risk of being deposed in their first year in office; they have not yet identified their most loyal backers and have not yet fully secured their ability to transfer benefits to them. With time and experience, they get better at identifying those on whose support they really rely. They discover that excluding "the many" from sharing in the wealth of the country is the best way to reward a small clique of supporters.

Even worse, such systems tend to perpetuate themselves, which is why a reform-minded leader who manages to come to power in such a system faces excruciating dilemmas. If he is committed to promoting growth and prosperity, he may find that pursuit of such goals can ensure the loss of office. Elections give a mandate to a democratic leader, but in pursuing reform, even a democratic leader may be forced to implement policies that injure the interests of the constituents who brought him to power. Any politician unable to satisfy his core constituents faces a risk of their defection to another politician who shows more promise of improving their lot. After listening to a long list of measures designed to improve his country's economy, President Rafael Caldera of Venezuela told Nobel laureate Douglass North, "If I were to do the things you are recommending, I

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would not survive in office long enough to enjoy the benefits."

Foreign Aid and Autocratic Longevity

HOW DOES the provision of foreign aid fit into the logic, and economic implications, of autocracy? In those many cases in which aid has not led to economic growth, what *has* it accomplished?

External aid often promotes longevity in office for autocratic leaders who are otherwise at risk of being deposed; it simply makes it easier for them to patronize their core group of supporters. In such cases, aid not only fails to promote economic growth, but it also diminishes the odds that the political system will evolve in a more inclusive, democratic and growth-oriented direction.

This may seem too large a claim to some observers. After all, external aid generally comprises only a small component of a nation's total economy. Since 1975, for instance, international aid has averaged only about $7 or $8 per citizen. Such numbers imply that foreign assistance is not significant enough to reshape economic prospects and barely enough to provide relief to the world's poorest people. This assumption, however, misses the fundamental benefit that aid provides to autocratic leaders, and again, the data illustrate it. Autocrats in countries with below-average growth rates who do not get aid have a 25 percent chance of staying in office for five years. If they receive economic assistance, that survival time rises to seven years, a 40 percent increase. A few dollars of aid per capita is small in terms of any impact on the national economy, but it is huge with respect to helping autocrats enrich their small coterie of supporters.

On average, every dollar of per capita foreign aid improves an incumbent autocrat's chance of surviving in office another year by about 4 percent (even after taking into account the independent effects on political survival exerted by such factors as the country's economic growth rate, black market exchange rate premium, national debt, and its geographic situation). Since the average autocracy gets about $8 per capita in aid, foreign assistance may boost the survival prospects of poorly performing leaders by 30 percent or more.

The data also suggest that giving assistance to leaders of exclusive, autocratic regimes is especially critical early in their tenure, when they do not yet have a solid hold on office. Aid frees up money for the incumbent leadership to buy support from a relatively larger number of backers without having to generate the wealth to do so through policy choices. Even small amounts of aid provide major opportunities for novice autocrats to outbid political rivals and hence deter defections to them. Mobutu Sese Seko, for instance, used foreign aid after his successful 1965 coup (as well as the nationalization of assets) to buy the loyalty of the Zairian military and the country's economic elite, thereby securing his hold on power. (His eventual overthrow, in the late 1990s, was directly tied to his growing inability to meet the military's payroll.)

Aid is most likely to be effective if it is given as a benefit to those who have demonstrated that they can use resources to improve economic performance. However, assistance given in response to expressed intentions, lacking a proven track record of effectiveness, is likely to lead to perverse incentives. This creates the central paradox of foreign aid: under many of the least politically inclusive systems, good policy is bad politics, and bad policy can be good politics. In those more inclusive systems, in which good policy is also good politics, leaders face greater obstacles to maintaining incumbency because it is not enough for them to dis-

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tribute a finite number of private goods to a small oligarchy to win support. They can only remain in office if they generate and sustain policies that deliver public goods (schools, health care, a safe environment) to the general populace.

The policy implications of the dichotomy between exclusive and inclusive systems of governance go beyond the matter of leadership tenure. When the political system is dominated by a small coalition of cronies, relatives or military officers, citizens do markedly worse on public welfare or humanitarian indices than do their counterparts who live under more inclusive systems. Across the board, the data show that more inclusive systems generally do a better job at producing safe drinking water, expanding public education, offering access to medical care, encouraging free trade, avoiding corruption and black marketeering, attracting investors and so forth. Moreover, even quite poor inclusive societies usually offer more of these advantages than do autocratic countries lucky enough to possess some important and valuable resource. The reasons are not difficult to fathom: inclusive governance promotes greater government spending on social policy because, in such systems, the longevity of political leaders is directly tied to the welfare of the majority. El Salvador and Jamaica are two excellent examples of relatively poor but inclusive societies with above-average social welfare (as demonstrated by their low infant mortality rates and high-quality drinking water). By contrast, during their non-democratic years, Mexico and Brazil had above-average income levels, but performed poorly on these social indicators.

Consider, too, the impact on life expectancy at birth of the coalition size that a ruler uses to govern. Being born in a polity that scores highest on the inclusiveness index adds nearly fourteen years to life expectancy, whereas an order-of-magnitude increase in per capita income adds only five years. Both are significant, but the impact of coalition size can have dramatic results, both by increasing life expectancy (because of government spending priorities) and by creating a more open economic system, since a competitive political system is a significant contributor to economic growth. By way of illustration, per capita income in Brazil in 1972, eight years after the military coup, was $2,907. In the same year in Jamaica, a functioning if narrowly-based parliamentary democracy, per capita income was about the same, $3,099. According to the "coalition size" index of inclusiveness, however, Jamaica scored 1.0 while Brazil scored 0.25. It is therefore not unusual—though it may be surprising to some—to find that whereas life expectancy in Brazil in 1972 was 59.8 years, in Jamaica it was 68.6 years, nearly a decade longer. Similar evidence can be marshaled using other measures of social welfare: regarding the equality of educational opportunity for women and men, differences in infant mortality rates, and so on. What is more, the data also suggest that when a government switches, whether by choice or the compulsion of circumstances, from being exclusive to being inclusive in nature, economic growth shows a marked improvement over the next three to five years.

In designing assistance programs, it is crucial to recognize that the social welfare improvements sought by donors are best promoted by encouraging leaders to adopt more inclusive political institutions. Those who fail to do so signal their unwillingness to put their hold on office at risk, even when doing so stands to improve the well-being of their citizens. If assistance programs are not designed to address the political incentives of leaders, further aid to autocratic regimes will continue to present the sorry record of the past: assistance without proper political

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incentives and inducements will not bring political civility and prosperity. Instead, donor assistance will continue to substitute for governmental efforts to make citizens better off, and may even help pay to keep failed leaders in office.

Engaging Difficult Partners

RECOGNIZING the political causes of poor economic performance is critical, but it does not relieve us of difficult choices. It is correct to say that aid will do more good in consolidating progress in countries already pointed in the right direction than it will in those countries still burdened by bad government. But that does not mean we can walk away from the people who live in those unfortunate lands where misery, resentment and the potential incubation of terrorism is likely to be most acute. So what to do? We suggest seven basic guidelines.

First, *donors must take greater responsibility for outcomes*. Whose fault is it when aid is ineffective because external efforts are not well targeted, well coordinated and rigorous in measuring results? If money is dispensed without adequate assessment of the potential for mismanagement? If there is inadequate information about what the aid is designed to accomplish? Donor countries need to institutionalize a more credible monitoring system with third-party safeguards that unambiguously separate disbursement from assessment and monitoring. The international financial institutions (IFIs) should introduce an "inspector-general function." A permanent quality control staff, composed of individuals unaffiliated with any IFI, that sits in on important decisions and is enhanced with the participation of the intended beneficiaries, is one way to go.

Second, *end the debt trap*. Loans to already heavily indebted countries reduce their opportunities for economic growth. Loans have been the preferred method of assisting developing countries because donors believed that loans would foster greater responsibility for, and ownership of, outcomes. However, the assumption that poor countries are less likely to squander funds that they must someday repay has proved wrong. Most nondemocratic leaderships have been more than happy to consume the benefits of the loans—enriching themselves and their supporters—while passing the future burden of debt service and repayment onto the country at large. *This is just the economic logic of autocracy at work across time rather than across the population at any given moment.* The resultant "debt overhang", not surprisingly, diminishes the appetite of investors for developing market investments. Even if the society offers otherwise attractive investment opportunities, the debt burden reduces the means to capitalize on them. With inadequate cash even to pay current obligations, little is available to pursue new investment.

The crushing weight of debt is so debilitating that the idea of debt forgiveness has gained widespread popularity. Debt forgiveness, however, does not address the central problem of perverse incentives. Excessive debts exist because the political incentive structure protects leaders from the consequences of poor economic results. There is a strong correlation between the magnitude of "debt overhang" and the degree to which a small coterie of insiders control government. Inclusive regimes, by contrast, have a much smaller debt-to-revenue ratio. Statistics collected on 46 countries concerning the 1946–93 period demonstrate this fact, even after controlling for other variables such as the impact of previous inflation and growth rates on indebtedness.[5] Thus, debt for-

[5] Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds., *Governing for Prosperity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 234–5.

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giveness must not be misused to wipe the slate clean, only to start a new cycle of mismanagement under a new clique of autocratic rulers.

Third, *use grants to work around governments in order to stay engaged with difficult partners*. It is callous to withhold all aid while awaiting the establishment of sound political and economic frameworks in impoverished autocracies. Many of the poorest countries have governments and institutions that either do not support development or cannot use development assistance effectively. In such circumstances, grants may be in order.

Grants are easier to monitor than direct budgetary support because they are given for a particular project with narrowly defined goals and, most importantly, they need not be made directly to governments but can be used as a tool to build civil society. Directly administered, grants represent just the kind of challenge needed to overcome the entry barriers set up by governments that survive as incompetent monopolists. A donor can put the project out to bid, select the contractor, and then pay for an independent performance assessment when the project is completed. If properly designed, grants also enable donors to empower people through building institutions outside of government. Whereas governments are unlikely to borrow to build capacity in society, a grant facility will allow IFIs to contribute to such capacity. The programs supported by grants can also be used as an incubator of leaders who can help focus demands for change and give those neglected by their government a voice. By empowering groups outside the civil service—which is often racked by patronage and corruption—to administer grants, donors build moral space that allows citizens to challenge the credibility of abusive governments. Concrete examples of successful project completion can lead populations to demand more from their governments. Unlike loans, grants deprive the government of the opportunity to channel the money to cronies rather than to those most competent to satisfy the grantor's objectives.

Fourth, *stop trying to address economic questions in isolation from political considerations*. Most causes of poverty in the world can be linked to leaks in the ship of state. That is why developing tools for broad stakeholder alliances (such as the World Bank's new poverty reduction facilities) is so important; otherwise, donors risk unwittingly collaborating with leaders who have created the conditions for economic collapse in the first place.[6] Linking the role of aid in humanitarian assistance to its role in policy reform is absolutely essential. This requires coordinating two objectives that require different mechanisms (loans and grants), different partners (the state and civil society), and different delivery systems (for example, the multilateral development banks rather than organizations such as the World Health Organization). Each grant and each project must serve as a building block toward the creation of a more inclusive regime.

Fifth, *aid disbursement techniques must prevent backsliding toward exclusive governance*. The tendency for an incumbent to shift policies toward autocracy will be enhanced if unrestricted aid is given before a country has a track record of good governance. Aid given before policy results are firmly established allows countries that only promise reforms to revert to bad policies in order to be eligible for

[6]For more on stakeholder alliances, see Hilton L. Root, Mark Andrew Abdollahian and Jacek Kugler, "In Korea, the Thirst for Funds Drives Change", *Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies*, 5:1 (2002), pp. 1–29; and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, *Predicting Politics* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2002).

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fresh aid. Countries with bad policies can then perversely obtain more aid than countries with socially productive policies. Aid could be used more effectively if donors find ways to reward non-lending activities, such as designing a change strategy for a country that is not eligible for assistance because of failed governance, or helping to create a domestic constituency that favors reform.

Sixth, *encourage trade liberalization as an essential component of global poverty reduction.* Full trade liberalization has the potential to lift at least 300 million people out of poverty by 2015 and can create domestic coalitions for reform and openness. Mexico's trade with the United States has more than tripled since the passage of NAFTA and, as a result, per capita income has begun to rise. In turn, economic growth has helped to consolidate both democratic and economic reforms. By creating jobs, it has thinned patronage networks and eliminated the traditional rents from controlled markets that once kept corrupt leaders in power. A new and independent middle class is emerging to demand genuine accountability from Mexican leaders.

The World Bank notes that the average poor person confronts trade barriers roughly twice as high as those confronting the typical worker in an OECD country. In general, tariffs in advanced countries on imports from developing countries are four times higher than those on imports from other advanced countries. Exceptional protection is imposed against imports from many developing countries of many farm products (particularly in the EU and Japan), of textiles and clothing (notably in the United States and Canada) and of footwear. According to the World Bank, a new trade round coupled with market reforms could boost global income by $2.8 trillion over the next 15 years.[7] If sub-Saharan Africa, for example, had maintained the share of world trade it had in 1980, annual exports would be $191 billion, more than double what they are today and almost four times the amount of the most ambitious calls for increased foreign aid.

Finally, *remain mindful of the inherent limitations of aid and focus on the maintenance and expansion of private sector flows.* No matter how successful the United States and other donor counties are at increasing state aid, it can never substitute for a healthy and conducive environment for private sector investment and capital formation. The hallmark of a good aid policy is one that strives to build a transmission belt from public to private investment flows.

THERE ARE good reasons to want to alleviate poverty, especially in the wake of September 11. But poverty is not exclusively an economic problem; it is a problem of political economy. Until this fact is squarely faced, no amount of aid will come remotely close to solving the problems that breed the hopelessness and despair the President wants to alleviate. We really do have a passing fair idea of what policies can overcome poverty, but most efforts to educate leaders and bureaucrats about good economic practices flounder because we have too often ignored the reasons that leaders fail to do what is right for their country. To be frank, much U.S. economic aid during the Cold War was motivated by a desire to keep certain strategically situated autocrats on our side during that conflict. How well or how poorly they used our money was a secondary concern. This is no longer the case. Our aims remain political, as well they should, but now those politi-

[7]Paul Collier and David Dollar, *Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Economy* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2002), pp. 58–9.

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cal aims can be served only by getting positive results from the aid effort.

The Bush Administration has taken a major step forward in establishing new criteria for foreign aid, by explicitly linking assistance to good governance. The President has wisely avoided facile and misleading depictions of the sources of global poverty and terrorism. But many difficult questions remain. How can the needs of people living in poor countries be served without progress toward democratization, especially when they lack the institutions needed to generate growth or to interact with the global system? If we agree that, until the fundamentals are in place, development assistance will reach only a fraction of its potential effectiveness, does this imply that we should ignore poorly performing nations? How do we distinguish between "states that are poor because they perform poorly" and "states that perform poorly because they are poor"?

With few options for successful assistance, the challenges posed by poorly performing countries go well beyond the usual limits of what we have understood to constitute development policy. What makes the task ahead particularly daunting is that the ultimate solution to poverty comes down to nation-building. Yet, in vast parts of sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia and elsewhere, states have atrophied, enabling them to be abused or captured by transnational terrorists, traffickers and smugglers. In a world where development is state-driven, what will happen to countries without minimally functioning states? What institutional alternatives should we be thinking about where an effectively functioning state is a distant reality? Overcoming the curse of bad government will require some particularly creative thinking, and much patience. Hard labors and long delays lay ahead, but a meaningful marker has been put down. At last we seem to have the definition of the problem down right. □

On Beneficence

I am certainly far from wanting to put the most natural, the most beautiful, and the most holy of virtues on trial. But I think there is no principle, however good, whose every consequence can be regarded as good. I think that beneficence must be a manly and reasoned virtue, not a weak and unreflecting inclination. It is necessary to do what is most useful to the receiver, not what pleases the giver, to do what best serves the welfare of the majority, not what rescues the few. I can conceive of beneficence only in this way. Any other way it is still a sublime instinct, but it no longer seems to me worthy of the name of virtue.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, *Memoir on Pauperism* (1835)

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Bases of Debate

America in Central Asia

Being There

Charles Fairbanks

LIKE A VOLCANO bursting forth, September 11 vastly altered the terrain of U.S. foreign policy. Before that date, Central Asia was one of the most obscure places on earth to most Americans. In the weeks before September 11, Gary Condit was attracting several thousand inches of newsprint for every one devoted to Central Asia. In recent weeks, however, every mass-circulation news magazine and major American newspaper has featured photographs of U.S. soldiers in places such as Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—countries that many Americans have considerable difficulty pronouncing or finding on a map.

As for the Washington foreign policy elite, only yesterday it was arguing that the United States had thrown itself too hastily into an activist Caspian energy policy. They pointed to the authoritarianism and corruption of governments there, and the hostility we were evoking from Central Asia's neighboring major powers. Since September 11, the United States has greatly increased aid—especially military aid, so far—to four of the five Central Asian republics and, far more dramatically, American military forces now use air bases in the region to carry out or support operations in Afghanistan. They appear to be digging in for the long haul.

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Steppes to Empire

Andrew J. Bacevich

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, Americans have handed George W. Bush the equivalent of a blank check on matters pertaining to foreign policy. Prosecuting the war trumps all other considerations. Yet as operations move beyond the so-called first phase, it becomes increasingly clear that the Bush Administration has more in mind than simply eradicating terror. As phase two beckons (not to mention phases three and four), automatic deference to the administration's wishes should no longer be viewed as the ultimate badge of patriotism. A healthy, respectful skepticism

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Central Asia also looks to become a major staging area for whatever nation-building exercises are undertaken in Afghanistan; if so, can the nomadic horde of consultants and NGOs—many of them no doubt from the United States—be far behind?

The United States has refrained from giving explicit security guarantees in exchange for access to Central Asian bases and staging areas, but the mere presence of U.S. forces under present circumstances suggests commitment. Such a suggestion abides, too, in the U.S.-Uzbekistan joint declaration of March 12 on a "Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework." That declaration reads, in part, that the United States "affirms that it would regard with grave concern any external threat to the security and territorial integrity of the Republic of Uzbekistan." Commitment is also implied in the amplified military-to-military relationships that normally and naturally accompany the provision of U.S. military aid.

Will this commitment wax or wane? *Should* it wax or wane? These are difficult questions, and the Bush Administration is now called upon to answer them. The key issue is the U.S. military presence; this is what most concerns the major powers that border Central Asia—Russia, China and Iran—and what symbolizes most vividly the expansion of U.S. global power to others worldwide. It is also the most important factor in creating U.S. political debts to local host governments.

Good arguments can be made both for and against a long-term U.S. military presence. On balance, however, the more prudent course would be to anticipate, and not to dread, several years' military basing in Central Asia. Military training relationships will make sense for decades. But we should acknowledge the potential dangers in such a course, the better to mitigate them to the extent possible. There are four such dangers.

First, none of the five Central Asian governments is a democracy, and most are plunged in an economic crisis comparable to the Great Depression. Polls suggest that

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should be the order of the day. Evolving U.S. policy toward Central Asia offers a case in point.

In truth, the enterprise that the White House has chosen to style as a war on terror has never been simply that. In the immediate aftermath of September 11, senior officials in the Bush Administration were quick to grasp that if Al-Qaeda's attack was an outrage that demanded retribution, it also constituted a significant strategic opportunity. To seize that opportunity, the administration has from the outset waged its war with one eye fixed on rooting out terrorists, and the other set on gauging the prospects for advancing a variety of other U.S. interests. Thus, through its conduct of the present conflict, the administration aims to reduce or eliminate security threats that the Clinton Administration allowed to fester—the notorious "axis of evil." It seeks to bolster regional stability and ratchet up efforts to reduce international drug trafficking. Its expansive Bush Doctrine proposes to legitimize "anticipatory self-defense" and "offensive deterrence" as the basis for using force. For its part, in addition to securing a big boost in defense spending, the Pentagon is using the war on terror as a pretext for deepening its relationship with various armies abroad, both to garner influence and to facilitate the future projection of U.S. military power. To state the matter baldly, through its conduct of the war against terror, the United States seeks to shore up and perhaps expand the Pax Americana.

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these weaknesses threaten the legitimacy of several governments. Clearly, these governments will wish to use the U.S. need for access to their territory to slacken pressure on them with regard to political and economic reform. Worse, aid money provided to autocratic governments may exacerbate corruption, making better governance more difficult instead of less. They will also try to leverage their relationship with the United States in their regional rivalries with each other. And, of course, the United States risks being associated with unpopular regimes in the eyes of the peoples of these countries, and suffering when those regimes eventually fall.

Second, there are possible military costs as well as benefits from a protracted Central Asian deployment. A prolonged presence in Central Asia could expose U.S. forces to Islamist guerrilla attack. Moreover, the Pentagon is preoccupied by the strain on military effectiveness created by the increased dispersal of its forces. With the substantial contraction of the Services since the end of the Cold War, and a general unwillingness to provide a defense budget that is adequate for both existing forces and force modernization, this is a serious concern.

Third is the potential impact of a protracted Central Asian deployment on U.S. relationships with major powers, notably Russia, China and Iran. The sudden arrival of the American military next door—in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan—along with the upsurge of Palestinian terrorism and Israeli reaction, appears to have outweighed Iranian interest in détente with the United States. From an opportunity to escape isolation, America has become, in Iranian clerical eyes, the very country tightening an iron ring around Iran. Central Asian regimes will try to use the American presence to ward off burdensome pressures from Russia and China; we will therefore become enmeshed in a test of wills guaranteed to irritate one side or the other—maybe both. In the Russian case, a long-term American deployment would abrade the Russian sense of historical entitlement in Central Asia. The Russians—government elite and the public alike—may also claim

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Initiatives already launched in support of this ambitious project have entailed the deployment of U.S. military assets to places ranging from Latin America to the Horn of Africa and from the Caucasus to Southeast Asia. Inasmuch as the ongoing campaign is very much a work in progress, we can expect that such commitments will continue to proliferate. One region that appears likely to attract significant continuing U.S. attention is Central Asia, a vast, forbidding tract that most considered before September 11 to be a strategic backwater, but that since has become the subject of intense interest.

Thus far, the Bush Administration has refrained from spelling out its plans for Central Asia with any precision. But with Secretary of State Colin Powell hinting at a "continuing interest and presence" in the region "of a kind that we could not dream of before", it appears that the administration is thinking big.[1] The available evidence suggests that the U.S. military will figure prominently in whatever strategy emerges; indeed, the Pentagon is already laying the groundwork for long-term U.S. involvement in the region.

Particularly noteworthy in that regard is the increasingly prominent U.S. military footprint visible in Pakistan, Afghanistan and two of the five Central Asian republics (Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan). Although initially justified as

[1] See Vernon Loeb, "Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia", *Washington Post*, February 9, 2002.

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a swindle: Just as the United States, they believe, reneged on a solemn promise not to expand NATO in the context of the agreement on German re-unification, so the Americans have taken advantage of Russian support for a temporary U.S. use of Central Asian facilities in the context of the war on terrorism to put Russia at a permanent geostrategic disadvantage. China worries that a protracted U.S. presence in Central Asia is part of an effort at encirclement and containment. There is a range of issues on which the United States seeks cooperation with Russia, China and Iran, and their displeasure over the U.S. presence in Central Asia could make securing that cooperation more difficult and expensive.

Finally, perhaps the most serious bundle of problems with staying involves not Russians or Chinese but ourselves. We are woefully ignorant about the area and, worse, our ignorance tends to be filled by wishful thinking. To substitute our daydreams, like the Middle East "peace process", for real knowledge of people and their cultures is one of the more unfortunate American traits.

It is worth reflecting, too, how scant our local knowledge is next to that of 19th-century Europe. Its entourage of entertaining misfits—knights-errant like "Chinese" Gordon of Khartoum; refugees from knighthood like Joseph Conrad; spiritual seekers like Sir Wilfred Blunt; monkish zealots like Père de Foucault; secular ascetics like Doughty or Thesiger; connoisseurs of the exotic like the French naval officer and novelist Pierre Loti; sexual adventurers like Sir Richard Francis Burton and Lawrence of Arabia—kept the elites from which they had emerged and their imperial publics engaged with the intricacies of the world over which they projected power. Moreover, as an epoch of rapid change, "progress" was then making many tastes, styles and ways of life obsolete, above all among the old ruling classes. That imperial age had, through its romantic craving for the unfamiliar and its obsessive polymathy, niches for every cultural resource it possessed (and often squan-

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needed to support combat operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the establishment of bases by American forces has the effect of creating new facts on the ground, facts that have a way of becoming permanent. When U.S. troops arrive, they tend to stay. That axiom remains as true today as it was in 1945 or 1950 or in the 1990s, as the continuing presence of U.S. forces in Europe, Japan, Korea, the Persian Gulf and the Balkans amply attests. In Central Asia, that pattern may be repeating itself as U.S. Central Command gears up for a major program of what the Defense Department likes to call "engagement"—employing a panoply of military activities and initiatives as an instrument of statecraft.[2]

Viewed in this light, the construction of an American base in Kyrgyzstan, just 19 miles from Bishkek, takes on a significance that goes well beyond the fact that the U.S. Air Force has acquired a convenient place to house 3,000 personnel and host nearly two dozen aircraft.[3] Much the same can be said with regard to Uzbekistan, where 3,000 U.S. troops have taken control of the old Soviet air base at Khanabad and established a forward operating facility at Karze-Hanabad. These constitute an opening wedge; efforts to secure access to other

[2]"Press Conference with General Tommy R. Franks, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command", Tashkent, Uzbekistan, January 24, 2002.

[3]Loeb, "Footprints in Steppes of Central Asia."

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dered). By contrast, our comparable exotics—and there are some—do not please our foreign policy elite, people who are so overworked and so proud that their skills apply to every time and place that they disdain such esoterica. If so few of us really know the region, and if our political elite is disinterested in those who do, we court serious error. We have already made at least one: to think, as we apparently do, that Pashtuns will ever accept an Afghan government effectively dominated by Tajiks is fantasy. Overwhelming U.S. power can beat down such miscalculations for a while, but only for a while.

These four dangers in staying constitute real potential weaknesses. But leaving is even more dangerous. Like it or not, the United States finds itself in a situation where it must extend itself into the world in various places and ways if it is to meet the security challenges posed by apocalyptic terrorism joined to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If the United States is going to succeed in the effort the President has put before the country, we must acknowledge that risks must be taken and prices must be paid. Whether done more in sorrow than in joy it does not matter; we must re-examine the scope not only of our foreign policy and defense policy, but of our entire contact with the world.

Why We Should Stay

THE UNITED States must stay in Central Asia, militarily and otherwise, for essentially three interconnected reasons. First, the nature and scope of international terrorism is broader than many appreciate. A critical part of the problem is that weak states abet terrorism, and Central Asia is home to several weak states.

Second, the United States stands to benefit enormously in the long run from the increased stability and the success of moderate Muslim societies and states. Central Asian Islam is for reasons of history and happenstance more moderate than most other types, and it is worth our

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bases in Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, and already-announced plans for more ambitious training exercises and security assistance programs, suggest that the Pentagon intends to drive that wedge deeper.[4]

Bases come with strings attached, and some are already evident. In return for access to Khanabad, for example, the United States has promised to triple the amount of aid it provides annually to Uzbekistan, boosting it to $160 million.[5] The administration has also reportedly promised to guarantee Uzbekistan's security.[6] Meanwhile, courting these ex-Soviet republics has obliged the administration to cozy up to unsavory autocrats hitherto known chiefly for economic mismanagement, a contempt for democracy and human rights, and a single-minded determination to retain their hold on power by whatever means necessary. Americans have already become accustomed to the grip-and-grin photos of their generals and diplomats making nice with the likes of Emomali Rahmonov, reelected in 1999 as president of Tajikistan

[4]Eric Schmitt and James Dao, "U.S. Is Building Up Its Military Bases in Afghan Region", *New York Times*, January 9, 2002.

[5]Sally Buzbee, "United States Expanded Influence Likely to Remain in Central Asia", Associated Press, March 12, 2002.

[6]"United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic Partnership and Cooperation Framework", U.S. Department of State, March 12, 2002.

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effort to sustain that moderation.

Third, we need to stay in Central Asia in order to stabilize Afghanistan. The idea that it will be enough to smash the Taliban and give humanitarian aid to render the country essentially harmless to American security is wrong. It will be hard to stabilize that country, and it will not be accomplished anytime soon. Moreover, because of Afghanistan's geopolitical situation—bordering Iran, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and China—it is a far more important country than even most American foreign policy experts tend to appreciate.

Islamist Terrorism and Weak States

THE BUSH Administration has waged war with inflexible resolution and inventiveness, but it has not cast much light on the real problem we face with international terrorism. Because certain bureaucracies were habituated to narrowly define the problem as singularly that of Al-Qaeda, the preconditions of Al-Qaeda's success have remained obscure. In fact, the problem of Islamist terrorism is fourfold.

The existence of small fanatical groups of full-time terrorists is only the first part of it. A second precondition is a climate of opinion in the Muslim world that tolerates preaching and recruitment for such groups. Third, such groups need sponsors, which Saudis, aided by a double-gaming Saudi state, were for Al-Qaeda and Pakistan was for the Taliban. To operate effectively, terrorists also need seams between state administrations where they can operate without their sponsors being identified or taking responsibility. So, fourth and finally, the terrorists require places to host them, such as Taliban Afghanistan, and before Afghanistan Sudan, and still to this day Syria and its Lebanese satrapy. In other words, terrorism needs failed or weak states to thrive.

This becomes clear if we review the prewar situation in Afghanistan. The Taliban sympathized with Al-Qaeda's interpretation of Islam, though only in general terms. In the course of the war,

with 97 percent of the vote, and Uzbekistan's President Islam Karimov, who in a 1995 plebiscite did even better with 99.6 percent.

Apart from proximity to the Afghan war zone, what exactly does Central Asia have to offer? The region's five republics possess abundant mineral resources, including but not limited to large reserves of fossil fuels. Uzbekistan alone has oil and gas reserves with an estimated value of one trillion dollars.[7] That said, prospects for translating these natural resources in anything resembling a peaceful and prosperous environment appear remote. The problems confronting Central Asia are daunting. Among them are chronic instability and extreme poverty; annual per capita GDP is an estimated $766.[8] Drug smuggling is rampant, Central Asia serving as the transit point through which Afghan heroin makes its way to markets in Europe and Russia. (Turkmenistan's president-for-life, Saparmurat Niyazov, is himself reputed to be a major trafficker.)[9] As described in Ahmed Rashid's best-selling *Jihad*, the region is also a breeding ground for Islamic radicals eager to foment revolution, purge the region of infidels and enthrone *sharia* as the law of the land. Central Asian gov-

[7]Energy Information Administration, March 2001, www.eia.doe.gov

[8]Paul Starobin, "'The Stans' Are Seizing the Day", *Business Week*, October 15, 2001.

[9]Rustem Safronov, "Turkmenistan's Niyazov Implicated in Drug Smuggling", *Eurasia Insight*, March 31, 2002.

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however, it became clear that the Taliban also *needed* Al-Qaeda: to supply highly motivated troops in the absence of a real Taliban army; to give money in the absence of a state apparatus that could raise or manage money; and to supply ignorant village mullahs with ideological guidance, as Al-Qaeda's role in the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas suggests. Put differently, the Taliban needed Al-Qaeda because they lacked a state in the modern sense, even though such an organization would be outlawed under normal circumstances. Al-Qaeda needed a place where state structures had been destroyed by civil conflict and left unredressed by international assistance.

Weak states in general pose serious problems for American foreign policy, but our realpolitik orientation on powerful states often obscures this fact. If we list the major headaches of U.S. foreign policy since the end of the Cold War, we find that more have come from weak states such as Bosnia and Haiti than from powerful states like China. September 11 has shown the need for a major re-focusing of U.S. foreign policy to deal with such neglected cases because weak states that happen also to be Muslim states are prime locales for terrorist refuges. It is no accident that Somalia, Puntland (an unrecognized government within the former Somalia) and Yemen became the foci of American concern after the initial victories in Afghanistan. Few have remarked, however, on how much these places resemble each other.

Of course, there are many patches of this planet that lack normal, functioning states in the modern sense. Aside from Somalia and Yemen, we may name the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Georgia, Bosnia, Colombia, Iraq and others. It is no surprise that within these states are areas not recognized as states that fulfill the conditions for terrorism noted above—places such as the Republika Srpska and Herzeg-Bosna within Bosnia; Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Achara within Georgia; Chechnya within the Russian Federation;

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ernments have responded to Islamist threats with an indiscriminate crackdown on any and all religious practice lacking government approval.[10] Freedom of religion does not exist, but then neither do most other freedoms, as the State Department's own annual report on human rights demonstrates. As for the legacy bequeathed to Central Asia by the Soviet Union, it consists chiefly of ethnic division, depleted farmland, an obsolete industrial plant, widespread and perhaps irreversible environmental damage (epitomized by the notoriously devastated Aral Sea), and the ex-communist apparatchiks who continue to infest local politics.

In short, the neighborhood in which the United States is intent on pursuing expanded "engagement" is a singularly nasty one. That realization alone may not persuade policymakers in Washington that Central Asia merits the sort of calculated neglect that the United States habitually reserves for Africa. But it certainly ought to douse quixotic notions of securing "the integration of the newly independent states into Western economic, political and military institutions and practices"; in other words, of transforming the Central Asian republics into liberal democracies protected by professional-

[10]United States Helsinki Commission Briefing, "Escalating Violence and Rights Violations in Central Asia", Washington, DC, March 28, 2002.

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the Kurdish quasi-governments in northern Iraq; and FARC- (and paramilitary) controlled areas of Colombia.

Weak states that provide administration-free zones are open not only to fanatics but to criminals and drug lords, as well. Afghanistan is the source of the bulk of the world's heroin, and most of it passes through Central Asia. Moreover, the decay of government authority in Central Asia is already a reality in some states and a possibility in all of them, particularly in remote mountainous areas that have always been recalcitrant to central control. The potential for such Muslim areas to provide religious fanatics and havens and to tempt state sponsors—three of the elements of Islamist terrorism—is very high.

This is already an urgent problem. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are on the verge of failed-state status. When the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), a terrorist organization made up of many different nationalities, invaded Kyrgyzstan a few years ago with a few hundred fighters, the Kyrgyz government was unable to dislodge them. They finally left after an enormous bribe. This disaster was the result of President Askar Akaev's failure to build a normal army, the historical precondition of a modern state. Shoring up the feeble statehood of several Central Asian states is an important anti-terrorist task for the United States, and nothing we can do to this end is as important as training combat-capable armed forces. We began doing this quietly after the IMU incursion, but the pace and scope of this aid has greatly increased since September 11. We need to see this process through to success. This will take time, and it will be facilitated immensely by a local U.S. military presence.

Finally on this point, weak states in the former Soviet Union are a particular problem for the United States. This is because we have treated the map that came into being at the end of 1991 as a permanent international settlement, like the negotiated settlements of 1815 and 1919. We regard those borders as permanent, but several states there, including Tajikistan, do not control all their nominal territory. That heightens the stakes of

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ized armed forces.[11]

Yet it hasn't. Some senior Bush Administration officials, at least, persist in pretending otherwise. After a trip through the region in February 2002—but sounding like she had just gotten off the plane from Saigon in 1962—Beth Jones, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, described her expectations of what the United States was going to achieve in Central Asia. Jones expressed confidence that in return for an "enhanced mil-mil relationship", governments in the region would step up to meet U.S. expectations regarding "economic reform, democratic reform, and human rights." Already she detected signs that Central Asians were getting with the program. Jones found it especially heartening that at her urging President Karmiov had agreed to allow the UN Rapporteur on Torture to enter Uzbekistan and to permit the International Committee of the Red Cross to inspect government detention centers.

The idea that, by entertaining the Rapporteur on Torture, President Karimov has somehow taken a crucial first step toward embracing liberal principles is risible. For the United States to have any hope of incorporating Uzbekistan and its four Central Asian neighbors into what is loosely referred to as the West would require a level of

[11]Stephen Blank advocates this in "The United States and Central Asia", Roy Allison and Lena Jonson, eds., *Central Asian Security* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2001), p. 128.

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Fairbanks, continued

our general diplomatic posture of support for the consolidation of independent statehood in Central Asia along invariant territorial lines. Russian attempts to "re-integrate" the former Soviet Union, such as they are, run counter to our diplomatic design. We can affect Russian behavior, however, not only by negotiating with them but by changing the facts with which they work. Stronger states in Central Asia will diminish Russia's interest in a revisionist foreign policy. Thus, a policy aimed primarily at preventing and deterring terrorism can work at the same time as a bulwark against lingering imperial tendencies in Russian foreign policy.

The Value of Moderate Muslim Countries

BECAUSE THE general atmosphere of Muslim countries provides an atmosphere conducive to anti-American terrorism, the United States has a great stake in the success of Muslim states with a moderate orientation. Muslims regard Islam as an *umma*—a single community—and the points of view that exist within it are important for the direction that the community as a whole will take. This is the reason that Israel has expended such effort to cultivate the Central Asian states. A similar effort should serve us as well.

We start with a major advantage. Traditional Islam in Central Asia never took the Wahhabi form that most often supplies the doctrinal element in contemporary Islamist terrorism. Attachment to formal as opposed to folk or Sufi Islam was never strong among the nomads, the ancestors of the Kazakhs, Kyrgyz and Turkmen, and the Soviet period made the ruling elites of every republic very secular in orientation. Central Asian elites understand and even exaggerate the danger of some forms of Islam to their new states. People are currently rediscovering Islam, some as cultural identity, some in traditional form, and a few as political extremists. But having suffered intra-ethnic violence and seen civil war in Tajikistan,

Bacevich, continued

sustained and comprehensive involvement that exceeds by an order of magnitude anything that this administration (or its successors) is likely to support. Even if the United States were willing to undertake such a project—one that would dwarf the Marshall Plan in scope—success would likely be decades in the offing. In Europe after World War II, the task at hand was to assist in rebuilding what war had destroyed. In Central Asia, the equivalent task is immensely larger. It is to create institutions and inculcate values that have never existed—a worthy cause, no doubt, but one for which the American taxpayer may be unwilling to foot the bill.

IF ADVANCING the cause of democracy and human rights does not form a plausible rationale for U.S. policy, then what actually underlies the Bush Administration's sudden preoccupation with the region? If a new "Great Game" has commenced in Central Asia, what are its stakes?

One obvious answer, of course, is oil and natural gas. An "enhanced mil-mil relationship" between the Pentagon and local armies is unlikely to yield much in the way of transforming the region into a garden of liberalism. But it could reduce the chances of some hostile power hijacking the region's energy reserves. By converting Central Asia into a quasi-protectorate—much as it did the Persian Gulf after Great Britain departed—the United States could ensure that the exploitation

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nearly everyone is wary of anything that might spark fighting on a sectarian basis. Thus the Central Asian states, if they can become strong states, can provide significant support for our conception of international order: culturally diverse but tolerant and peaceful.

Closely related to such a conception is the more general American desire to help people, which is not only noble but self-interested. America and its friends account for some 78 percent of "gross world product." September 11 was a sign that the accumulation of American power has reached a point where almost all enemies will respond to us asymmetrically: that is, outside the traditional arena of world politics. America, like Rome at the end of the Second Punic War, seems to be turning into the kernel of a world empire. The only thing that can make a world empire acceptable, however, is some kind of beneficence. Policies such as ending the slave trade made Britain's position in the first half of the 19th century more legitimate. Beneficence—for us, assistance to those who want to be free, action for human rights and democracy, and tolerance—sometimes crosses other foreign policy aims, and it always runs the risk of hypocrisy. But it is still important. A policy to work intensively with the existing Central Asian regimes may be justified by national interest, but it requires as well an active concern for the long-term encouragement of positive trends in these societies.

Unless we act more seriously than we have in the recent past, however, our effort at improvement will indeed seem hypocritical. The United States, the most influential democratic country, routinely protests the lack of free elections in places like Turkmenistan, where the question of elections has no practical relevance. But we do nothing effective in cases where the question is current, where there is international leverage for positive change, and where we would pay only a small price for greater activism. Kyrgyzstan, for example, began as the most democratic country in Central Asia, but has strayed from the path. Enormous foreign debt, which cannot be repaid, dependence on foreign aid

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of the region's energy reserves proceeds in such a way as to serve American purposes as opposed to those of Iran or Russia or China.

There is nothing inherently nefarious or even selfish about this. The U.S. interest in the world's energy resources is legitimate, real and—especially as long as Americans continue their love affair with gas guzzlers—even compelling. But before announcing that the imperatives of "global leadership" require incorporating Central Asia into the American imperium, policymakers ought to tote up some of the potential complications that lie in store. These include all of the following:

First, by inserting itself into Central Asian affairs, the United States runs the risk of becoming further identified with regimes that are corrupt and repressive. The charge will stick because it will be accurate: compared to the likes of Rahmonov, Karimov and Niyazov, even the shah of Iran in his later years was a model of probity and enlightened rule.

Second, as a corollary, by making itself the guarantor of regional stability—in effect, of the political status quo—the United States will likely fuel anti-American sentiment and exacerbate rather than alleviate Islamic radicalism, not just in Central Asia but throughout the Islamic world.

Third, as the embodiment of the U.S. presence (and as the ostensible purveyors of an alien and unwelcome culture), American soldiers and diplomats can expect to become targets of those who find that presence offensive. Costly and

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Fairbanks, continued

and international investment, and the threat of extreme Islamist groups give the democratic community enormous leverage in Bishkek. Major geopolitical interests are scarcely at issue. Nonetheless, democratic countries have passively observed the dimming of Kyrgyzstan's democratic prospects. When President Akaev's major rival, former Bishkek mayor Felix Kulov, was prevented by various shenanigans from actively contesting the 2000 presidential election, the only American responses were private ambassadorial remonstrances, a brief scolding from visiting Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and a testy phrase or two in a State Department press briefing. There were *no* concrete consequences.

U.S. human rights policy needs to differentiate its strategies toward various countries, seeking objectives that are obtainable. Free elections *are* conceivable in Kyrgyzstan, and they might change the nature of the system. Free elections are impossible for years under the present Uzbek or Turkmen regimes, so we should not demand them. The registration of a human rights NGO, on the other hand, was achieved in Uzbekistan in the circumstances of the new U.S.-Uzbek relationship after September 11. Sometimes governments will accept some risks in domestic relations if their external security seems to be better guaranteed, and this is the effect of our arrival on all the Central Asian states. We should leverage our presence to achieve feasible change and thereby strive to reduce over time the problem of working with Central Asia's authoritarian regimes.

Of course, interference in the ways of Central Asian rulers may sour their zeal for military cooperation. We can reduce our risk in this respect by maintaining several military relationships in the region. That will enable us to shift from one base to another if need be, remaining relatively detached from tense Central Asian rivalries. Countering all the inconveniences of their relationships with America, too, will be an eagerness to have us as a counterweight to post-colonial Russia.

Bacevich, continued

concerted efforts will be required to avert a recurrence of Beirut, Khobar Towers, or the attack on the U.S.S. *Cole*. If recent experience tells us anything, it is that a 100 percent success rate at force protection is unlikely.

Fourth, as a further consequence, a military establishment already complaining of being overstretched and overworked will find itself called upon to do even more. The problem will not be money but people. A widening imperial perimeter requires ever more sentries. But the recent surge of patriotic sentiment notwithstanding, young Americans are no more eager to risk their lives outposting the empire today than they were before September 11.

Fifth, however determined policymakers may be to limit the scope of the U.S. involvement, the imperative of satisfying (or at least placating) various constituencies at home will create temptations for counterproductive meddling. An administration engaged in Central Asia will find itself facing demands from earnest citizens that it "do something" on behalf of religious freedom or women's rights or the environment, demands likely to be all the more insistent because the conditions in the region are genuinely egregious. To disregard these advocates completely is to incur their wrath, expressed at the polls. But to make concession to their concerns is to be drawn further into the vortex of Central Asian affairs than actual U.S. interests, seen realistically, could possibly justify.

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There is always a danger in overstaying a welcome, but in Central Asia today there is a danger of *under*staying a welcome, too. Just as it proved unwise to abandon Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Red Army in 1989, so it would be a mistake to give up too soon trying to help Central Asian states become forces for moderation and stability in the Muslim world.

STABILIZING AFGHANISTAN

MOST IMPORTANT of all, it will prove extremely difficult, if not impossible, to stabilize Afghanistan without a military presence in the former Soviet republics to the north. Weak or failed states foster terrorism, especially if they are Muslim; if Afghanistan is prey to the lawlessness, misery and statelessness that now exist, then the Taliban, or another group like it, will rise again in a few years, attract groups such as Al-Qaeda and we will face September 11—or worse—all over again.

Our task in Afghanistan, which the Bush Administration understands well, is to restore the economy by a route other than renewed opium production, to build an Afghan state that can control Taliban remnants, and to educate Pashtun youth to a more centrist version of Islam. There has been scant recognition so far, however, on just how difficult this task will be.

To do any of this, America needs stability in Afghanistan, and no stability is possible without some approximate balance between the competing ethnic factions within the country and their foreign patrons. The interim government is "multiethnic", but bureaucratic titles mean little in a country that has been hacked apart by civil war for thirty years. In such a situation the "power ministries", to use the expressive post-Soviet jargon, are decisive. Mohammed Fahim and Yonus Qanuni, the Ministers of Defense and Interior, are the masters, along with their close ally, Foreign Minister Abdullah. The way they use their mastery is eloquently expressed by their choice of generals for the new "national" army: 36 of the initial 38 generals were Tajiks, most of

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OTHER considerations that should affect calculations about U.S. policy in Central Asia lie in the realm of geopolitics. In that regard, two stand out.

Russia will view any long-term U.S. presence in the region as (yet another) American intrusion into *its* sphere of influence. As Charles Fairbanks himself has observed, "Russia is extremely frightened of us remaining there."[12] Is it wise to frighten Russia? Over the past dozen years Moscow has endured a long list of slights, insults and humiliations, some real, others imagined. The United States ought to ask itself whether adding to that list constitutes sound policy—not because Russian power any longer commands special deference or respect, but because a wounded and resentful Russia poses a source of potential danger and diplomatic enervation.

For its part, China will surely interpret the American military presence in Central Asia as evidence that the United States is engaged in a concerted effort to encircle the People's Republic. If, indeed, policymakers in Washington have concluded that Beijing is bent on challenging the U.S. claim to regional hegemony—that following in the footsteps of Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union, China is destined to be America's next arch-antagonist—then a policy of military encirclement may be justified. But if a Sino-American conflict, whether cold or hot, is not yet inevitable, then perhaps a certain circumspection on the part of the

[12]Fairbanks quoted in Buzbee, March 12, 2002.

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Fairbanks, continued

them, like Fahim, Qanuni and Abdullah, of Panjshiri background.

Postwar Afghanistan is so far an endeavor to dominate fourteen or more discordant ethnic and religious groups not by the Northern Alliance, nor by Tajiks, nor even by Sunni Tajiks, but by *Panjshiri* Sunni Tajiks—the inhabitants of just one valley in a very big country. Such a project will inevitably invite the hostility of most other ethnic groups and factions. Moreover, because every Afghan group has a foreign patron, this audacious attempt throws the equilibrium among foreign states out of balance. During the years of Taliban rule, the Northern Alliance depended predominantly on Russia and Iran. Iran now plays a more independent game in western Afghanistan, but the Panjshiris still look to Russia.[1]

The Russian government has taken advantage of U.S. military victories in Afghanistan to pursue objectives there that are directly opposed to America's own policy and interests. With the Panjshiri Tajiks as their utensils, Moscow essays again the establishment of preponderant Russian influence over Afghan affairs. The Russian project in Afghanistan is staggering in its boldness. When there was a Soviet Union, something similar was tried with the instrument of Afghan communism, and then with an army that had overawed all of Eurasia. Now, shrunken Russia—with an economy contracted to less than South Korean dimensions, a weakened state and a demoralized army—tries again. It is hardly child's play. The mischief being done by Russia in Afghanistan should be con-

[1]Russia's present sway over the Panjshiris can be judged from the sudden apparition in the news, as the Northern Alliance began to win victories, of Chechens, a small and distant people, by the hundreds or thousands among the prisoners and slain. No Chechen, alive or dead, has yet been produced, however. Chechens are not an Afghan obsession but a Russian one. Their introduction into Northern Alliance briefings serves only Russian interests.

Bacevich, continued

United States would be wiser.

These potential consequences are possibilities, not predictions. But they point to the conclusion that if the entry of the United States into Central Asia under the guise of fighting terror presents certain attractive opportunities, pursuing those opportunities raises certain perils. To venture into the steppes is to venture into a minefield. That does not mean that we shouldn't hazard the journey, but the decision is not one to be taken lightly.

Decisions made in the coming months regarding America's role in Central Asia could well constitute a watershed in the evolution of U.S. foreign policy after the Cold War. Rather than deferring matters to the Bush Administration and obligingly endorsing the results, Americans should insist on a public debate of the prospective implications of asserting U.S. power in that remote region. Only by promoting such a debate will they begin to unwrap the secret that members of the policy elite have long since divined: the pre-eminent challenge facing the United States in the 21st century is not eradicating terror but managing the informal American empire acquired during the course of the century just past.

Managing that empire successfully will require that American statesmen manifest any number of virtues, not least among them steadfastness and courage of the sort that George W. Bush has demonstrated since September 11. But

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sidered when we weigh the utility—and the future—of our Central Asian military presence.

The ethnic group that has lost the most from the recent war is the Pashtuns. Pashtuns dominated the Taliban government and the Afghan monarchy from the 18th century, making it still less likely that Pashtuns will accept for long a settlement biased against them. The external patron of the Taliban Pashtuns was Pakistan, which has a huge stake in their fate because there are so many Pashtuns within Pakistan. The shipwreck of Pakistani interests in the war raises profound questions about the survival of General Musharraf, who made the brave decision to suddenly reverse a long Pakistani policy and help us. Musharraf has been able to control Islamic effervescence in Pakistan during the war, and thus to give us military bases. But given the war's outcome, the long tradition of Muslim extremism in the subcontinent, and Pakistan's huge social problems, how long can we rely on Pakistan for bases to operate in Afghanistan? As an insurance policy at the least, the utility of an alternative base for Afghan operations in Central Asia should be obvious.

THE VERY surge of energy we Americans pull from within us to accomplish great tasks hides within it the temptation not to follow through, because it lifts us above everyday things. An entrepreneur who discovers a new way to make a fortune and builds it into a great corporation is likely, just because of that, to neglect the dreary slogging afterward: answering the mail, paying the bills, balancing the books. We can too easily "yield to. . . the relief of victory", as Churchill called it.[2] When we had triumphantly routed the Iraqi army in 1991, we relaxed into these so human moods and left the work at the edge of completion. Having so recently had this experience and seen the results, we should know better than to repeat that lapse. □

[2]*The World Crisis 1914–1918: The Aftermath* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929), p. 15.

imperial statecraft also requires a keen sense of priorities and an appreciation of limits. As Americans ponder the nature, purpose and extent of their imperium, Central Asia offers a crucial preliminary test of their ability to demonstrate those attributes. It will by no means be the last. □

Terror, Islam and Democracy

Islamist terrorism is first and foremost an ideological and moral challenge to liberal democracy. . . . [Its] religious vocabulary hides violent Islamism's true nature as a modern totalitarian challenge to both traditional Islam and modern democracy. . . . Although few in the West may remember it today, it is difficult to overstate the degree to which the aestheticization of death, the glorification of armed force, the worship of martyrdom, and faith in 'the propaganda of the deed' shaped the antiliberal ethos of both the far Right and elements of the far Left earlier in the twentieth century. . . . Every Islamist terror campaign against Westerners during the last 20 years has had as its cognate an Islamist effort to tyrannize over a Muslim population somewhere in the world.

—Ladan and Roya Boroumand, *Journal of Democracy*, April 2002

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

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Poor Kyrgyzstan

Richard A. Slaughter

DURING THE 19th century it became increasingly clear to Western economists (and at least some statesmen) that genuine wealth did not come from the exploitation of colonial resources and markets, but from increased production made possible by education, technological innovation, specialization and trade. In time, this recognition raised the revolutionary idea that wealthy, advanced nations had an enlightened self-interest in helping poorer nations to thrive materially. This idea, which in due course was assimilated into the Wilsonian pantheon of political virtue that makes up democratic peace theory, has taken on special significance since September 11 of last year. Now nation-building, and the *sine qua non* of economic development that is the precondition for it, are recognized almost universally as security issues. Unfortunately, we do not do these things well.

Despite—or perhaps because of—the existence of several large professional bureaucracies whose very *raison d'être* is to work the foreign poverty problem, no professional consensus exists to explain why some countries succeed and others fail to grow. This lack of consensus is reflected in the record of the many methods that have been tried, discarded, combined, recombined and recycled over the years: free trade, direct aid, technology transfer, infrastructure support, foreign direct investment, technical assistance for institutional reform, and so on. All this is despite the fact that over the past half century there have been three phases of assisted economic development in U.S. foreign policy from which to draw lessons.

The first of these, involving the Marshall Plan and the economic resuscitation of Japan, was clearly successful. The second, in which the United States shared the effort with others, focused on the former colonies of the European powers in the 1960s and 1970s. Its record was decidedly mixed. The third effort began in the wake of the Soviet collapse; here, too, success so far has been spotty. A few countries—Poland, Estonia, Slovenia—have done well, but most, particularly those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, have not. The obvious high-stakes question before us is: What have we learned from all this?

I spent the better part of a year recently on an Asian Development Bank (ADB) technical assistance project in Kyrgyzstan, and I shall consider the question with respect to that country. Studied without illusion, the example of Kyrgyzstan shows that the standard pre-

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scription of foreign aid and investment flows from the developed to the non-developed world may be neither necessary nor sufficient for growth or democratization.[1]

Theory and Practice

A STRATEGY for assisted economic development should logically be based in a theory of how economies work. In the immediate post-World War II experience, however, the task of connecting aid efforts to economic theory was derailed by the very speed of the success achieved. The pre-war democracies needed only investment and free trade; they had human capital and institutional coherence. Germany and Japan, both of which had ample human capital, were occupied and their entire economic and political structures rebuilt with Western oversight. After 1953, the European states had the additional benefit of the Coal and Steel Community, and then the European Economic Community, to assist transparency and to reduce trade barriers.

The post-colonial aid experience, it came to be believed, required more work, time and money than were forthcoming. The theory thus took root, in rather circular fashion, that development failures were caused by a dearth of external inputs. But this was not so. No amount of investment, concessional loans, and market access would have been enough to spark growth in countries whose political institutions operated on a model more akin to 15th-century Spain than to 17th-century Britain or 20th-century America.

The post-Soviet era in Kyrgyzstan and the rest of Central Asia bears no resemblance to the foreign aid circumstances of the late 1940s and 1950s. Despite being joined to an essentially European industrial core, the newly independent states resemble the former European colonies in Africa much more than they do the former East European satellites of the Soviet Union. In many, the rule of law—in the particular sense of limited government and protection for private property rights—has still not taken hold; arbitrary rule by, for and on behalf of the ruling ethnic group continues to breed violence and poverty while limiting growth. Such circumstances can, and often do, co-exist misleadingly with elections and a relatively free press.

In order to solve these problems, the various constituent parts of the international foreign aid armada (both the post-World War II donor agencies and newer contenders such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development), accompanied by a horde of NGOs and consultants, has come loaded with external inputs. There are four principal arrows in their collective quiver: privatization, loans, direct grants and technical assistance. They have not worked any better in Kyrgyzstan during the last decade than they did in the Third World starting in the 1960s. Privatization has allowed unscrupulous managers to asset-strip enterprises, effectively de-industrializing the country. Development loans are viewed as "free money" by receiving ministries. Targeted grants are usually successful in meeting short-term objectives, but do little to inculcate responsible habits or construct the institutions needed to encourage long-term, stable growth. Foreign consultants regularly arrive to

[1]The project focused on poverty relief through better efficiency in health care and education delivery, and was in turn attached to an ongoing loan project intended to rehabilitate schools and hospitals in the three southernmost Kyrgyz provinces. See Asian Development Bank TA No. 3106-KGZ *Benchmark Report, Section V:* "Social Sector Funding, Economic and Tax Analysis" (Djalal-Abad City, Kyrgyz Republic, April 2001).

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provide counsel and guidance, but their advice is not translated into practical action. The Kyrgyz run the risk of becoming ever more dependent on foreign aid; one village mayor, speaking of a school renovation underwritten by a foreign-aid loan, said, "It will last for twenty years, and then someone else will repair it for us." A fifth tool is the development of indigenous natural resources via foreign private investment, facilitated by tax concessions, free enterprise zones (FEZs) and special terms for joint ventures. In Kyrgyzstan, however, these efforts are often launched without consideration for what the investment will do to local entrepreneurial activity, domestic savings, or the potential economic return relative to the subsidy provided.

The difficulty with all these tools is not so much the tools themselves but the theory of economic development that directs their employment. The development agencies mechanistically attack poverty and maladministration as symptoms indistinguishable from the disease that causes them. They deploy what amounts to an input-output model which assumes that a given mix of inputs (in this case, public administration, macroeconomic policy, directed infrastructure and investment subsidies) will produce a given set of outputs—a growing export sector and higher income, generating government revenues to fund education, health care and social welfare.[2] But just how the transformation is to occur is a "black box", partly undefined and partly ascribed to local politics and culture—factors that can be neither quantified nor much affected by the "deliverables" of aid agencies and consultants.

A better theoretical approach to the problems of development, which we might call the institutional approach, has been elaborated in recent years by several scholars, including Nobel prize-winning economists Douglass C. North and Ronald Coase, as well as Latin American economist Hernando de Soto, British analyst Peter Bauer, and others.[3] Coase was interested in how transactional costs—the costs of obtaining information and enforcing agreements—explain the development of human organizational and legal systems. North has been interested in the derivative question of how the institutions that arise from those organizational patterns and systems promote or inhibit economic growth. De Soto identifies the lack of property rights—the right to have legal title to property and to be able to mortgage or sell it at low administrative cost—as the primary obstacle to Third World development. Bauer, who passed away on May 2, focused on culture, corruption, and the failure of input-output approaches to take them and other aspects of political reality firmly into account.

When one looks at Kyrgyzstan, where only the input-output approach has been put to the test, one sees proof of North's observation that such countries are "poor because the institutional constraints define a set of payoffs to political/economic activity that does not encourage

[2]Wassily Leontief, the foremost proponent of input-output analyses of economic structure, might not agree with this use of the term, but for our purposes it will do.

[3]See Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Ronald Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", *Economica* (1937), reprinted in Oliver E. Williamson and Sidney G. Winter, eds., *The Nature of the Firm: Origins, Evolution, and Development* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991); Hernando de Soto, *The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else* (New York: Basic Books, 2000); and Peter Bauer, *From Subsistence to Exchange and Other Essays* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

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productive activity." This bespeaks the potential value of the institutional approach, but also draws attention to the inherent difficulty of economic development and nation-building in places without the institutional and attitudinal predicates for them.

Backdrop

THE KYRGYZ Republic is one of five Central Asian Islamic republics on the southern fringe of what was the Soviet Union, all of which came within the Russian sphere during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The region's contemporary resource base consists of Caspian oil and natural gas, to which the Kazakhs and Turkmen have access through control of the Caspian Sea's eastern shore, as well as some gold mines, hydroelectric power, and agriculture. At the forefront of agricultural production is the Fergana Valley, which formed part of the fabled Silk Road and which runs west to east from the current border of southern Uzbekistan into southwestern Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all own part of the lower Fergana Valley, the borders twisted together in awkward fashion. Significant Uzbek enclaves lie inside Kyrgyzstan, and a tongue of Uzbekistan separates the two major southern Kyrgyz cities, Osh and Jalal-Abad.

While Kyrgyzstan's southwest contains part of the Fergana Valley, its mountainous eastern provinces, lying just north of China's Xinjiang province, are both poor and sparsely populated. The northwest, which lies on the Kazakh steppes, features only Bishkek, the country's capital. It is the richest part of the country because it contains the capital, what is left of the industrial base, and the rail line from European Russia. The north and south are split by the Tien Shan range, one of several high mountain ranges in Central Asia. Peaks there reach almost 23,000 feet; even the passes exceed 9,800 feet, and can be altogether impassible in winter.

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There are two primary cultural threads at work. The first, nomadic and tribal, harks back to the Mongol invasions of the 13th–14th centuries, when prior civilizations were either eliminated or driven westward to Turkey. There is little architecture in the region (except in Samarkand), no art, and no cultural descendants left from before that time. Both the Kazakhs and the Kyrgyz are descended from the invaders, speak similar Turkic languages and share many customs. The other cultural thread is Persian, which spread into the Central Asian vacuum over the past several centuries. Persian influence is strongest in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, the latter being the only Central Asian country whose main language, Dari, is closer to Farsi than to Turkish. The Kyrgyz look down on the Uzbeks as "market people" in the same way that most English aristocrats viewed someone "in trade" in the 19th century. The difference is that the Kyrgyz are not aristocrats but horse traders and nomads. They discount the future at a much higher rate than do the Uzbeks (or than did 19th-century English aristocrats), and are much poorer as a result.

Both Turkic/nomadic and Persian threads were overlaid by the Russian Empire in the 19th century, and the country has been much affected by both that overlay and its recent recession. Today, for example, the Kyrgyz, as the governing ethnic group (now become again a small majority as many Russians and Germans have left), hold the public positions formerly held by Russians, who still make up 18 percent of the populace. These public positions, including most police, military and ministerial jobs, provide the best opportunity for extra income by charging under-the-table access fees. These opportunities are unavailable to the Uzbeks, who number 14 percent of the total population nationally but over 40 percent in the southwest. This is producing growing ethnic friction.

Geography also mixes cultural differences with economic problems. Southerners see northerners as leeches living off their labor, because the south is the country's food basket and the northern industrial base collapsed in the early 1990s. While southerners detest the "parasites" in the north, northerners look with disdain on the more traditional south. Among our project staff, the Bishkek people almost invariably start a conversation in Russian, the colonial language; those from Jalal-Abad speak first in Kyrgyz or Uzbek, the languages of emerging nationality. Many conversations will contain all three languages, frequently with a healthy sprinkling of English. The differences find many expressions. On one flight to Jalal-Abad, my flatmate (tall, blond, pale and obviously American) was seated next to a Bishkek woman who, practicing her English, inquired where he was from. He said "*Jalal-Abad.*" She pressed further: "I mean, in what city do you live." He answered, in Russian, "*Ya iz Jalal-Abada*" (literally, "I am from Jalal-Abad."). Her immediate response, accompanied by a look of deep concern, was "Oh, I am so sorry."

In many ways, however, life in the more rural Jalal-Abad has its attractions, at least for sojourning foreign technical specialists. Unlike Sovietized Bishkek, Jalal-Abad is truly Central Asian. It evinces the Uzbek-Kyrgyz mix and feels more like a large village than a city. The predominant housing is the traditional Central Asian communal compound. Roosters crow and dogs bark from sunrise to sunset; mullahs call the faithful to prayer several times a day, women sell by sing-song their butter and eggs in the morning, and the neighbors' sheep drop scented marbles in one's path in the afternoon.

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Life seems juxtaposed between centuries. Rural housing is primarily adobe, with an average structural expectancy of about six years. Ninety percent of the population live in their own homes and have electrical power, but outages are both random and frequent. Voltage is usually below standard; gas pressure is extremely variable, and since there are no safety valves, it is possible for a gas burner to go out during the afternoon with the flow resuming during the night. Schools and hospitals are largely built of mud and straw or Soviet concrete slab construction; most roofs, of compressed asbestos, leak. Hot water for sterilization in a hospital might consist of an electrified coil dipped into a bucket. Donkey carts, side by side with cars and trucks, transport everything from asbestos roof tiles to television sets. While installation of a telephone land line ($1 a month) might take six months, a cell phone can be had in a half hour (at international prices, and one must pay in cash for air time in advance). While internet servers are not dependable, they and the phone system work well enough that business can be conducted around the world at any time of day or night, power or no. I have arranged dinner meetings in Boise, Idaho with speakers in Virginia or Texas and staff in Washington using e-mail in the dark at a hall table in Jalal-Abad.

Life centers on small-scale economic activity; most businesses are small retail operations, ranging from old women selling candy and cigarettes from a TV tray in front of their homes to kiosk-like stalls on the street, in the bazaars or in pedestrian tunnels under main streets. While the population is 98 percent literate and higher education is prized, there is no demand for educated workers, leading to downward pressure on wages and massive underemployment. The primary driver for our ADB assistance crew was formerly an assistant factory manager; our translators, with college degrees, were happy to be paid $250 a month, our Jalal-Abad cook and housekeeper $15 a week. Our Jalal-Abad driver charged $10 a day for himself and his car, including gas, which sells—like everything else imported—at world prices. At that rate, he was subsidizing us.

The picture one gets from a close-up view of Kyrgyz politics is similarly mixed and colorful. In the beginning there was great hope for democracy in independent Kyrgyzstan. President Askar Akaev made democratic-sounding noises, the press was mostly free, and the republic acceded to the WTO in 1998. These impressions, however, belied deeper problems. The 2000 presidential election was largely determined in advance through language proficiency tests, the imprisonment of political challengers for alleged corruption, and other means of eliminating serious opposition to Akaev's third term. The irony was not lost on the people; when I asked my Bishkek driver and good friend how long it had taken to count the ballots, he replied that "the results were known months ago."

The Origins of Kyrgyz Poverty

POVERTY IS unevenly distributed in Kyrgyzstan, and is particularly endemic in the Kyrgyz countryside. A 1997 survey conducted jointly between the Kyrgyz statistical agency and the International Development Association (IDA) determined that, according to IDA criteria, almost two-thirds of the rural population was poor, while a bit more than one-quarter of urban residents were so situated.[4] The study also found that

[4]International Development Association and the National Statistical Committee, Kyrgyz Republic, "Update on Poverty in the Kyrgyz Republic", Report No. 19425-KG, June 1999.

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population had been shifting from urban to rural areas. GDP has declined by over 60 percent since 1990 due to the disruption of old Soviet trade patterns. The 1998 Russian economic collapse further set back what had been a satisfactory recovery to that point. In Bishkek, however, the streets are full of cars and people have money to spend, even as elderly widows beg because inflation has undermined their survivors' pensions.

The finding that Kyrgyz poverty is most prevalent in rural areas—and this, of course, it has in common with much of the Third World—has had a bracing impact on the international aid agencies active in Kyrgyzstan. These include the aforementioned European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), but also the Swiss Coordinating Committee, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. Treasury Department, and the Asian Development Bank among others. Deploying their input-output model, they have focused on rural poverty: agricultural aid, school and hospital rehabilitation or construction, and modification of subsidies to target them more specifically to the poorest in society. The strategy is not likely to succeed for the simple reason that the assumptions underlying it are wrong—on two critical counts.

First, the source of Kyrgyz poverty is fundamentally urban (not rural) and is political (not economic) in origin. Second, raising agricultural productivity on a fixed land base will reduce, not raise, agricultural wages. Since there is little value-added food processing and Uzbekistan interferes with shipments to external markets, higher production translates into lower market prices. This latter point is economically obvious, or should be, and there is no reason to belabor it. The first point, however, is critical, and illustrates, among other things, the utility of the institutional model of economic development.

THE KYRGYZ poor are in the countryside partly because the private response to economic collapse in 1993 and again in 1998 was for urbanites to move to villages where there was family support and where one could engage in subsistence farming. So while nominal incomes declined sharply on the national level, the rural population, household production, and barter trade rose. Few people went hungry.

Economic growth tends to occur in cities, and for good reason. Rural areas are frequently poorer than urban areas because low population density and the greater distance to markets raise transportation costs and inhibit economies of scale. The residents of mountainous areas are doubly affected by this fundamental economic fact of life because, by definition, they are low-density populations with little arable land that suffer very high transportation costs.[5] Appropriate technology in rural villages and micro-credits help, but are not sufficient. Large-scale subsidized infrastructure investment, in the absence of supportive legal and financial institutions, is not the answer either, having led Kyrgyz debt from zero to more than 150 percent of GDP in less than ten years. Because social infrastructure investment must be paid for from general economic gain, the new infrastructure—whether improved transportation or better schools—must help to generate those gains. Too often this is wishful thinking because institutional structures inhibit the economic activity that the infrastructure would otherwise support, while public works corruption diverts up to 90 percent of the capital into private

[5]See S. Frederick Starr, "Altitude Sickness", *The National Interest* (Fall 2001).

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pockets. If the anticipated growth does not occur, expenditures on infrastructure perversely weigh down the rest of the economy.

It is indisputable that an underdeveloped country requires investment capital. How the capital is obtained, however, matters a great deal. In the Kyrgyz case, it is obtained almost entirely through foreign loans (for infrastructure) or subsidized foreign investment (for industry). Almost no capital investment in Krygyzstan comes from its own citizens. This contrasts with nearly all successful development cases, where most capital is raised internally and most foreign direct investment is private.

Foreign loans underwrite the entire infrastructure program, social sector rehabilitation and reform and other projects in Kyrgyzstan. Tax concessions include a Free Economic Zone in which manufacturing activity is freed from 70 percent of taxes that would otherwise apply, and concessions are offered for specific projects. These concessions result in a very uneven playing field for business. In Bishkek, the new American hotel enjoys tax-free status, while the older Turkish hotel does not. The difference enables the more luxurious hotel to offer rates competitive with its less desirable cousin, and may well drive the latter out of business. On another front, the government has made a large investment in the Kumtor gold mine, which now accounts for one-third of the debt service. Total debt service accounted for 25 percent of government outlays in 1999, and nearly 50 percent in 2000.[6] Mine profits, of which the government is to receive two-thirds, have made scarce appearance.

International best practices, too, coming from a different economic environment, sometimes have perverse effects in Central Asia. One example is pension reform. In Kyrgyzstan, the pension tax was raised to fund future obligations, in line with defined benefit systems standards. The resulting tax rate, 38 percent combined tax on employee and employer (since reduced to 33 percent) is higher than the individual and business income tax rates. In a country whose relevant experience has been rapid inflation with non-indexed Soviet pensions, the population has no faith in the system. People work as hard to avoid the pension tax as they do to earn a living. Most workers outside what is left of the old industrial sector record the monthly minimum wage (now about $2), and take the remainder under the table, while their employers cook the books and negotiate with both suppliers and customers to make things balance for the tax inspector. When a problem is found, the tax inspector, for a fee, will provide advice on how to fix it. The result is a massive loss of tax revenue (and an underestimation of GDP) with a stifling effect on growth. Combined with trade restrictions imposed by Kyrgyzstan's neighbors (the Uzbeks and Kazakhs) in retaliation for Kyrgyz entry into the WTO, the tax structure and administration drive the economy underground and stifle growth.

Another example of institutional dysfunction is provided by energy policy. Energy, which inhibits economic development in Kyrgyzstan because it is unreliable, is wasted on a massive scale because subsidies leave no incentive for modernization or conservation. The Kyrgyz consume between three to five times as much energy as do Americans per unit of GDP, and yet produce, officially, 1/200 as much income.

For most consumers, there is little incentive to conserve electricity and much incentive to waste gas. Our house in Jalal-Abad had an electric furnace, while the cookhouse had a gas stove and a gas-fired heater for washing and for the sauna. The

[6]World Bank, *Kyrgyz Republic Fiscal Sustainability Study*, Report No. 20644-KG, June 2000.

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electricity was metered at six mills per kilowatt—about a fifth the cost of its production and delivery. The gas was metered, too, but because the meter only had three digits, the monthly bill was negotiated with the meter reader. Our landlady would regularly turn the electric furnace off at six every morning, in freezing weather, to save "that expensive electricity", but she cared less about the gas, even though the burners are so crude that they waste most of the energy used. We once fired the sauna for four hours; because the gas pressure was low, it would not heat to the required temperature. From the standpoint of the individual consumer, such profligate behavior is entirely rational.

Other features of Kyrgyz fiscal policy are also dysfunctional in macroeconomic terms. Most derive from political conditions that reward favoritism, nepotism and patronage, or are part of the social safety net (e.g., utilities priced well below cost). Public service amounts to clan-based sinecures for the connected.

Corruption is endemic. It is tempting to think that ending corruption could bring an end to poverty, and some development agencies assume exactly that.[7] But it isn't that simple when everyone (including young children) is involved in demanding payments, making them or evading taxes; where tribes and empire, not the nation-state, have been the political norm for millennia, and where Western legal and financial institutions have never existed. It would be a mistake, however, to ascribe corruption, inequality and poverty to traditional patterns alone. The present corruption in Central Asia—the "informal economy" as it is locally known—arose out of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Industry designed to serve European Russia succumbed quickly to market realities and most workers reverted to home production and barter. While the Soviet system had many problems, including its own forms of corruption, it was breathtakingly efficient compared to what exists now.

Corruption exists on several levels in contemporary Kyrgyzstan, two of which are of particular significance. The first is technically not corruption because it is government policy; it consists of the almost literal confiscation of cash flows wherever they can be found. The second, resulting from economic collapse, is best termed functional corruption. From the cop who bids for lucrative street corners to the teacher who sells access to class, passing grades and good references, to the public health surgeon who demands an under-the-table fee, corruption is a rational response to the absence of other economic opportunities. Most Kyrgyz engage in the informal cash economy, which produces no tax revenue at all.

The combined effect of an irrational tax structure, functional corruption and rent-seeking by government is that 80 percent or more of the Kyrgyz economy is underground, unreachable by taxes—which, of course, has the effect of leading government, under pressure from the IMF, to raise tax rates on the economic activity it *can* reach. The official GDP for 2000 was $242 per person, of which 25 percent was estimated to be underground, and from which the government collected 35 percent in taxes. Estimates of GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis range from $1,800 to $2,500 per person.[8] While PPP estimates have different meanings, the true level of economic activity is up to ten times what is reported and taxed. So Kyrgyzstan is not as poor as it seems. On the other hand, the greater the extent to which an economy is driven underground

[7]See Maureen Lewis, "Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern Europe and Central Asia?", World Bank, 2000.

[8]IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/131, October 2000, pp. 22–4.

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to home production, barter and unreported cash—the greater the extent to which economies of scale cannot be achieved and growth is inhibited.[9] This and other data lead to the conclusion that if Kyrgyzstan and its neighbors were to adopt institutional forms that enable the realization of potential output, they would no longer be poor.

It is clear from talking with businessmen and officials in the Finance Ministry that to do business in Kyrgyzstan one must either be based in a FEZ, plan to go bankrupt or operate illegally, all the while paying for official favors and evading taxation. Smuggling, keeping duplicate sets of books, negotiating tax evasion with employees, suppliers and clients, and paying bribes—all of which are rampant in Kyrgyzstan—would not occur if it were possible to make money legally. In short, a downward spiral is at work: economic activity produces little revenue for the government, leaving it with no money to invest or even to pay rudimentary salaries, so it attaches what it can find; and because government cannot pay for services and preys on whatever wealth it can locate, economic activity remains rudimentary and veiled. This cycle is death for any prospect of sustained or serious economic growth. This is, of course, precisely what the institutional theory of development predicts: If the system rewards unproductive expenditures of human time and energy, then unproductive consequences will inevitably ensue.

The government is not unaware of this reality. In 2001 the income tax was reduced from 30 percent to 10 percent—but the IMF objected, so the new rate is 20 percent. Small business (under $62,000 annual sales) taxes have been simplified. The pension system is under discussion, but President Akaev is opposed to change for financial reasons. The value-added tax remains 20 percent and the tax inspectorate has not been reformed.

In March, international creditors agreed to re-schedule the Kyrgyz debt on favorable terms, with five- and ten-year grace periods. This re-scheduling, together with the economic boost provided by the new U.S. military presence, should enable the government to resurrect social programs, adjust education, health, and police wages for past inflation, and institute necessary reforms. Such measures are not likely, however, and the government is running out of time. On March 17, a protest in Jalal-Abad triggered by the corruption trial of a popular southern parliamentarian turned deadly, producing the worst violence since a minor riot the night of the presidential elections in October 2000. For the last year President Akaev has increased the suppression of political dissent in the face of escalating opposition efforts to provoke incidents. After twelve years in office, busily supervising the disintegration of his country's economy, the President is becoming increasingly unpopular; he is openly blamed for persistent corruption and worsening poverty. Combined with the ethnic discrimination felt by the Uzbek population in the south, the potential for violence is increasing even if the Taliban-backed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) is no longer a threat, having been largely eliminated by the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan.

Some point to the memorandum of understanding (MOU) signed between the Kyrgyz Republic and the United States

[9]My analysis of countries in Central Asia, eastern and western Europe, and North America indicates that the greater the gap between the real economy, as measured by purchasing power parity, and the official GDP estimate, the poorer the country. Central Asian countries are at the bottom of this comparison; Kyrgyzstan is the worst of that group, at 8:1 PPP/GDP ratio. Turkey, for example, has a 2.2:1 ratio, the Czech Republic a ratio of 2.3:1.

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on February 15, 2002 (outlining commitments made by the Kyrgyz to open their economy and make progress toward democracy in return for international development aid) as proof that change is in the wind. The MOU should be seen as official cover for the U.S. military presence, however, because the international community, locked into its development model, really has no choice but to take Kyrgyz assurances at face value. Our experience has been that the Kyrgyz, not being irrational, have learned that they can tell the international community what it wants to hear and then use the money in the traditional way. They have not yet failed to get away with this approach. President Akaev, under domestic pressure because of growing impatience with development failures and growing repression, will most likely use his new breathing room to alleviate the symptoms a bit, while further padding the pockets of existing gatekeepers.

THREE GENERAL conclusions about assisted economic development can be drawn from the Kyrgyz experience. First, development assistance should not be burdened with equity and poverty reduction agendas. Such objectives tend to undermine the core development focus on basic institutions, defeating both goals in the end. Successful development will both reduce poverty of its own accord and provide revenues for the social safety net. We need to focus on the engine of growth, not its downstream effects.

Second, concessional lending in the absence of institutional reform leads to a trap, because the resulting infrastructure provides insufficient growth to pay its cost. The benefits of better infrastructure can only be realized if the economic activity it supports can provide a positive legal return to entrepreneurs. Otherwise, the governments of developing states will be smothered by rising debts that will, in turn, discourage both domestic and foreign investment.

Finally, and most important, governmental institutions must be designed to reduce, not increase, the costs of doing business. Regulation must provide transparency, not enable official rent-seeking. Contracts must be enforceable and taxes must be predictable and consistently applied. If these conditions can be met, many other problems will be easy to solve. If they are not met, no amount of inputs and no number of development entrepreneurs will make much of a difference. □

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Advisors, Czars and Councils

Organizing for Homeland Security

Ivo H. Daalder & I.M. Destler

NINE DAYS after September 11, President George W. Bush announced that the Federal government's effort to secure the American homeland against future terrorist attacks would be led by a new, White House-based Office of Homeland Security (OHS). He appointed his close friend, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge, to head the office. While this step was widely welcomed, there has been a near-consensus among Washington veterans that Ridge lacks the leverage necessary for the job, even as a member of the White House staff with clear and direct access to the President. "I fear that as an advisor who lacks a statutory mandate, Senate confirmation, and budget authority, he will not be as effective as we need him to be", Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) argued. "A homeland coordinator with only advisory authority is not enough. We need a robust executive agency to carry out the core functions of homeland defense."[1] Lieberman and others have accordingly introduced a number of proposals to rectify these imperfections, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Director Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr., recently told Congress that the administration was open to proposals for re-organization.[2]

Almost every proposal thus far seeks to fix the problem by bringing widely dispersed authorities and agencies into a new central structure. But centralization alone cannot be the main answer to this formidable challenge. Currently, responsibility for preventing, protecting against, and responding to a terrorist incident is spread not only across the Executive

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[1] "Statement by Senator Joe Lieberman on Homeland Security Legislation", October 11, 2001.

[2] "Prepared Statement by Mitchell E. Daniels, Jr.", before a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on Homeland Security Organization, April 11, 2002. Legislative proposals include: *Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001*, H.R. 525, 107 Cong. 1 sess. (introduced by Rep. Wayne Gilchrest, February 8, 2001); *Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001*, H.R. 1292, 107 Cong. 1 sess. (introduced by Rep. Ike Skelton, March 29, 2001); *The National Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism Act of 2002*, H.R. 4660, 107 Cong. 1 sess. (introduced by Rep. Mac Thornberry, May 2, 2002). A virtually identical bill, S. 2452, was introduced the same day by Senators Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter and Bob Graham.

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Branch, but also across Federal, state and local authorities. Moreover, the private sector also has a critical role to play. It is simply not possible, nor is it desirable, to bring all the major homeland security functions under a single roof.

What is needed instead is leadership, coordination and mobilization of the responsible agencies and their leaders—at the Federal, state and local levels. That is precisely the task President Bush has handed Governor Ridge. Given the number of agencies, interests and people involved, it is a task of truly mammoth proportions. It requires strong, personal support from the President, more than has been evident in the first seven months of Ridge's tenure. Past experiences in parallel coordinating efforts—for national security and economic policy—provide valuable lessons on how Ridge might accomplish the task. Within such a coordinating context, some consolidation of functionally similar activities (for example, dealing with border security) makes sense, as does making Ridge's position statutory and subject to Senate confirmation. Enhancing his authority over budgetary matters would make sense, as well. But on their own, the structural reforms championed by many critics of the current arrangement will be of little help, and could even undercut Ridge's ability to influence the broad range of government activity that he can never directly control.

Re-organization Would Help . . .

PRIOR TO September 11, a succession of government commissions as well as legislators argued that terrorism constituted a real threat to U.S. security, but that the U.S. government did not give the threat the priority it deserved.[3] Consolidating homeland security functions, they argued, would give it that priority, by creating what the General Accounting Office called a "focal point."[4] In an effort to ensure that homeland security would be a White House priority most proposals sought to place the new organization within the Executive Office of the President.

Clearly, these advocates were on to something. Before terrorists turned commercial jetliners into weapons of mass destruction and killed 3,000 people on U.S. soil, homeland security was not a top priority for the U.S. government. To be sure, successive presidents had talked about the threat of terrorism. Bill Clinton frequently and often publicly worried about a germ-weapons attack by terrorists on U.S. territory. George W. Bush mentioned the threat of terrorism during his campaign, and continued to talk about it once in office (although often as an argument for developing missile defenses). Spending on counterterrorism activities

[3]See, for example, *Countering the Changing Threat of International Terrorism*, Report of the National Commission on Terrorism, chaired by Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, III; *Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change*, The Phase III Report of the U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century, March 15, 2001, co-chaired by Senators Gary Hart and Warren B. Rudman; and *First Annual Report to the President and the Congress: I. Assessing the Threat*, Report of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 15, 1999, *Second Annual Report to the President and the Congress: II. Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism*, December 15, 2000, chaired by Gov. James S. Gilmore, III, and *Third Annual Report to the President and the Congress: III. For Ray Downey*, December 15, 2001, chaired by Gov. James S. Gilmore, III.

[4]General Accounting Office, *Combating Terrorism: Selected Challenges and Related Recommendations*, GAO-01-822 (Washington: General Accounting Office, September 2001), pp. 34–43.

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also increased significantly—from $6 billion in 1998 to well over $10 billion in 2001. Finally, with the appointment of Richard Clarke in 1998—in one sense, Ridge's predecessor—as coordinator of counterterrorism, an attempt was made to pull together the myriad agencies and interests involved in preventing and responding to terrorist attacks.

Nevertheless, as of September 10, 2001—even with heightened presidential interest, increased funding and improved coordination—the terrorist threat had not moved anywhere near the top of the White House agenda. Clarke, a Clinton-era holdover, remained a senior director on the NSC staff, but reported to the national security advisor, not to the president. Terrorism was still just one concern among many. Although the various agencies all had terrorism coordinators, other concerns dominated their agendas. For the Pentagon, re-equipping the military to fight two major theater wars simultaneously remained the priority. China, not Al-Qaeda, was the rising threat, and ballistic missile attacks by rogue states, not suicide bombers, were the immediate concern. Drugs, not dangerous pathogens, were the targets of customs agents searching luggage and cargo entering the United States. Consular and immigration officers fretted about granting visas to potentially illegal immigrants rather than students-*cum*-terrorists. The FBI focused on building criminal indictments against terrorists who had committed acts of violence against U.S. interests overseas, rather than tracking non-U.S. nationals who might undertake terrorist acts on American soil. Other priorities displaced the attention and resources that should have been devoted to homeland security.

September 11 changed all that. Now, for all of these agencies, at every level, the terrorist threat stands front and center. The commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, Robert C. Bonner, told the *New York Times* that "terrorism is our highest priority, bar none. Ninety-eight percent of my attention as commissioner of customs has been devoted to that one issue."[5] The INS, FBI and other key agencies have been re-organized so as to make counterterrorism their top concern. Priorities have shifted in agencies that have not been re-organized—including even the Internal Revenue Service, which has assigned some of its criminal investigators to assist in helping determine how terrorist groups are funded.

There are other reasons to consider re-organizing homeland security beyond the need to focus public attention; the key one is the fact that responsibility for homeland security really is very widely dispersed. According to the OMB, nearly seventy agencies spend money on counterterrorist activities—and that excludes the Defense and State Departments and the intelligence community.[6] One organizational chart of Federal government agencies involved in homeland security contains 130 separate boxes.[7] Even by more discriminating accounting standards, anywhere between forty and fifty agencies are believed to be involved in the effort—ranging from the departments of Defense, Treasury, Justice, Transportation, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture; to intelligence agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency; to law enforcement agencies like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; to agencies monitoring points of entry into the United

[5] *New York Times*, October 10, 2001.

[6] Office of Management and Budget, *Annual Report to Congress on Combating Terrorism* (August 2001).

[7] As described in the *New York Times*, November 4, 2001.

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States like the Border Control, the Coast Guard, the Customs Service and the Immigration and Naturalization Service; to agencies responsible for responding to an attack, like the Federal Emergency and Management Agency, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Guard Bureau and the Pentagon's soon-to-be-established Northern Command.

This diffusion of responsibility is inherent in providing homeland security because success depends on a multitude of unconnected individuals making good decisions. It is an inherently decentralized operation. A customs service agent sensed something amiss with a car traveling from Canada to the United States in December 1999 and discovered its trunk loaded with explosive materials designed to blow up the Los Angeles International Airport. A flight instructor found it suspicious that a student was interested only in steering a commercial jetliner, not in taking off or landing, and then reported his suspicion to locally-based Federal authorities (who tried in vain to get FBI headquarters in Washington to take the matter seriously). A firefighter yelled at people coming up from the World Trade Center subway station to go back down, before himself climbing the stairs to fires burning on the 75th floor of one of the towers. A doctor re-examined the X-ray of a postal worker and diagnosed inhalation anthrax in time for an effective antibiotic treatment to be administered. A flight attendant noticed a passenger lighting a match near his feet and acted swiftly to prevent him from detonating a bomb concealed in his shoe. Ultimately, the security of the American homeland rests upon individual judgment calls by those who guard the frontlines: the border guards, immigration officers and customs agents, the doctors, nurses, firemen and police officers. Managing, coordinating, leading and mobilizing these people so that their individual decisions add up to a nation more secure, better prepared and more responsive to the terrorist threat is the organizational challenge of homeland security.

. . . *but Centralization Won't Work*

THE BASIC concept behind nearly all proposals that have been set forth for organizing homeland security activities is centralization: the consolidation of functions now scattered across numerous agencies under one common organizational roof. As one astute commentator put it, "There is nothing that has the force of an uncompromising and powerful new entity. A Department of Homeland Security, with power and budgets and subordinate agencies, is also the only way to avoid the disconnected roots of Sept. 11. Only a department would have the ability to set changing priorities between a terrorist and non-terrorist focus, and prepare and respond accordingly."[8]

Among the earlier and more prominent proposals for centralization is that of the Hart-Rudman Commission, released in early 2001. Prophetic in its anticipation of an "end [to] the relative invulnerability of the U.S. homeland to catastrophic attack", the commission put forward "organizational realignment" as the centerpiece of its recommendation:

> The President should propose, and Congress should agree to create, a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities involved in homeland security. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) should be a key building block in this effort. . . . The President should propose to Congress the

[8]William M. Arkin, "Protecting the United States", *Washington Post* (online version), October 7, 2001.

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transfer of the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and the Coast Guard to the National Homeland Security Agency, while preserving them as distinct entities.[9]

The commission further proposed to divide managerial responsibilities within the new agency among three directorates responsible, respectively, for border security, critical infrastructure protection, and emergency preparedness and response. These proposals were put forward in legislation by Representative Mac Thornberry (R-TX), originally introduced in March 2001; since the September 11 attack, they have been endorsed by Senators Joe Lieberman, Arlen Specter and Bob Graham, who propose the establishment of a new cabinet department.

Advocates of consolidation are right to say that excessively dispersed authority is a serious problem, but, on its own, their solution is inadequate to the task. The homeland cannot be secured by pulling three significant but second-order operations—the Border Patrol, the Customs Service and the Coast Guard—into an enhanced FEMA, a well-regarded agency, but one whose prime role has been response to natural disasters. Inevitably, most of the forty-plus Federal offices with pieces of the problem would be left outside the walls of the new entity. As a result, the head of that agency cannot be assigned principal responsibility for homeland security in the manner supporters of consolidation advocate. Even with full Cabinet status, the secretary of a new Department of Homeland Security will not be able to coordinate the activities and actions of his many cabinet colleagues who have an interest in and share responsibility for protecting the American homeland. To be effective, interagency coordination and operational responsibility must, to the maximum extent possible, remain in separate hands.

As the Hart-Rudman Commission recognized, many institutions and functions that are critical to the task *cannot*, by their very nature, be included in a consolidated agency. The FBI will necessarily remain in the Justice Department (and resistant even to *its* authority). The CDC, indispensable to combating bioterrorism, should remain, albeit loosely, within the Department of Health and Human Services. Perhaps most important, the intelligence arms of domestic law enforcement and the vast and relevant resources of the CIA and the NSA cannot possibly be brought under the direct authority of Governor Ridge or any future Cabinet-level homeland security official. This means that time-sensitive information requiring priority border or immigration attention will have to come from somewhere other than any conceivable homeland security agency.

The intelligence connection is part of a daunting broader reality: the need for domestically-oriented security authorities to coordinate with international policy agencies and activities under the aegis of the National Security Council. Looking in the other organizational direction, coordination also has to link downward effectively with police, health, rescue and other units under the authority of governors and mayors throughout the land.

Even for organizational units brought within a new agency, formal inclusion would not automatically guarantee effective integration. Upon his appointment, Ridge alluded to the problems of intragovernmental conflict when he declared, "The only turf we should be worried about protecting is the turf we stand on." This warning, alas, applies inside as well as outside organizational walls. The Hart-Rudman Commission sounded a cautionary note when it recommended integration with a caveat: "Transfer of the

[9] *Road Map for National Security*, pp. xiii, 13–4.

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Customs Service, the Border Patrol, and Coast Guard" should be undertaken "*while preserving them as distinct entities.*"[10] But this apt recognition of the value of each unit's internal coherence was also an acknowledgement that centralization can, and should, only go so far.

Leadership and Coordination

TO RE-ITERATE, the basic organizational need of homeland security is to address activities that are highly diffused and decentralized. How to ensure that a border guard makes the right decision is more important than whether his boss is responsible directly to a central homeland security official. In the end, the real need is to have the right people in the right places with access to the right information, and who can cooperate in ways that make their individual efforts larger than the sum of the parts. This requires senior government officials working together: synchronizing their activities and sharing necessary information and developing a process that maximizes incentives for them to do so.

Forging such a process must be Ridge's central goal. He must engage and re-inforce his senior colleagues in their efforts to make their departments instruments of presidential counterterrorism policy. The attorney general, for example, is an absolutely critical player in homeland security, with oversight for the FBI, INS, and law enforcement generally. He is likely to see himself as the plausible government-wide leader in the domestic response to September 11, just as the secretary of state sees himself, not without cause, as the leader (short of the president) in U.S. foreign policy. The attorney general could very well be threatened by how the homeland security advisor plays his role—after all, successive secretaries of state waged bitter battles over foreign policy with the Henry Kissingers and Zbigniew Brzezinskis who were housed a thirty seconds' walk from the Oval Office. If Ridge appears to be mounting a broad challenge to Attorney General John Ashcroft's authority, the prospects for an effective, integrated campaign against terrorism will plunge precipitously.

The opposite scenario, a homeland security advisor who cannot assert direct authority, poses different problems. Drawing on his own, very different experience as "drug czar" in the Clinton Administration, Barry McCaffrey expressed concern that Ridge "has an inadequate mechanism to do the job. Six months from now, there's a danger that he will turn into little more than the speaker's bureau for homeland defense."[11] Fortunately, the executive order creating Ridge's position also established the Homeland Security Council (HSC) and tasked it with "advising and assisting the president with respect to all aspects of homeland security [and] ensuring coordination of homeland security-related activities of executive departments and agencies and effective development and implementation of homeland security policies." The HSC is headed by the president, and the attorney general is prominent among its members.[12] The homeland security advisor is simultaneously a council member and the official tasked with managing

[10] *Road Map for National Security*, p. 14 (emphasis added). The Senate and House re-organization bills also insist that each agency "shall be maintained as a distinct entity."

[11] *Washington Post*, November 18, 2001.

[12] The language is from the executive order. Others named as full members are the vice president, the secretary of defense, the secretary of health and human services, the secretary of transportation, the director of FEMA, the FBI director, the director of central intelligence, and the assistant to the president for homeland security.

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the HSC process. This offers him a vehicle for engaging senior colleagues—the attorney general above all—at a time when he has maximal presidential support and attention. He can model his approach on the successful efforts of others in parallel roles.

LEARNING FROM THE NEC: A highly relevant example is the role played by Robert Rubin at the beginning of the Clinton Administration. Like Ridge, he was assigned responsibility for a new coordinating council—the National Economic Council (NEC). Like Ridge, Rubin was tasked to get the government moving in a policy area of top presidential priority, peopled with senior officials holding strong mandates and strong views. Had Rubin seen his role as the new president's "economic czar", one of issuing orders for other Clinton economic officials to carry out, his governmental life might have proved nasty, brutish and short. Instead, he took the initiative in organizing internal debate on key issues. He developed a process designed to force presidential decisions even as he assiduously reached out to the secretary and deputy secretary of the Treasury, the director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors. He gave them key issues to present at a pivotal, pre-inauguration meeting with the president-elect in Little Rock, Arkansas. The meeting ended with one key decision made, with all the Cabinet and deputy-level economic players engaged, and with Rubin's NEC neatly ensconced at the center of the economic policy process.[13]

Rubin gave the leaders of the economic agencies something they wanted and needed—visible participation in and influence over the most important decisions of Clinton's early presidency. In so doing, he strengthened their credibility and influence within their agencies, and also in Washington generally. Moreover, this seems to have been a conscious, calculated strategy on Rubin's part: rather than the sparring for turf typical of all too many debates among senior officials, he shaped a positive-sum process in which all would come out feeling like winners even though they could not, of course, win all of the policy arguments. Ridge can do likewise with the HSC. By taking the initiative but exercising power collegially, the homeland security advisor can achieve much more in coordinated anti-terrorist action than he could through any conceivable organizational consolidation.

LEARNING FROM THE NSC: The Bush Administration can draw even more upon the experience of the oldest and most successful of White House-based coordinating councils, the National Security Council. Emulating proven NSC practices, Ridge has used the HSC as an umbrella to establish a network of formal and informal interagency coordinating structures. Giving him authority to do just that was President Bush's Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 1, which directed that the organization and operation of the Homeland Security Council be modeled on the NSC process that Bush established at the outset of his administration. Under this directive, Ridge chairs the HSC "Principals Committee", composed of all regular members of the Homeland Security Council except the president and vice president. Ridge's deputy chairs the HSC Deputies Committee, composed of the deputies of all departments and agencies that have a seat on the HSC. Senior officials on Ridge's staff chair 22 different assistant secretary-level Policy Coordinating Committees (PCCs), covering such policy

[13] I.M. Destler, *The National Economic Council: A Work In Progress* (Institute for International Economics, Policy Analysis No. 46, November 1996), p. 14.

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areas as: detection, surveillance and intelligence; law enforcement and investigation; weapons of mass destruction consequence management; domestic transportation security; medical and public health preparedness; and domestic threat response and incident management.

The NSC experience also suggests the importance of supplementing formal channels of cooperation with informal ones. NSC processes operate most effectively when the national security advisor works closely—and often informally—with his or her key counterparts at State, Defense and the CIA. When Colin Powell was national security advisor in the last year of the Reagan Administration, he met with Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary Frank Carlucci each day at 7 a.m. in his office to coordinate the day's work. And nearly all NSC advisors from Brzezinski onward have convened weekly lunches or breakfasts with their senior counterparts to work on issues in a less formal setting. Ridge should conduct similar sets of regular, informal meetings with his key counterparts, including especially the attorney general and, to a lesser extent, the secretaries of defense and treasury.

But notwithstanding his formal and informal roles in the interagency process, Ridge must realize that his power in Washington will be ephemeral if it is not nurtured and protected. Battles will inevitably loom with Cabinet colleagues. He needs to be careful about which ones to fight—and he must win most of them, particularly in his first year. The early returns are not uniformly encouraging. While he worked hard with others to create a national terrorist alert system, the ultimate authority for determining alert levels was vested in the attorney general, even though the OHS director was arguably better placed to do so. And whereas Ridge championed the establishment of a new, independent border agency through the consolidation of the Coast Guard, Customs Service, Border Patrol, and Agricultural Quarantine Inspection Agency, he was ultimately forced to join a consensus in favor of something far less, as discussed below. If such defeats, real and perceived, become a pattern, Ridge will lose credibility. Few will defer to him, and fewer still will be likely to follow his lead.

A further lesson from NSC experience is the need for the coordinator to take the lead in day-to-day problems, yet avoid becoming so consumed by putting out fires that he neglects the ultimately critical task of strategic management. Ridge has already demonstrated his effectiveness in responding to current concerns. In late October 2001, he called the attorney general, FBI director, HHS secretary, CDC scientists and others to the White House in order to get a straight story on what had happened with the anthrax mailings. He then took control of communications, making himself the public focal point on anthrax and other terrorist threats. When American Airlines flight 587 crashed in Queens, NY, two weeks later, it was Ridge who energized the interagency process, working with other key players to determine whether terrorism might be the cause and, if so, what the appropriate response should be. In these and other instances, Ridge demonstrated the truth of what national security advisors have long known: that a person who enjoys the president's confidence and is clearly empowered by him enjoys tremendous power to coordinate smoothly and effectively among top-level officials, particularly when there is a self-evident need for *someone* to get the job done.

In the Queens airplane crash case, Ridge acted immediately, but withdrew just as quickly when the evidence indicated that terrorism was not the cause. This suggests an ability to avoid being con-

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sumed by operational detail at the expense of addressing longer-term, strategic needs. To this end, Ridge could also draw on the NSC experience by using a device national security advisors have found particularly effective early in their tenures—commissioning analyses of first-order issues requiring presidential decision. This would involve the issuance of Homeland Security Study Directives (HSSDs)—tasking interagency groups to present specific options, defined not as agency preferences but as real, alternative ways of addressing key problems. Some HSSDs could address questions of structure and process (organization, budget authority, and the collection, sharing and analysis of intelligence). Some could address particular broad tasks such as prevention, damage limitation, countering particular threats like biological and chemical agents, and cooperative law enforcement. The options developed in such studies would be discussed and debated at HSC meetings chaired by the president, followed by his choosing among them. His decision would subsequently be codified in an HSPD signed by the president.

Commissioning such policy reviews while the homeland security office and council are relatively new would serve several related goals. It would give the advisor the initiative in policy development, engage other departments and agencies in the critical task of formulating realistic choices, and connect the advisor and the HSC to the president at a time when the chief executive is giving top priority and attention to homeland security issues. It would also be a potent device to meet the need for what Ashton Carter labels "*program* coordination, . . . a multiyear, multiagency effort to develop tactics, technology, and where required new institutions for the ongoing struggle against catastrophic terrorism."[14]

Reaching Down the Organizational Pyramid

THE HSC's task is harder than the NSC's because its family of agencies lacks a culture of cooperation such as that which the NSC has nurtured among the intelligence and foreign policy communities since 1947. It is also different in three other important ways. Its primary impact must be at the bottom of the Federal government's organizational pyramid, not the top. Moreover, the HSC must engage state and local officials as well as Federal authorities. Finally, its effectiveness will depend on effective linkage with activities—like foreign intelligence—that will remain in the NSC, not the HSC, orbit.

National security and economic advisors mainly target presidential decisions and actions. The homeland security advisor, however, must concern himself mainly with how the system operates at ground level. The national security advisor can focus primarily on relations with a few key countries, and on top-level decisions affecting them; Ridge must concern himself with building a system that will make airplanes, food and water distribution facilities, public buildings and entire communities across the land less vulnerable to attack. National security advisors concern themselves with the top. The homeland security coordinator must look to the bottom.

It is a daunting task, but it is not his alone. The attorney general needs to guarantee that the FBI and the INS take timely preventive action or pass information on to others who can do so. The HHS secretary needs the CDC to raise the priority it gives to preparing for, detecting and countering biological weapons

[14]Ashton B. Carter, "The Architecture of Government in the Face of Terrorism", *International Security* (Winter 2001/2002), p. 13.

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threats. The secretary of defense should enable the National Guard to be fully engaged in homeland security planning and action by ending the military's reliance on these units as backup for missions overseas. By firmly connecting these tasks to the president's anti-terrorism program, which he and they will craft together, the homeland security advisor can strengthen their abilities to influence those below them.

While actions by Federal agencies must be the prime HSC target, Ridge must focus also on building lines of cooperation and information-sharing with the other levels of our Federal system—and, importantly, with the private sector—much as the Clinton Administration needed to do when addressing threats to the security of the Atlanta Olympics in 1996. Ridge must lead the effort to standardize the training of first responders across the nation. Local communities, states and the Federal government need common procedures, practices and equipment to facilitate communications both to prevent attacks from occurring and to speed an effective response if one does. As Ridge has recognized, all kinds of information need to be provided in a timely manner, "not only across the Federal government, but to governors and states attorney generals and mayors and local and state law enforcements."[15] Ridge and his staff will have their work cut out for them. If the culture of cooperation among Federal agencies is weakly established, these norms are almost completely lacking among local, state and Federal authorities. Fortunately, the experience and relationships Ridge developed as Governor of Pennsylvania should prove relevant to this task.

Ridge should also be able to draw upon two established organizations to strengthen ties across levels of government. FEMA, the agency of first resort in responding to catastrophes on the ground, has ten regional offices with multiple connections to relevant state and local authorities. The National Guard, organized and controlled by the states, has a "historic and Constitutional mission of homeland security" (in the words of the Hart-Rudman Commission) and should "redistribute resources" to make this its primary task.[16]

Finally, Ridge and his top White House colleagues need to address the unique coordinating challenges of dealing with a transnational phenomenon like terrorism within organizations that are structured along the foreign-domestic divide. Ridge's mission, to secure the homeland, is basically domestic, but the essential source of the threat lies abroad, outside his jurisdiction. A step in crossing this divide has already been taken with the appointment of two officials—General Wayne Downing as national director and deputy national security advisor for combating terrorism, and Richard Clarke as special advisor to the president for cybersecurity—each of whom reports directly to both the homeland security advisor and the national security advisor. But there must also be good coordination at the top, suggesting that Rice and Ridge talk frequently and participate in regular "CRR" (Card-Rice-Ridge) meetings, connecting the two key advisors with the president's chief of staff, Andrew Card.

In addressing all these challenges, what the homeland security director most needs to do is embrace and exploit his role as cross-government coordinator and mobilizer. He must conceive of himself not as a "czar" issuing orders, but as a leader working with and energizing his peers to achieve their common objective. Within this framework, however, two additional steps should be considered.

[15] "Governor Ridge Speaks at Homeland Security and Defense Conference", October 27, 2001.

[16] *Road Map for National Security*, pp. 24–5.

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One is limited organizational consolidation, focused narrowly on border security. A second is statutory and budgetary authority.

The Need for Reform

FORMER SENATOR Gary Hart has argued that,

> without budgetary or statutory authority, Ridge is doomed not to succeed. If he only has the power of exhortation, the disparate agencies will do what he asks them only when that is approved by their own superiors. Ridge can have interagency working groups and encourage people in the Coast Guard to talk to Customs, but gaps and seams will remain. He will have to keep going to the Oval Office to make anything happen. Anyone who knows Washington knows this won't work.[17]

These concerns are not easily dismissed, but we have a more optimistic view of what a determined, presidentially-backed effort at coordination can accomplish. Moreover, it is clear that conventional re-organization is not the *main* route to effectiveness for Governor Ridge, for, as we have noted, it is impossible for him to secure direct authority over more than a fraction of the activities his office must seek to shape. Hence a coordination-mobilization strategy is essential.

Unfortunately, the President has not provided the full, visible backing to Ridge that is necessary for this strategy to work. As a result, there is a growing perception both within the administration and outside it that Ridge is losing power and influence in Washington. There are indications that White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card has initiated a top-to-bottom review of Ridge's office. "Everything is on the table", a Bush staffer is quoted as saying.[18] But the problem Ridge confronts is not primarily organizational. It is the absence of strong presidential support. For all intents and purposes, Ridge has been left to flounder as Congress, the press, and even some of his administration colleagues have joined in the attack.

There is therefore an urgent need to bolster Ridge's position by providing him with strong statutory authority. Ridge's current position and the existence of the Homeland Security Council itself derive not from a law passed by Congress but from an executive order President Bush signed last October. This has created problems on Capitol Hill, particularly since the administration insists that Ridge, as a presidential aide (like the national security advisor), should not be required to testify before Congress. Democrats and Republicans alike have complained bitterly, with Senate Majority Leader Tom Daschle (D-SD) even threatening to issue a subpoena to force Ridge to testify.

The White House's resistance is untenable. Although a formal parallel exists between the homeland and national security advisors, Ridge's job is, in practice, much more that of a publicly visible operating official on the model of the drug czar or the OMB Director. He has developed a budget. He is the prime public spokesman in his area of activity. He needs to be made formally accountable to Congress, both out of respect for legislative authority and to increase overall governmental capacity to respond to the challenge of catastrophic terrorism. In the words of Rep. Ernest Istook, Jr. (R-OH), who chairs the appropriation subcommittee responsible for the White House budget, "The point is not whether a presidential advisor testifies, it's whether somebody can be given express major responsibilities under an executive order and then be exempted from accountability. I see it

[17] *The Nation*, November 18, 2001.

[18] *Newsweek*, May 13, 2002.

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as respecting the Constitution."[19]

The administration should work with Congress to craft a clean bill giving Ridge, his office and the council statutory authority. Given Ridge's operational responsibilities, it makes sense to model the authority and status of the office on other formal EOP units (such as the Office of Management and Budget, the U.S. Trade Representative and the Office of National Drug Control Policy) whose heads are subject to Senate confirmation and testify regularly before the legislature. This would enhance Ridge's ability to deal with members of Congress and other elected officials—from governors and mayors to county commissioners. The bill should also provide Ridge with greater budgetary authority. Working with the OMB director, he should be authorized to review the budgets of counter-terrorism units across government and make changes, which would be subject to override only by the president's budget task force (composed of the vice president, treasury secretary, the president's chief of staff, and the OMB director) or, in the strongest version, only by the president himself.

Ridge would also be strengthened by consolidation of the agencies responsible for border security. The current dispersed responsibility makes little sense from either a practical or an organizational point of view. As Ridge complained, "When you come into the United States, multiple faces of the federal government meet you. And I think we ought to have one face at the border."[20] Accordingly, in December Ridge proposed the creation of the National Border Administration, which would consist of the Coast Guard, the Customs Service, the enforcement arm of the INS (including the Border Patrol), and the Agriculture Quarantine Inspection program. According to a White House white paper proposing this consolidation, the new agency's core mission "would be to manage the physical entry and exit of all people, goods, and vehicles into the United States by air, land, or sea, and in so doing to prevent, preempt, and deter terrorist infiltration or the introduction of weapons of mass destruction."[21]

Ridge's proposal met with predictable resistance. None of the affected departments wanted to give up the border security functions under their control. And all of the agencies proposed for merger feared that duties not related to terrorism would receive shorter shrift if they were merged into an entity whose primary task will be to prevent terrorists and weapons from entering the United States. Yet the case for the organizational status quo is extraordinarily weak. Not a single one of these border agencies is central to the mission of its departmental home; not the Customs Service in Treasury, not the INS enforcement arm in Justice, not quarantine inspection in Agriculture, not the Coast Guard in Transportation.

Nevertheless, the parochial interests of the departments—to preserve budgets and personnel—appear to have prevailed. Rather than proposing the consolidation Ridge favored, the HSC Principals forwarded a consensus recommendation to President Bush last March to merge the Customs Service and Border Patrol into a new border entity within the Justice Department. This, of course, falls far short of what our nation's security demands: a truly comprehensive border agency under a strong director. If President Bush refuses to back his own homeland security director on this issue, then Congress should do it for him by rejecting the limited re-organization the administration proposes and creating a new, independent Federal Border Agency along the lines Ridge origi-

[19] *Washington Post*, March 21, 2002.

[20] Quoted in the *New York Times*, March 6, 2002.

[21] Quoted in "Border Security White Paper", The White House, December 21, 2001, pp. 1–2.

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nally suggested.

Congress should also consider including in the Federal Border Agency the new Transportation Security Agency (which is responsible for monitoring who and what boards commercial aircraft), and possibly even the consular functions of the State Department. The director of this new agency should have a seat at the HSC table, and its staff must be an integral part of the Ridge-led HSC coordination process. However, unlike the Hart-Rudman, Lieberman-Specter and Thornberry consolidation proposals, Congress should not include either FEMA or those offices now in Commerce and the FBI that deal with national infrastructure protection, since these are functionally distinct from the frontier monitoring agencies.

SECURING THE homeland against terrorism is a daunting challenge. Any new leader and organization would need simultaneously to act boldly to establish their authority and to feel their way as they learn what works and what does not. For reasons detailed above, it is best to conceive of the task *not* as one of organizational centralization and consolidation, but rather cross-governmental coordination, mobilization and leadership, with priority given to establishing collaborative, positive-sum personal relationships at senior levels.

If the task is undertaken in this manner, there is room for cautious optimism. The keys to success are two—Governor Ridge must convince his Cabinet colleagues that their ability to get things done depends crucially on their working together within the coordinated process he runs; and the President must back Ridge fully in that effort. In the end, Ridge's power and authority—and the president's homeland security organization—depend on the willingness of all players to work with rather than against the President's point person for homeland security. As the struggle over the border agency consolidation in early 2002 has demonstrated, this is easier said than done. But without such a willingness, an integrated approach to homeland security will remain beyond our reach. □

Growing Pains

It must be considered that there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle, than to initiate a new order of things. For the reformer has enemies in all those who profit by the old order, and only lukewarm defenders in all those who would profit by the new.

—Niccolò Machiavelli,
The Prince, Chapter 6

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All That NATO Can Be

To Prague and Beyond

Charles Gati

SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, senior American policymakers have been understandably focused on the war against terrorism—an effort that fixes their gaze on the Middle East and Central Asia, terror cells in western Europe and Southeast Asia, and the exigencies of homeland security. In their peripheral vision, they remain aware of other major zones of policy concern: Russia, China and Taiwan, the Balkans (still), and even the occasional bout of dyspepsia in places such as Argentina and Venezuela. Thank heaven, therefore, for those unproblematic spots that do not generate problems and the consequent need to spend energy and anxiety on them—places like central and eastern Europe.

Alas, we should not yet be so thankful. While we have been attending to other, more pressing matters over the past half dozen or so years, the post-communist success stories that most people expected to write themselves after 1989 have turned into tales with rather mixed plot lines. Intentions and expectations have fallen out of harmony with one another. Thus it is that the road to NATO's November 2002 summit in Prague is paved with good intentions—and outdated expectations.

The intention is to invite as many as seven countries from central and eastern Europe—Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from the Baltics; Slovakia and Slovenia from central Europe; and Romania and Bulgaria from the Black Sea region—to join the organization. Together with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, admitted in 1999, they make up a sort of "top ten" of the post-communist world. These ten have accomplished much more than their neighbors in the Balkans and the non-Baltic parts of the former Soviet Union and, not surprisingly, are among the leading candidates for early entry into the European Union.

That said, all is not well in Mitteleuropa—that broad and endlessly fascinating swath of land formerly part of the Habsburg Empire—and its environs. The expectations of the 1990s were excessive. Many who should have known better assumed that history and civilization would inevitably tie these countries to the West—that they would quickly achieve genuine democracy and become eager allies. It has not been that way.[1] Rising

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[1] For an early account along these lines, see Charles Gati, "The Mirage of Democracy", *Transition* (March 1996). See also Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm", *Journal of Democracy* (January 2002).

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nationalism has diluted the intensity of the region's commitment to the rule of law and to the spirit of tolerance. Since joining NATO, both the Czech Republic and Hungary have often ignored Western advice. Indeed, unless an appropriate method is found to discipline members for their misdeeds, the utility of NATO as an instrument of Western influence in central and eastern Europe will begin to diminish the very moment these new applicants become members.

For this reason, supporters of Washington's plan for NATO enlargement later this year, like this writer, should make their case based on a candid evaluation of recent trends in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, and on an equally candid assessment of what the new candidates are like and may be expected from them. The principal concern is that while the so-called transition *from* the one-party dictatorships and planned economies of the communist past is well underway, it is still uncertain that change will lead *to* Western-style democracies and free markets. Widespread official corruption erodes the popular appeal of the capitalist enterprise as nostalgia for the meager benefits of the old welfare state persists. The appeal of national identity, culture and tradition, neglected, manipulated or suppressed under Soviet domination, competes vigorously now with the attraction of integration into NATO and the EU. In power, moderate conservatives, liberals and social democrats find themselves squeezed by demagogues at both ends of the political spectrum—especially by the anti-U.S., anti-EU and anti-semitic far Right—with bitter charges and countercharges evoking old prejudices rooted in historical precedents, myths, stereotypes and scapegoats.

Such negative aspects of the post-communist experience prompt the peoples of central and eastern Europe to view their daily lives and future prospects in

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hues far darker than those of more sanguine Western press assessments. This is true not only in normally gloomy Hungary but also in normally more optimistic Poland; in poor Romania and in the relatively prosperous Czech Republic; in historically pro-Russian Bulgaria and in the intensely anti-Russian Baltic states. And this is why, with only one exception (in tiny Slovenia), publics in these countries have failed to re-elect any of their governments since 1989; instead, they have preferred to throw the bums out with the next election. Since the restoration of its independence in 1991, Latvia has changed its government at the rate of about once a year. In several countries, including the region's two most populous states, Poland and Romania, as well as in Hungary and the Czech Republic, Socialists or Social Democrats are currently in power. Those who voted for them apparently did so because they believed the Socialists understand better that vast majorities long for job security, inexpensive public transportation, universal health insurance and free education. But the Socialists cannot deliver such services without vibrant economies and institutions of government that can raise revenue and spend it effectively. This is why, despite their past, most socialist parties are vigorous proponents of free-market reform—often outdoing their nominally non-socialist political opponents.

No wonder, then, that public opinion surveys reflect a sense of confusion and ambivalence. The latest New Europe Barometer covering the ten countries of central and eastern Europe finds only lukewarm support for a democratic political order: Two percent of the respondents said they were "very satisfied" and 37 percent were "fairly satisfied"; but 43 percent were "fairly dissatisfied" and 18 percent were "very dissatisfied" with the way democracy works.[2] Yet an overwhelming majority—more than 80 percent—rejects the possibility of returning to the communist one-party state. In Isaiah Berlin's terminology, they value negative freedom, the absence of undue governmental restraint, but they are still searching for positive freedom to make effective use of their newly gained liberties. What are they likely to find, and how does it affect prospects for U.S. policy toward the region?

Fragments, Frustration and Focus

PERSISTENT popular ambivalence in eastern and central Europe stems from serious economic, political and foreign policy predicaments that confound the processes of "transition." Some of these predicaments inhabit the economic realm, others the political realm.

In the *economic realm*, differences among and within the countries of the region present old and new problems alike. For example, while some countries have made remarkable economic progress since gaining freedom and independence, others still linger at or below 1989 levels. Slovenia's GDP per capita (about $10,000) is beginning to approach Portugal's, a member, albeit the poorest one, of the European Union. Meanwhile, the average GDP per capita of the three poorest countries in central and eastern Europe—Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia—is less than $2,000, or only 20 percent of Slovenia's. Within each country, there is another, more divisive kind of gap—that between city and countryside. While there is little or no unemployment in Warsaw, for example, rural unemployment in eastern Poland has reached a staggering 30 percent. Dazzling shopping centers in Budapest can make visitors

[2]Richard Rose, *Advancing into Europe? Contrasting Goals of Post-Communist Countries* (Freedom House, forthcoming).

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believe they are in the prosperous West, but the occasional visitor to eastern Hungary encounters dilapidated or idle factories and their seemingly dilapidated and idle workers. In Bucharest, the sight of elegant, well-dressed women contrasts sharply with the sight of a mightily disheveled humanity in Romanian villages.

The statistic that best captures economic conditions as they are experienced by the region's inhabitants is GDP per capita in purchasing power parity (PPP). The figures, illustrated in the table below, show that in the last decade the purchasing power of the people of central and eastern Europe has increased by an impressive 40 percent (compared to an increase, admittedly from a higher base, in the European Union of about 26 percent). East of the Baltics, however, the people of the former Soviet Union have become poorer by more than 15 percent. Yet it makes no difference subjectively to the peoples of central and eastern Europe that they are better off than the citizens of Belarus, Russia or Uzbekistan, because Czechs and Poles do not compare their living standards to those in the former Soviet Union. They look instead to Scandinavia, Austria or Germany, and what they see is that it will take a long time to catch up with their western and northern neighbors. This is a source of bitter disappointment, for back in the hopeful days after the collapse of communism they all dreamed, and many fully expected, that hard work and Western goodwill would reposition the region from Europe's periphery to its prosperous center. If that dream lives on at all, it has been crushed into fragments by the reality of the past decade.

Disappointment is also fueled by the popular assumption that almost all of the economic benefits of the past decade have gone to a small group of privileged entrepreneurs and their political cronies: business executives working for Western companies; real estate agents, traders and lawyers; and officials at all levels who were paid off during the skewed privatization processes of the 1990s. If this group—perhaps 5 to 10 percent of the population—has gained as much as their expensive BMWs and fancy homes suggest, and if pensioners and old people in general (who comprise as much as a third of the population) are net losers because of declining welfare-state benefits, then the region's 40 percent gain in purchasing power since 1992 is more apparent than real for the average person. Workers in heavy industry and agriculture have yet to profit from the free market. Double-digit unemployment this year in six of the region's ten states—Slovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, Slovenia, Lithuania and Romania—

GDP Per Capita in Purchasing Power Parity

	*central & eastern Europe**	*former Soviet Union**	*European Union*
1992	$6,520.06	$6,998.72	$18,193.61
1993	$6,643.04	$6,313.87	$18,352.27
1994	$7,005.47	$5,445.31	$19,149.28
1995	$7,640.37	$5,323.95	$20,198.97
1996	$8,006.11	$5,192.22	$20,648.54
1997	$8,175.71	$5,251.27	$21,015.21
1998	$8,227.02	$5,128.63	$21,405.04
1999	$8,655.46	$5,585.44	$22,416.54
2000	$9,274.87	$6,160.35	$23,827.10
2001	$9,142.08	$5,910.01	$23,014.62

Source: World Bank, 2002

*The three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are included under central and eastern Europe, not the former Soviet Union.

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has added millions to the ranks of those for whom a more competitive economic environment has meant abject poverty.

The very unequal distribution of new wealth is further exacerbated by official corruption. According to Transparency International, Romania is the region's most corrupt country, followed by Latvia, Slovakia and, in a tie for fourth place, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic. Poll after poll suggests that corruption is present everywhere and is also *the* single most divisive political issue everywhere. Not only is corruption discrediting free enterprise, but it is also undermining the very concept of the rule of law, turning the optimists and idealists of the late 1980s and early 1990s into the cynics of the early 2000s.

Thanks to extensive reporting by Czech newspapers, and especially the independent investigative weekly *Respekt*, a vast amount of credible information is available about Czech corruption at the highest levels of the outgoing government of Milos Zeman's Social Democrats, a government kept in power by Václav Klaus' conservative Civic Democratic Party since its formation in June 1998.[3] At that time, Transparency International rated the Czech Republic next to Belgium in clean government; three years later, in 2001, the Czechs were tied with Bulgaria, just a notch ahead of Colombia and Mexico on the list of ignominy. The evidence, stubbornly denied by the Czech government, is so convincing that 70 percent of respondents in a 2001 survey said they believed their country was run by organized crime. Marginalized and isolated, President Václav Havel, a man of integrity occupying a largely ceremonial office, has been unable to resist the trend. His losing struggle against Zeman, Klaus and Foreign Minister Jan Kavan—a man with a mysterious past—is a sad commentary on what has happened in this once so promising post-communist country.

The process by which a small group appears to be suborning Czech democracy is especially hurtful in Prague. But compromised personnel is not the most troublesome legacy of the communist past. It is the memory of shame. Communism always had many active opponents in Poland; it was not really so surprising, then, that millions of Poles signed up to support Solidarity in the 1980s. The Hungarians fought bravely in 1956. Czechoslovakia did have its Prague Spring in 1968. Yet in the 1970s and 1980s, in every country but Poland, for every Václav Havel there were hundreds of thousands who stayed on the sidelines. They did not believe in the system, but they, like people elsewhere, went along to get along. Today, so many years later, many claim brave deeds against communism. The result is the pathology of post-communism: the unspoken reality of past accommodation and even collaboration in uneasy juxtaposition with current myths of opposition and resistance.

Indeed, the region's *political realm* offers as many disappointments as its economic realm. Coherent political constituencies, philosophies and biographies have yet to find each other, and the result is widespread frustration.

As to the biographies, almost all of the early heroes who bravely confronted communism have either lost their popular appeal and retired from active politics (such as Poland's strongly pro-Western Freedom Union, led by such towering figures as Tadeusz Mazowieczki and Bronislaw Geremek), or turned coat and abandoned their original values (such as Hungary's Federation of Young Democrats,

[3] See Matthew Rhodes, "Czech Malaise and Europe", *Problems of Post-Communism* (March-April 2000), and Jeffrey M. Jordan, "Patronage and Corruption in the Czech Republic", *RFE/RL East European Perspectives*, February 20 and March 6, 2002.

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the Fidesz Party, led by former Prime Minister Viktor Orban).

As the center does not seem to attract enough voters, polarization, fragmentation and the rise of anachronistic parties mark the region's immensely complex internal politics. On most substantive issues, the dividing line is no longer between ex-communists and anti-communists; many a political contest instead pits anti-EU nationalists against pro-EU integrationists, with ex-communists found in both camps. Interestingly, some of the ex-communist social democrats in Slovenia, Hungary and Poland have been in the forefront of those trying to prepare their countries for Western integration.

The real political problem in Poland, for example, is that since parliamentary elections last September, no major pro-integration party is left on the scene to counter the new coalition government led by the ex-communist Democratic Left Alliance, or SLD. The centrist Freedom Union could not even pass the 5 percent threshold needed to enter parliament, and Andrzej Olechowski's moderately conservative Civic Platform received less than 13 percent of the vote. The opposition that gained about a quarter of the parliamentary seats in that election consists of three backward-looking parties that reject both Westernization and modernization: the demagogic Self Defense, a farmers' group; the League of Polish Families, a Catholic fundamentalist party known for its anti-semitic tirades; and Law and Justice, a populist law and order party. They all object to what they see as excessive Polish concessions to the European Union. Always angry and negative, and often irrational, they rail against Poland's enemies at home and abroad, believing that vast international conspiracies aim to undermine Polish sovereignty.

Their main target is Prime Minister Leszek Miller. The same people attack him for his hard-line communist past and for his present pro-Western, social-democratic policies. Foreign Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz is also under multiple attack—sometimes for having signed a letter of protest against NATO's Kosovo campaign in 1999, sometimes for having withdrawn his signature from that letter in 2001, and often for having changed Warsaw's negotiating position so that Poland could close four new chapters of the European Union's *acquis communautaire* in record time this spring. In the event, then, Polish voters—like many of their counterparts elsewhere in central and eastern Europe—are left with an unsavory choice. They can support politicians whose past is tarnished but who currently pursue respectable policies, or politicians whose past seems respectable but who advocate positions empty of any content relevant to the 21st century.

IF POLISH politics are complex and contentious, Slovak politics are even more so. There, more than half a dozen parties make up a pro-Western but highly fragmented coalition of strange bedfellows that includes Christian Democrats and reformed Communists, Greens, Social Democrats, and an ethnic Hungarian party that is itself a coalition. Despite all, the government, led by Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, has worked hard to meet NATO's expectations, and it has also done a remarkably effective job getting the country ready to enter the European Union. Yet with elections scheduled for September 2002, two months before NATO's Prague summit, this unwieldy coalition will almost surely unravel because the necessary reforms it has carried out have eroded its political base.

The worst possibility is that Vladimir Meciar, the authoritarian former prime minister whose Movement for a Democratic Slovakia continues to lead in

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the polls, will return to power. (Washington, to its credit, made it clear earlier this year that a Slovakia with Meciar at the helm will not be invited to join NATO.) Somewhat more promising, and perhaps more likely, is the possibility that if Meciar wins only a plurality of the vote, the Slovak president would ask Robert Fico to form a government with some or most of the parties from the present coalition. Fico, a political chameleon, leads an undefinable new party called, ironically, under the circumstances, *Smer* (Direction). He is younger, more charismatic, and perhaps wilier than Meciar, but what a diverse coalition under his direction could accomplish, and how long it would last, is anyone's guess.

The issue matters for Slovakia and for NATO, however. For if NATO prefers to enlarge its ranks by inviting all seven serious applicants, it might include a Slovakia run by Fico despite his seemingly unmanageable coalition. While such a Slovakia may or may not become a reliable and stable ally, it is clear that the exclusion of Slovakia alone at the Prague summit would seriously harm whatever chance democratic governance has to set roots there.

IN SLOVAKIA, as indeed everywhere else in central and eastern Europe, domestic politics thus significantly intersects with the realm of foreign policy. NATO should be particularly concerned with two aspects of this intersection: regional stability and Russian influence.

Regional stability is not the serious problem it was earlier this year when the Hungarian government, which was voted out of power in April, sparked considerable tension with several neighbors. At issue was the "status law" that provided some 4.5 million ethnic Hungarians in neighboring countries, notably in Romania and Slovakia, with the right to live and work in Hungary for three months. The perks in themselves were innocent enough, but then-Prime Minister Orban's accompanying inflammatory rhetoric deeply offended Romanians and Slovaks alike. When he spoke of the need to "link together Hungarians living beyond our borders with those in Hungary" and of "joining the forces of Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin", some Romanians and many Slovaks began to wonder if Hungary would return to the active irredentism of the interwar period. That was not in the cards—Orban is no Milosevic. But so pervasive is concern about ethnic conflict and regional instability in central and eastern Europe that nearly everything tawdry and dangerous seems possible.

Orban also managed to irritate the Czechs with a casual comment about another historical issue, the so-called Beneš Decrees. Named after Czechoslovakia's postwar president, Eduard Beneš, the decrees provided for the expulsion of ethnic Hungarians (as well as ethnic Germans) from Czechoslovakia in the immediate aftermath of World War II. They were seen as Nazi collaborators, and the Czechoslovak government confiscated their property without compensation. By espousing collective guilt, the decrees were unjust; yet by suggesting their revocation more than half a century later Orban opened a can of worms. The Slovak government decided not to attend a four-country summit of the Visegrad group of central European states, and Prague and Warsaw soon followed suit. The summit was cancelled. The good news is that Hungary's new government will not flirt with that country's ultra-nationalist Right, and thus even the remote prospects for a clash have disappeared for years to come. Yet the episode showed how thin is the veneer of regional stability, and how quickly it could be sacrificed on the altar of domestic political opportunism.

The second issue for NATO is the

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gradual revival of Russian interests, notably in the Baltic states, Bulgaria, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. Rich Russian oil companies—Yukos and Lukoil in particular—have been buying refineries and seeking markets for their products. Whether they seek only profits or also collude with the Kremlin on political matters is not clear. In 2000, the Polish press offered evidence that the Russian firm Gazprom was putting down not only a pipeline across the country, as it had contracted to do, but was secretly laying a fiber optic cable as well. The oil business aside, Hungary, with the help of the FBI, collected enough evidence in the late-1990s to expel from Budapest one Semyon Mogilevich, the reputed head of the Russian mafia in central and eastern Europe.

Reports in the Czech press often wonder about the unusual number of Russians, perhaps as many as 15,000, who live in the famous resort town of Karlovy Vary, the Czech Republic's answer to Brighton Beach. There is a daily flight from Moscow, and Russians own about 40 percent of the town's real estate. Karlovy Vary, which is situated right on the German border, used to be a center of Warsaw Pact intelligence activity. The Prague daily *Mlada fronta Dnes* summarized the problem for the Czech Republic, and by implication for the whole region and for NATO, too, when it said last summer that members of the Russian mafia sought to "penetrate economic spheres, gain interest in strategic economic sectors, and they try to cause corruption in state administration and influence decision making. They try to establish their members in bodies of state power and political parties." With ethnic Russians making up 30 percent of the population in Latvia and 26 percent in Estonia, the problem is presumably even more acute in those countries.

NATO's Choice

GIVEN SUCH economic, political and foreign policy trends in central and eastern Europe, what should NATO do at its Prague summit with and for the countries of the region? What in turn can central and eastern Europe do for NATO? The answers to these questions may emerge from a consideration of what NATO has become, how it needs to change, and what it can be.

WHAT NATO HAS BECOME: The NATO that will admit new members in Prague is not the same military-political organization it was before September 11. Especially in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, Washington decided to bypass its allies and thereby downgrade NATO's military utility. The war against terrorism is America's war, with Europeans reduced to playing a supporting role. With Europe falling further and further behind the United States in military technology and know-how, and with Russia inching closer to the organization, NATO's strategic significance after 9/11 has become unclear.

Against the backdrop of such developments, Washington has not yet devised a new strategy and, regrettably, has neglected an ideal opportunity to remodel the superstructure of U.S.-European relations at a time when all parties' interests and attention spans are up to the work. The need is great, for an impossible paradox needs relatively quick resolution. On the one hand, the United States effectively controls NATO, and all agree that NATO should matter because it offers a legitimate way for the United States to stay in Europe (something everyone wants), and because serious conflicts requiring joint action might well arise in the future. But the Bush Administration either cannot or does not wish to make effective use of NATO, which in time must diminish U.S.

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control over it and the legitimacy for a U.S. role in Europe that NATO confers.

We should candidly admit that NATO's current agony is due less to European disinterest and mischief than to Washington's decision to go it alone. Nor can NATO's condition be blamed on the admittedly mixed results of the first round of enlargement. The critics of the mid-1990s were wrong: enlargement has not stopped improvements in U.S.-Russian relations; it has not "diluted" the organization; and it has not increased our NATO-related expenses. However, the critics were right in anticipating continued and persistent nationalist resistance to genuine integration.

THE BEGINNING OF NATO'S RECOVERY: Under the circumstances, the second round of enlargement could be—and should be—the beginning of a process to redefine NATO's mission. The new NATO will not be the NATO of the Cold War, and it ought not be the NATO that could not find its place after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It should be a NATO whose primary mission is to maintain and expand the zone of political stability from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The record of enlargement so far proves this to be a realistic objective; after all, contrary to many forecasts, the miserable and dangerous Balkan wars have not spread to central and eastern Europe. One reason for that happy non-event is that NATO's new and old members have understood their responsibilities and have acted accordingly. Not only the new members but the new applicants, too, have contributed to the difficult peace slowly emerging in the Balkans. Elsewhere, too, despite dire predictions, differences such as those between Hungary and Romania, or Poland and Lithuania, have produced no wars, not even skirmishes. After reviewing some of the potential sources of ethnic strife, William E. Odom explains it well: "Why have most of these 'sleeping dogs' not barked, or not barked louder? Because prospective NATO members do not want to spoil their prospects for admittance. Without that hope, some of their leaders would feel free to exploit these issues for domestic political purposes."[4] Their eagerness to lend a hand offers the prospect of considerable interest in embracing a common Western political and economic agenda in the future, as well. As an April 7 *Washington Post* editorial put it, the real benefit of enlargement "lies in the leverage it offers to shape the political and economic development of European countries where democracy and free markets are not yet taken for granted. . . . [A]dmission to NATO will maximize the chances that Central and Eastern Europe will, for the first time in its history, become a region of stable and pro-Western governments."

WHAT NATO CAN BECOME: For this to happen, however, Washington must be realistic about what the West can expect to achieve in central and eastern Europe. Despite the Poles' enthusiasm and deep commitment, the region will not significantly enhance NATO's military might. But given its location, central and eastern Europe could and should play a helpful role in pushing the frontiers of stability eastward, most essentially toward Ukraine. Growing stability in the region as a consequence of progress toward Western-style democracy taking root is an achievable goal worthy of NATO's efforts. In other words, NATO, with its strictly military mission uncertain for now, should work for regional stability and long-term democratic development.

For the seven candidates who might be invited to join NATO in November, Prague should therefore be seen not as a

[4]William E. Odom's testimony before the House International Affairs Committee (April 17, 2002).

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sprint to the finish line but as the beginning of a marathon. For its part, the United States should insist on being heard—now and after enlargement, too. The U.S. Mission to NATO should be required to report to the U.S. Congress every year on how new members are fulfilling their responsibilities, including the contributions they make to advance the rule of law and civil society, as well as how many tanks they have and how many training exercises they undertake. If members commit what NATO's majority regards as misdeeds, they should be isolated and ignored, perhaps suspended. Absent an amended NATO treaty providing for a member's suspension or expulsion, the United States could and should apply appropriate bilateral penalties and convince other allies to follow suit. With such follow-up mechanisms in place to assure continued Western influence, the process of enlargement should continue. It is the best way, in the end, to remove eastern and central Europe from our list of places that could go boom. □

Diacriticism

On March 27, Lithuanian Prime Minister Algirdas Brazauskas was expected to visit Poland. At the last moment, he cancelled his trip because, after six years of negotiations, a highly controversial agreement on the spelling of national minorities' names was not ready to be signed. Only two weeks earlier, after Polish Interior Minister Krzysztof Janik had visited Vilnius, the two sides said the agreement was a done deal and only minor "technical issues" had to be resolved. But then the talks between the two countries suddenly collapsed.

According to the Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*, the Lithuanians objected to Poland's unwillingness to agree to "a 10-year transition period for the introduction of the original spelling of names of Poles living in Lithuania [as] proposed by the Lithuanian side." The controversy had to do with such Polish letters as s, c or z with diacritical marks—those little signs just above, below or across certain letters in the Polish language. As such marks do not exist in Lithuanian, what had to be settled was whether their introduction in Lithuania, where 250,000 ethnic Poles live, could take place over a period of ten years—or less. Poland wanted it done sooner. In Vilnius, the conservative politician Vytautas Landsbergis asserted, however, that the right to spell Polish names in the original would be a "very special privilege" that would not extend to "the Latvian, Estonian, German, French and Scandinavian minorities."

Poland nonetheless remains the most fervent advocate of Lithuania's NATO membership.

—C.G.

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The Long Spoons of Ulster

Jonathan Stevenson

THE EPOCHAL September 11 attacks have increased the sensitivity and hostility of most governments worldwide to terrorism. Nevertheless, there remains a practical distinction between "new" terrorist outfits like Al-Qaeda, which have no negotiable political objective, and "old" terrorist groups motivated by nationalist or irredentist agendas that may be subject to negotiation. If anything, September 11 has made the leaders of some countries afflicted with "old" terrorist problems want to settle matters quickly, before such groups establish links with or try to imitate the methods of new terrorists like Osama bin Laden. Varieties of such activity have occurred from Sri Lanka to the Andes in the hopes that negotiated solutions are in fact possible. With the FARC in Colombia and the PLO in Palestine, protracted but futile efforts at patient negotiation suggest that in these cases they may not be. With the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka and ETA in Spain, it is too soon to say. But it is at least plausible that these and other problems may be amenable to negotiated solutions. Governments thus need to exercise a hard-nosed realism: to appreciate and preserve distinctions among terrorist groups, and to remain open to negotiating with those that may be politically tamed.

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) has appeared to be one such group. When the Belfast Agreement was approved by 71 percent of Northern Irish voters in May 1998, moderate Ulster unionism and Irish nationalism held sway.[1] The greatest political challenges to ending the "troubles" appeared to have been overcome. Deaths from political violence dwindled from close to one hundred per year before the autumn 1994 ceasefires to about twenty per year in the subsequent five-year period.[2] The Republic of Ireland discarded its constitutional claim on Northern Irish territory. After more than 25 years of violent oppo-

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[1]In Northern Ireland, Protestants now constitute about 58 percent of the population, Catholics about 42 percent. Virtually all Protestants are "unionists", which means they support union with Britain; the vast majority of Catholics are "nationalists", supporting unification with the Republic of Ireland. Unionists who have practiced or endorsed terrorist violence are generally termed "loyalists", while nationalists who have used or supported terrorism are known as "republicans."

[2]Even that figure is distorted by the 29 killed by the dissident Real IRA in a single bombing in Omagh, County Tyrone, in August 1998.

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sition to a "partitionist" solution to the Northern Irish conflict, once militant republicans in Sinn Fein, the IRA's political wing, accepted a devolved government founded on the legitimacy of partition—at least as an interim arrangement.

At the same time, Protestant unionists further enshrined the consent principle (dubbed the "unionist veto" by republicans) whereby Northern Ireland must remain part of the United Kingdom until its majority says otherwise. The "soft" constitutional nationalists that opposed violence, being the majority of the province's Catholics, won sub-sovereign cross-border administrative bodies in specified substantive areas to be jointly run by officials from Dublin and Belfast. Between 1994 and 2001, the province was significantly demilitarized; the British troop presence dropped from over 17,000 to 14,000 and numerous watchtowers and army posts were dismantled. The belief prevailed that the hard work had been done, and that even the most fraught issues left to be faced—the disarmament of terrorist groups, or "decommissioning", further demilitarization, police reform and others—would in time be solved.

It hasn't turned out to be such a smooth ride. While police reform is under way, little decommissioning has occurred. Increasing numbers of unionists resent governing with a political party that sports a "private army", while acquiescing to the evisceration of a police force that suffered over 300 fatalities in resisting that army. At the same time, nationalists have warmed to a Sinn Fein whose paramilitary arm no longer demonizes the Catholic community by killing policemen and soldiers, but still dominates Northern Irish politics by dint of holding on to nearly one hundred tons of weaponry. These trends were starkly confirmed on June 7, 2001, when Northern Irish voters chose their 18 Westminster members of Parliament. The Rev. Ian Paisley's anti-Agreement Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) increased its number of MPs from two to five at the expense of the larger Ulster Unionist Party (UUP); Sinn Fein (which stands for Westminster elections but does not participate in national government in Britain) vaulted from two to four at the expense of the soft nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Local council elections followed a similar pattern. This suggests that the sides are drawing further apart, not closer together.

Nevertheless, the republican and unionist positions are not as irreconcilable as these results might indicate. Paisley's DUP and Sinn Fein are thinking and behaving differently than they have before. The DUP manifesto is not focused on undermining the Belfast Agreement but rather on "holding Tony Blair to his pledges." Its key principles are drafted carefully so as to enshrine meaningful decommissioning as the only indispensable requirement of Sinn Fein's participating fully in devolved government. As for Sinn Fein, partition and devolution will never be satisfactory to republicans; yet a week before the Westminster election Martin McGuinness triumphantly told London's *Daily Telegraph*: "There's almost an inevitability that within the next five years . . . the First Minister will be a Sinn Fein minister." Devolution compensates republicans psychologically for decades of perceived exclusion. For practical purposes, too—given that they do not actively engage in British national politics—republicans need devolved government in Northern Ireland as a way to demonstrate their competence as a legitimate party, the better to become a major political force in the Republic of Ireland en route (presumptively) to a united Ireland. Republicans therefore seem willing to govern with unionists for some undefined but not fatally short period.

Dramatic developments in late

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October 2001, as well as the chilling effect of September 11, reflected these attitudes. David Trimble resigned as First Minister of the devolved assembly on July 1 over the decommissioning impasse, and on October 18 finally withdrew the Ulster Unionist Party's ministers from the assembly's governing executive. This put pressure on the IRA to disarm in order to forestall the collapse of the assembly and save the Agreement. After the arrests in Colombia of three IRA men for training the anti-American Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in August and then the September 11 attacks, Washington privately made it clear to Sinn Fein that republicans would receive no diplomatic support from the United States unless the IRA disarmed. This combination of internal crisis and diplomatic pressure produced the IRA's first disarmament gesture of October 23.

As gestures go, however, it was minimal: It involved no more than two arms dumps out of dozens, and was verified not by the British government or unionists but by the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD). Chaired by Canadian General John de Chastelain, the IICD has no enforcement power and has functioned as little more than a liaison. Neither the nature and quantity of arms nor the method by which they were rendered unusable was made public. When asked by unionist assembly member Pauline Armitage whether he could not disclose this information "because it is so paltry that it would be embarrassing", Gen. de Chastelain replied: "I would never argue against a woman's intuition."

Nevertheless, most unionists re-joined the executive. Trimble was narrowly re-installed as First Minister, but support in his own party was so weak that he had to ask members of small non-aligned parties to designate themselves unionists for a day to secure this result. In any event, the assembly has been functioning ever since. Decommissioning is likely to remain the source of repeated crises, however; it is the one issue with the potential to destroy the Belfast Agreement. The question is, will it?

The Decommissioning Problem

IN DEFERENCE to republican sensitivities, the Belfast Agreement does not strictly require IRA decommissioning, but merely establishes it as an objective of the peace process "in the context of the implementation of the overall settlement." In the run-up to the Agreement, however, Trimble needed London's affirmation that Sinn Fein would not be allowed to participate in the executive unless the IRA had first substantially disarmed. On Good Friday, April 10, 1998, the day before the Agreement was signed, Trimble received a letter from Tony Blair stating that "the effect of the decommissioning section of the agreement, with decommissioning schemes coming into effect in June [1998], is that the process of decommissioning should begin straight away." It clearly implied that absent meaningful decommissioning after six months, the British government would "support changes" to provisions of the Belfast Agreement "preventing" uncooperative parties from holding office in the devolved assembly's governing executive.

The letter finessed the timing issue, but its obvious intent was to reassure Trimble that the British government would honor his wish to deny Sinn Fein executive participation absent decommissioning. Unionists have argued ever since that insofar as such reassurance is an integral part of the *quid pro quo*, it is effectively part of the Agreement. Thus, they contended, the UUP council's allowing Sinn Fein into government prior to IRA disarmament in December 1999 signified the

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re-negotiation of the "no guns, no government" condition and justified the imposition of a shorter deadline set by the UUP. When the IRA missed that deadline and Westminster suspended the devolved assembly in February 2000 as a consequence, Sinn Fein countered that the Agreement also specified that decommissioning must begin only "in the context of . . . overall implementation." This "context" is republican code for loyalist disarmament, the literal or de facto disbandment of the 88 percent Protestant police force (formerly known as the Royal Ulster Constabulary, but last November renamed the Police Service of Northern Ireland as a concession to nationalists) and a comprehensive British military withdrawal.

When the peace process began in 1994, the republican argument was that because the IRA had not been defeated militarily it was not obliged to relinquish any arms. As it became clear that unionists and the British government would insist on some form of decommissioning, Sinn Fein changed its position, maintaining that the Agreement requires only that the party use its influence to attain IRA decommissioning. When the assembly was suspended on February 2000 after less than three months over the IRA's refusal to decommission, Sinn Fein argued that with devolution delayed by the decommissioning impasse, republicans had not had enough time to establish the "trust" in devolved institutions that the Agreement's original timetable would have allowed.[3]

Such arguments sum to a "constructive ambiguity" without which an agreement might have been impossible. It has permitted unionists and republicans alike to construe the agreement as they wished, but the IRA's unwillingness to decommission and unionists' insistence that it do so has continually plunged the assembly into crisis. The IRA's agreement in May 2000 to allow international inspectors (former African National Congress secretary-general Cyril Ramaphosa and former President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari) to visit arms dumps convinced the UUP to re-enter government with Sinn Fein after a three-and-a-half month suspension on June 1, 2000. At that time, a new one-year deadline was established. The IRA retained control of the inspection process, however, choosing when and where inspections could be held and concealing the location of the two dumps. All the while, security forces were under tacit but unmistakable pressure to relax anti-terrorist enforcement efforts. In the event, the IRA allowed only three inspections. Nevertheless, Sinn Fein governed with unionists for 13 months until Trimble's July 2001 resignation.

In political terms, the unionists' insistence on decommissioning has not served them well. It has decreased their leverage over other issues of serious concern (in particular, police reform) and has afforded Sinn Fein a greater degree of control over the agenda than it might otherwise have had. But the unionist community is the operative majority in Northern Ireland, and for better or worse, it has defined IRA decommissioning as a moral imperative. Sinn Fein, for its part, has consistently argued that the key ingredient of the peace process is not a formal hand-over of weapons but rather the integrity of the IRA ceasefire.[4] At the same time, it has cleverly

[3]Unionists consider the original deadline to be May 22, 2000. Although that date occurs nowhere in the text of the Belfast Agreement, the referendums approving the Agreement were held on May 22, 1998 and thus, under the Agreement's specification of "two years following the . . . referendums", established the later date as the target for decommissioning.

[4]The IRA cessation lasted from September 1994 to February 1996 when the Canary Wharf bombing ended it. It was re-instated in July 1997, and since then has largely held up. Although

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exploited the unionists' immovable preoccupation with decommissioning to control the political process, understanding that because the IRA possesses the weapons it can strongly affect unionist behavior by showing flexibility or rigidity on decommissioning as need be.

Blair's Weakness

SINN FEIN's capacity to manipulate might have been tempered by resolute British government support for the unionist position, but Tony Blair has been feckless. The IRA's threat of violence, as Lionel Shriver rightly observed, "makes the British government dance."[5] While paying lip service to the objective of decommissioning, Downing Street has tried to get republicans to disarm with concessions on police reform and demilitarization—rather than, say, threats that the cross-border bodies would cease to operate or that police reforms would be held in abeyance unless weapons were handed over. As a result, more often than not unionists have appeared to be spoilers, while Sinn Fein and the IRA looked like the Agreement's saviors. In casting any prospective collapse of the Agreement as an unalloyed catastrophe and refusing to entertain any "Plan B", Blair implicitly blackmailed unionists with the specter of renewed IRA terrorism. By so doing, he also intensified the unionist suspicion that he would never keep his pre-Agreement pledge to enforce decommissioning, thus making them feel as though the burden for achieving decommissioning falls entirely on them—which helps to account for unionists' preoccupation with it and which, as noted above, actually helps the IRA. Recent unionist electoral choices can be interpreted as a protest vote over a British government policy that piggybacks onto the IRA threat. Recent instability in the loyalist ceasefire and heightened dissident loyalist violence appear similarly sourced.

The IRA's adventures in Colombia and the September 11 events bailed Blair out by increasing U.S. intolerance of the IRA's refusal to disarm. Even so, Blair's soft approach has left London with little room to maneuver. Now that the IRA has forfeited a delicate sufficiency of weapons, the British government will be accused by republicans of "moving the goalposts" unless it delivers on its promises of accelerated police reform and demilitarization. Unionists expect these processes to involve an equitable give-and-take on weapons. But the IRA regards its October 23 disarmament token as leverage for getting major government and unionist concessions on matters that have nothing to do with the implementation of the Belfast Agreement. For example, General de Chastelain revealed on April 9 that another disarmament gesture had been made; once again, its nature and extent were left unspecified. Both prior and subsequent to this event, it appeared that the Labour Party would submit to Parliament draft legislation to give about 200 IRA fugitives some form of amnesty, this almost certainly on the strength of the IRA's pledge to forfeit that additional soupçon of weaponry. But amnesty is not mentioned in the Agreement.

Each side has tools to press its points. Unionists retain the power to withdraw from the executive and collapse the devolved assembly, and may do so should more substantial decommissioning not be forthcoming. Conversely, the IRA has not forsworn the use of violence, and terrorism presumably remains its fallback position should non-violent efforts prove

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the ceasefire declared by the two main loyalist groups in October 1994 started deteriorating in 2000, it substantially endured for over five years and loyalist violence still has not resumed full-force.

[5]Lionel Shriver, "The Ian and Gerry Show", *Wall Street Journal Europe*, June 14, 2001.

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inadequate to its purposes. Yet, as republicans have made the disarmament gestures that unionists have cast as their Holy Grail, the onus will stay on unionists to acquiesce to more concessions. That is perhaps why, in early December 2001, the UUP's ruling council voted 409 to 320 not to impose a deadline for additional decommissioning.

As ever, too, Blair's government is trying to marginalize the issue, having pressed the House of Commons before Christmas to extend the IICD's toothless mandate for five years rather than press the IRA for more product. The British government is probably also rewarding the IRA for its gestures by exerting quiet pressure on the security forces in Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic to relax anti-terrorist enforcement measures, such as searches for arms caches and attempts to recruit informants. On balance, then, the combination of cynical republican audacity, unionist shortsightedness and British appeasement have ensured that Sinn Fein and the IRA are credited with visionary statesmanship—even while the IRA remains one of the best armed terrorist groups in the world. Not even Yasir Arafat has been able to achieve such a feat.

Blair's Challenge

NOTWITHSTANDING Washington's role in convincing the IRA to make its move on October 23, further effective pressure on the IRA is not likely to come from outside actors. As long as the assembly is maintained and the IRA ceasefire holds, the Bush Administration will be inclined to regard the Provisional IRA as sufficiently quiet. Conversely, having technically met the primary unionist demand, and having distinguished itself from terrorists like bin Laden, the IRA can afford to resist further political compromise. Before Bill Clinton left office, he tried hard to get the IRA to move on decommissioning and discovered that he lacked sufficient clout. While American sponsorship of the peace process—in particular, former U.S. Senator George Mitchell's able chairmanship of the political negotiations—helped produce a formal agreement, prior to September 11 American diplomatic support had only marginal value in the current implementation phase of the peace process. Furthermore, a hands-off diplomatic philosophy fits discretionary situations like Northern Ireland's quite well. Richard Haass, director of policy planning at the State Department and the administration's point man for Northern Ireland, has noted that Northern Irish political leaders should get primary credit for the success of the peace process; he does not believe that intensive mediation by Washington will help at this stage. While outside intervention may still occur to some effect in crises, for increasing political stability it is indeed the local players that really matter. So what, then, will these local players—not least Prime Minister Blair—do?

After October 23, the IRA will be even less apt to respond to additional unionist ultimatums. That is because the SDLP, the only Northern Irish party with enough electoral leverage over republicans to make a lasting and material difference, is now close enough to the Sinn Fein view that it supplies ample political ballast. The now-retired SDLP party leader, John Hume, is generally credited with having drawn Sinn Fein toward a peace process and certifying Gerry Adams as a legitimate interlocutor through the Hume-Adams talks in 1993. But since then, save for perfunctory denunciations of political violence, there has been little daylight between Sinn Fein and the SDLP. Indeed, the SDLP hemorrhaged in the June election because it attempted to "out-green"

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Sinn Fein by refusing to meet unionists halfway on police reform or to support moderate unionists on decommissioning. This strategy backfired: marginal voters attributed nationalist gains to Sinn Fein assertiveness and thus saw no reason to take a poor man's version of hard-line nationalism when they could get the real thing.

Unionists see the capitulation of soft nationalists to Sinn Fein's agenda as having dimmed hopes for a political middle ground, but there may be a way back. The SDLP's decline may push the party back to its fundamentals, and it may again become a moderating influence that can build political bridges between nationalism and unionism. Given its stodgy image among young Catholics, this would be a difficult task, but one worth the effort. A politically re-oriented and re-invigorated SDLP—more assertive about mediation and less aligned with Sinn Fein—would dilute unionist fears of a "pan-nationalist front." That would encourage unionist moderation and nudge Sinn Fein toward the center rather than the rebellious political periphery to which it is naturally drawn. If such moderation does not occur, hard-line unionists could create enormous trouble. Although the events of October 23 wrong-footed Paisley—he did not expect physical decommissioning ever to occur, and therefore has been uncharacteristically silent—he is not above sabotaging the Agreement, and he may have the political muscle to do so. If the British government makes further concessions to republicans, he could engineer the decisive defeat of pro-Agreement unionists in the June 2003 assembly elections.

This is the backdrop against which one must see the joint attempt by London and Dublin on August 1 to entice the IRA into a decommissioning move with a package of proposed concessions on police reform, fugitive amnesty and demilitarization. It was an effort met with republican temporizing and unionist outrage. Had Blair clearly underscored that, without decommissioning, nationalists would lose the benefits of devolution—in particular, functioning cross-border bodies and drastic police reform—he would have demonstrated greater even-handedness and might have prompted further compromises from the nationalists. Since Blair has little left to offer republicans without violating the consent principle altogether, threats rather than additional promises are more likely to produce serious disarmament gestures. But Blair demurs, and so affords republicans maximum political room to maneuver.

What Co-existence Requires

EVEN THE thoroughgoing disarmament of paramilitaries would not ensure peace and harmony in Ulster. Decommissioning is not a panacea. Serious ructions are inevitable in a circumstance in which the two main political camps seek irreconcilable sovereign ends and harbor grudges rooted in generations of communal violence. By the same token, incremental changes in the status quo stand a far better chance of keeping the fundamental disagreement between Ulster unionists and Irish nationalists tolerably civilized than either side's insistence on the other's surrender. From either side's deepest credal beliefs, justice would require confrontation. The trick, then, is to so busy both sides with process issues that they have not the opportunity to dwell and act on those beliefs. Put differently, for two sides fated to sup at the same table, everyone needs long spoons.

From a practical unionist perspective, the IRA's manipulative foot-dragging on the inspections, burgeoning evidence of its conditional intent to take up arms again, and the continuation of brutal self-policing have necessitated disarma-

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ment.[6] Decommissioning is not an operational security requirement; the IRA is sufficiently resourceful to purchase new weapons and construct bombs out of fertilizer. Most unionists understand that it is unrealistic to expect the IRA to emasculate itself by relinquishing all, or even most, of its weapons. But symbolic gestures can still further unionist-nationalist coexistence. The IRA has already made two such gestures and, as far as unionists are concerned, has been rewarded by its return to devolved government and an amnesty for its fugitive terrorists that the Belfast Agreement does not require. Unionists are likely to angle for at least two more things from Sinn Fein in the coming period before the 2003 elections.

First, they will demand that the IRA renounce terrorism permanently and irrevocably, which amounts to an unequivocal declaration that the war is over. Trimble and others have tried throughout the seven-year peace process to extract this concession, without success. They will keep trying, however, because they regard such a renunciation as a critical symbolic watershed. Republicans, it is true, have accepted devolution and the consent principle, and have made a couple of disarmament gestures. But ongoing IRA arms procurement and vigilantism, and the arrest of the three Provisional IRA men for training members of the FARC, justifies unionists' inference that if republicans do not continue to get what they want out of the peace process, they will simply fall back to violence. The IRA's reluctance to renounce the armed option—which they could easily do with crossed fingers, Arafat-style—suggests that honor, after a fashion, does matter to these terrorists. A pledge would create some political barrier to IRA backsliding and would help build unionist confidence.

Second, unionists will demand a cessation of the IRA's "self-policing" of Catholic areas. While the IRA has always argued that the Royal Ulster Constabulary's inability to win the confidence of the Catholic community has necessitated such action, unionists read ongoing kneecappings of juvenile Catholic car thieves as evidence that the IRA intends to remain in business as a private army. Indeed, the number of "vigilante" incidents in which IRA or loyalist paramilitaries administer "justice" to thieves or drug dealers actually rose by 40 percent from 2000 to 2001. Paramilitaries regard their own neighborhoods as their last redoubts and are not disposed to give up local tyranny. Yet the IRA has some incentive to end its intramural coercive practices, since doing so would create more space for compromise on police reform and demilitarization.

Neither of these aims seems absolutely fanciful. The IRA did declare the 1994 ceasefire and it did enter a non-violent political process. It did so on account of the military futility of its armed campaign and Sinn Fein's inability to garner more than about 10 percent of the vote while the IRA engaged in violence. It stands to reason, therefore, that further IRA concessions may be won if its military and political prospects remain constrained.

Other pressures also work to aid the unionist agenda. A return to violence would threaten Sinn Fein's electoral gains and damage its political credibility sufficiently to lose Dublin's sympathy, London's receptivity and Washington's good offices, all of which have been essential to legitimizing Irish republicanism in Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, September 11 has increased Tony Blair's and the unionists' leverage against the IRA.

[6] In June 2000, a Florida court convicted four IRA gunrunners of illegally attempting to ship weapons to Ireland in 1999—apparently with high-level IRA approval. Security forces also have solid evidence that the IRA has been actively purchasing weapons from the United States and eastern Europe.

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Clearly, political pressures from both the British Conservative Party and the United States make it easier for Blair to be tough on terrorists of any variety.[7] Given Washington's new hypersensitivity to terrorism, its relative lack of interest in a strategically unimportant conflict, and its need to focus counterterrorism efforts principally on radical Muslim groups, the Bush Administration will expect Blair to keep his house in good counterterrorist order.

Further, the terrorist attacks on U.S. territory will probably discourage the IRA from returning to violence in deference to new sensitivities among Irish-American supporters (who are disproportionately represented in New York's fire and police departments, which lost hundreds in the World Trade Center) as well as the U.S. government. Such considerations could well limit the degree and frequency of Real IRA and dissident loyalist operations—at least for a while.

But whether even all this will produce an IRA renunciation of terrorism and a clear declaration that the war is over remains to be seen. Most likely not. On St. Patrick's Day 2002, the Police Service of Northern Ireland's Special Branch headquarters in East Belfast was broken into and sensitive intelligence files were stolen, including those concerning informants against the IRA. Security forces are confident that the Provisional IRA was involved. Then, in April, police uncovered a "hit list" of senior British and Northern Irish officials in West Belfast. Also in that month, Russian security services informed British military intelligence that the Provisionals had purchased at least twenty sophisticated AN-94 armor-piercing assault rifles from Russian sources in the autumn of 2001. These developments strongly suggest that the IRA's non-violent path remains merely tactical rather than strategic. The last revelation further demonstrates the intentional operational emptiness of the decommissioning gestures: as the IRA puts old weapons "beyond use", they are simply replaced with newer and more effective ones.

Indeed, the appearance of reasonableness that the IRA has enjoyed in the British-Irish context—facilitated by Blair's see-no-evil approach—has emboldened it to undertake provocative relationships elsewhere that directly contravene American policies. Re-inforcing this Cold War habit was the replacement of a republican-friendly Bill Clinton by an uninterested George W. Bush and the September 11 attacks. First, in August 2001, three IRA men were arrested in Colombia. Then, in December, Adams went on an official four-day visit to Cuba, where he met Fidel Castro and criticized U.S. Cuba policy. In April 2002, a report to Congress by the State Department's Office of Counterterrorism substantiated suspicions that up to 15 Provisional IRA men had joined Iranian, Cuban and possibly Basque terrorists in Colombia between 1998 and 2001, and trained the FARC in urban terror techniques, including the use of secondary explosives and homemade mortars—both IRA innovations. Credible inferences arose in early and mid-2002 that the IRA had trained Palestinian snipers and taught Palestinian terrorists how to make booby-trap bombs that have since been used against Israeli soldiers. Finally, Gerry Adams in April refused to testify before a Congressional committee about the three alleged IRA men arrested in Colombia on the grounds that he might prejudice their trial—a position that managed to both intimate IRA involvement and deprecate U.S. security worries. What emerges is a picture of a republican leadership considerably less

[7]That said, this winter's new British anti-terrorist legislation explicitly exempts domestic terrorists, implicitly Northern Irish ones.

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able to rally the international forces that served it so well in the 1990s, and more concerned about re-establishing its revolutionary credentials with its hard-line constituency at home.

The Belfast Agreement as History

IN A TIME when terrorism of any kind is seen as an existential threat, the Belfast Agreement absent terrorist disarmament would have functioned as especially bad precedent. In some respects, it already has. On the strength of the Agreement, the Basque separatists of *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) overtly modeled its 1998–99 flirtation with a ceasefire and peace process on the IRA's strategy. ETA hoped to get a mass prisoner release without disarmament. Yet José María Aznar's government would not consider prematurely setting ETA prisoners free or otherwise forego disarmament. ETA's unrealistic expectations, based on a decommissioning-free version of the Belfast Agreement, stopped negotiations with Spain at the door and sent ETA back to unbridled terror. More broadly, negotiated resolutions of the Israeli-Palestinian and Kashmir conflicts that do not involve the arrest and disarmament of terrorists are scarcely imaginable.

So it is plainly counterproductive that the Belfast Agreement has established the precedent that politically motivated terrorists (i.e., most of them) can get out of jail free when their friends end violence; this dispensation may be counted upon to increase the incentives of all political malcontents to kill for political advantage. Other requirements of the Agreement—punitive police reform, super-majorities and the institutional entrenchment of sectarian polarities, to name three—also provide political ammunition to minority-backed insurgencies.

The IRA's gesture of October 23, however, furnished some offsetting precedent. Indeed, within less than a week ETA stated that it was willing to lay down its arms provided Madrid holds a regional referendum on independence. Although Aznar refused, ETA's offer signaled a degree of flexibility that had not been in evidence since it ended its ceasefire in December 1999. Given that Sinn Fein is its principal source of diplomatic support, it seems likely that ETA, too, felt cornered by the combination of September 11 and October 23. Furthermore, the fact that American threats of diplomatic abandonment produced—or, at minimum, hastened—the IRA's accommodation on decommissioning means that ultimately the IRA itself blinked out of weakness. For comparable reasons, the NATO- and EU-brokered dispensation in Macedonia, in which more substantial rebel disarmament proceeded concurrently with political reform, is also salutary.

As in Macedonia, prospects in Northern Ireland have recently turned from completely bleak to marginally better. During the summer, civil breakdown accompanied a near collapse of the political situation. The April-September Protestant "marching season" was especially acrimonious in 2001, and sectarian riots in North Belfast and loyalist petrol bomb attacks throughout the province became almost daily occurrences. On August 1, the dissident Real IRA set off a car bomb in a residential area of west London, which appeared to indicate more lethal intent than had recent operations. But Sinn Fein and the Provisional IRA's ambitious all-Ireland political agenda has blunted Real IRA accusations that the republican movement is settling for a partitionist solution. The statesmanlike character of the decommissioning gesture, too, has elevated the political stature of Irish republicanism. Thus, the Real IRA's incentive to increase terrorist activity is now relatively low. Prisoner release and five years of comparative calm have also made more IRA men reluctant to risk jail

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and the security forces less inclined to alienate the nationalist community. Even if the IRA were to return to violence, it would find world opinion less susceptible to manipulation than heretofore. Post-September 11, the IRA would also garner less support from Irish America, its traditional source of strength.

The peace process is still vulnerable to serious risks, as *must* be the case whenever irreconcilable principles clash. The IRA's disarmament gestures, though negligible in terms of actual hardware, symbolized surrender to many hard-line Irish republicans and is likely to produce some defections from the Provisional IRA to the Real IRA, which opposes the peace process. Conversely, an apparent condition of the first disarmament move, approved by the House of Commons on December 18, was that Sinn Fein MPs would get access to Parliament facilities and entitlement to £107,000 each per annum in expenses, despite their refusal to take the oath of office or participate in government. Understandably, this and other concessions have humiliated unionists and may generate sufficient anger to deprive Trimble of his current precarious control of the UUP.

Loyalists continue to pose a threat to political stability as well. Unlike Sinn Fein and the IRA, die-hard loyalists have no real political power to lose from intransigence. They have little incentive to relinquish their primary source of influence: weapons. Gerry Adams, in a rare moment of consistency, has said that Sinn Fein will not press for loyalist decommissioning, requiring instead only an intact loyalist ceasefire. But loyalist violence is on the rise, as indicated by Northern Ireland Secretary of State John Reid's declaration in October that the government no longer recognized the ceasefire of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), one of the two main loyalist groups, and the European Union's and U.S. State Department's subsequent addition of the UDA and three smaller loyalist groups to their respective lists of terrorist organizations subject to asset freezes. Further unionist concessions and Catholic social ascendancy are likely to fuel loyalist violence, which could in turn produce community pressure on the Provisional IRA as well as the Real IRA to retaliate. And London's or Dublin's inclination to capitulate to extra-Agreement demands, republican retaliation for loyalist violence, or republican refusal to take other steps toward demilitarization could impel unionists to precipitate another make-or-break moment for the Agreement. All sides remain at the table, but their spoons get longer each day.

YET DESPITE London's diplomatic weakness, unionism's political maladroitness and the IRA's artful dilatoriness, minimal decommissioning has for now rescued the devolved assembly. For peace to take deeper root, however, unionists need either substantial additional decommissioning, or the IRA's permanent renunciation of violence and a significant reduction in terrorist self-policing.

If London thinks outside the small box that is Northern Ireland, it will see that helping unionists, rather than further appeasement of republicans, is in the British national interest. Though it is no longer an imperial power, Britain still, as Lord Hurd has put it, "punches above its weight" in international affairs. One reason is its "special relationship" with the United States, but another is its capacity—unlike other European powers—to deliver effective military force when asked. Britain's combat readiness turns in significant part on its steady blooding in Northern Ireland, where it has lost over 750 soldiers since 1969. But military morale and the willingness of British soldiers to fight depend on the British government's defense of their past sacrifices.

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September 11 affords London the political leverage to vindicate its countrymen's losses in Northern Ireland by getting tougher with Sinn Fein and the IRA, which would also enhance its credibility as a foe of transnational terrorism. Past timidity notwithstanding, London can still make the Belfast Agreement acceptable history and better precedent as well as expedient conflict resolution. □

Green, Orange and Red

The ground bass of the great Irish melody is complaint. Successive waves of invasion by Celts, Norsemen, Anglo-Normans, English, have allowed us in Ireland always to lay the blame for the ills that beset us upon the Other; upon, indeed, a rapacious host of Others. . . .

This is not to say that Irish plaints are unjustified, as a glance at the history books, at least the unrevised ones, will amply demonstrate. In the closing decades of the sixteenth century the suppression by Elizabeth's distinctly unsad captains of the Desmond rebellion in Munster left all of Ireland below a line drawn between the cities of Cork and Limerick, an area of lush land half the size of Belgium, utterly laid waste and depopulated. In their drive through the countryside the English conquistadors left nothing and no one standing. Sir William Pelham, one of the commanders, put it succinctly: 'We consumed with fire all inhabitations and executed the people wherever we found them.'

—John Banville,
"In the Puddles of the Past",
New York Review of Books,
May 9, 2002

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The Resilience of the Adversary Culture

Paul Hollander

THE TERRORIST attacks of September 11, whatever else they mean and have wrought, provide a new vantage point for examining the recent evolution and current condition of the American adversary culture. This term, coined by Lionel Trilling in his 1965 book *Beyond Culture*, refers to a discernible and durable reservoir of discontent, to a disposition on the part of those Americans who habitually find the United States—or at least its government—at fault in virtually every conflict in which it is engaged. It is a culture whose boundaries, both demographic and intellectual, defy precise definition, but the concept has nonetheless been indispensable for identifying a chronic domestic estrangement and the specific beliefs associated with it.

As to the demographical boundary, most of those within the adversary culture may be loosely described as intellectuals, or quasi-intellectuals, and their followers; they are found in the greatest concentrations on major college campuses and nearby communities. Living near a campus generally inclines one to overestimate the adversary culture's importance and influence, whereas distance from such a setting tempts one to write it off as inconsequential. A visit to a campus by someone not inured to its atmosphere can illustrate the psychic distance between the two. About five years ago, *New York Times* columnist Maureen Dowd asked former President George H.W. Bush what he had learned at a Hofstra University conference about his presidency; Bush answered: "I learned that there are some real wacko professors scattered out around the country."[1]

As to the adversary culture's intellectual boundaries, it is generically far Left, its central animating views being unswervingly anti-capitalist. For most of its 20th-century existence, these views coincided with formal Marxist and less well-defined Marxoid perspectives. But radical pacifists and anarchists were counted among that culture, and with the collapse of Soviet communism and the accompanying nadir of socialism, the mix of attitudes within the adversary culture has changed and grown. Environmental, anti-globalization and "multicultural" forms of radicalism have been moving into spaces formerly occupied by conventional left-wing parties and movements. Environmentalism fits the adversary culture well, as we will see, because of its essentially anti-modernist bias. Anti-globalization combines environmentalism and anti-corporatism on a global scale to

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replace what used to be discrete anti-capitalism on national scales. Multiculturalism fills the need to bind together the several constituencies of the adversary culture, for no longer is that culture dominated by white Protestants and Jews as it had been before the first half of the 20th century.

So, too, has the adversary culture adopted post-modernism and deconstructionism as the intellectual anchors for its politics. These radically relativistic affections have been combined, curiously enough, with denunciations of American society and Western culture just as heartfelt as those of simpler days gone by. As before, these condemnations rest on the non-relativistic assumption that there are absolute standards available with which to condemn that society and culture.

Adherents of the adversary culture can be found in a wide variety of settings, organizations and interest groups. They include postmodernist academics, radical feminists, Afrocentrist blacks, radical environmentalists, animal rights activists, pacifists, Maoists, Trotskyites, critical legal theorists and others. They often have different political agendas but share certain core convictions and key assumptions: all are reflexively and intensely hostile critics of the United States or American society and, increasingly, of all Western cultural traditions and values as well. The most important among their beliefs is that American society is deeply flawed and uniquely repellent—unjust, corrupt, destructive, soulless, inhumane, inauthentic and incapable of satisfying basic, self-evident human needs. The American social system has failed to live up to its original historical promise and, they insist, is inherently and ineradicably sexist, racist and imperialist.

It should also be noted that, for the most part, the adversary culture took little notice of the collapse of Soviet communism, the end of the Cold War and the retreat of state-socialist systems around the world. Its increasing preoccupation with matters domestic reflects the dearth of foreign alternatives to the alleged evils of American society and capitalism. Of late, therefore, as suggested above, critiques of globalization on the basis of its domestic environmental and economic effects have become a substitute for more explicit attacks on capitalism.

Nevertheless, the supporters of the adversary culture still tend to sympathize with virtually every political force that opposes the United States. These include the former Soviet Union, China under Mao, Castro's Cuba, Sandinista Nicaragua, supporters of the uprising in Chiapas, Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Yugoslavia under Milosevic, the PLO and various other anti-Israeli Arab groups, and, most recently, even the Taliban. There have been occasional disagreements among these critics regarding U.S. policy toward particular adversaries: a few of them supported the Gulf War and more of them the intervention in Kosovo. Most recently, some recognized that the Taliban's hatred of the United States and all it stands for does not necessarily make it an admirable ally or friend. Barbara Ehrenreich, for example, was seriously disheartened that authentic enemies of the United States were less than enlightened as regards the rights of women: "What is so heartbreaking to me as a feminist is that the strongest response to corporate globalization and U.S. military domination is based on such a violent and misogynist ideology."[2]

BUT DOES any of this still matter? Many observers claimed in the weeks after September 11 that the most remarkable thing about the contemporary adversary culture is its silence. Hendrik Hertzberg, for example, found that only "traditional pacifists . . . and a tiny handful of reflexive Rip Van Winkles" object "to the aims and methods

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of the antiterrorism campaign. . . . Conservative commentators have had a frustrating time of it rounding up the usual blame-America-first suspects, because so few of those suspects are out there blaming America first."[3] Michael Kelly proclaimed "the renaissance of liberalism" and argued that "what had been since the late 1960s the dominant voice of left-liberal politics" has become "marginalized" post-September 11.[4] Even more pointedly, George Packer argued in the *New York Times Magazine*:

> September 11 made it safe for liberals to be patriots. Among the things destroyed with the twin towers was the notion held by certain Americans, ever since Vietnam, that to be stirred by national identity, carry a flag and feel grateful toward someone in uniform ought to be a source of embarrassment.[5]

Loud dissent and telegenic demonstrations against the beginning of U.S. military action in Afghanistan on October 7 were noticeably muted, it is true—more so even than the modest protest accompanying the Gulf War in 1991. But the adversary culture had not disappeared, and as America's conduct of the war on terrorism gradually replaced the images of the September 11 attacks themselves, it made a quick comeback. The influence of the adversary culture has been most obvious on the campuses, where anti-U.S. sentiments and statements are conventional wisdom, and least apparent in towns and suburbs, where its presence is all but absent. Generally speaking, the adversary culture, entrenched in its academic strongholds and other cultural institutions, still wields considerable influence even as it has become increasingly isolated and weakened by recent defections. In addition to the appeal of some of its messages of the moment, some of the adversary culture's worldview has been absorbed over time into what we casually call the mainstream through the media and, in a different way, through the American commercial culture.[6] (It is, for example, commonplace for observers outside the adversary culture to refer to the American international vocation as "imperial."[7]) That is why some observers had trouble locating the adversary culture after September 11; they were looking in the wrong places.

They were looking, in particular, at the overtly political. While the adversary culture still overlaps with the Left (old, new, and left-over), a purely political definition does not do it justice. Rather, the attitudes and beliefs in question also involve what is peripheral to the political: a sense of identity, cultural norms, matters of taste. Russell Jacoby's comment about alienation captures what is distinctive about the adversarial disposition: "Alienation once referred to social relations and labor, signifying an objective condition. Later it turned into an irritation or annoyance. 'I am alienated' someone will announce, meaning, 'I am unhappy or uncomfortable.'"[8]

Some Americans, it seems, have always been alienated; we should not lose sight of the fact that many of the earliest American forebears came here from the Old World precisely because they were alienated *there*. A keen receptivity to the real or perceived injustices of American society thus has a long tradition; high expectations and the value placed on nonconformity have deep roots in American social and cultural history. Strong beliefs in the perfectibility of human beings and institutions have for centuries been an essential attribute of the American view of the world, as has an indefatigable optimism regarding the solubility of all social, political and personal problems. The social critical temper of the adversary culture has always fed on the high expectations that American social and historical conditions have generated and nurtured,

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and such expectations remain in place today.

The current adversary culture bears the imprint of the last high watermark of American social discontent: the "Sixties." More than a result of the Vietnam War, however, as is usually assumed, the contemporary phase of the adversary culture owes its strength to a period of great changes after World War II. In this most modern of all societies, the pains and problems of modernity—especially its corrosive effect on sense of purpose, community and identity—are inseparable from the discontents that the adversary culture embodies and projects. Since we may be sure that the next half century will bear as much disconcerting change as the last half, it is a good bet that, for better or for worse, the American adversary culture will persist and thrive. Surely, the actions of a few dozen terrorists are not enough to stymie it.

It was therefore inevitable that early proclamations of the decline of the adversary culture would prove short-lived. Rather than undergoing major change, the left-liberal side of the American political community underwent a split after September 11. The stalwarts of the adversary culture—Noam Chomsky, Susan Sontag, Gore Vidal and others—blamed the United States for the attack against it, and some even cheered it. All their familiar ideas were on display, as well: Vietnam War metaphors, therapeutic analyses designed to turn murderers into victims overwhelmed by the "root causes" of their deeds, appeals to oppose America's inherent racism and militarism, and whatever other pet obsessions happened to be at hand. But there were also new and important voices dissenting from the conventional adversarial wisdom. As Norman Podhoretz put it: "September 11 served as an inverse Kronstadt for a number of radical leftists of today. What it did was raise questions about what one of them called the inveterately 'negative faith in America the ugly.'"[9]

Dissidents from the adversarial predisposition have included Michael Walzer who, for example, emphatically rejects the idea that poverty and inequality explain terrorism. He favors a "cultural-religious-political explanation" that emphasizes the obsession with an Enemy embraced by people who are "ideologically or theologically degraded."[10] He has even signed up, conditionally, for a military campaign against Iraq. Christopher Hitchens has criticized those on the Left who were reluctant to acknowledge that "the bombers of Manhattan represent fascism with an Islamic face." He reminds fellow leftists that what Islamic militants "abominate about 'the West' is not what Western liberals don't like."[11] Ellen Willis, a columnist for the *Village Voice* and a journalism professor at NYU, has argued that "the lessons of Vietnam" do not apply to Afghanistan, and favored committing ground troops in the war.[12] Richard Falk has argued that a U.S. military response to 9/11 could be justified and himself sought to provide a legal-moral framework for "a just response"—although he did feel compelled to observe that "a frenzy in the aftermath of the attacks [is] giving us reason to fear the response almost as much as the initial, traumatizing provocation."[13]

As a result of all this, Michael Kazin has predicted the disappearance of the prospect for a "unified left."[14] Echoing Hertzberg, Kelly and Packer, Andrew Sullivan reached the logical but surprising conclusion that the Right was also split by September 11:

> . . . perhaps the biggest conservative victim of the war has been cultural pessimism. Not long ago leading paleoconservatives were denouncing America as a country . . . 'slouching toward Gomorrah.' Moral decline was almost irreparable; civil responsibility was a distant

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> memory . . . the evils of feminism, homosexuality and Hollywood were corroding the country's ability to believe in itself and defend its shores. . . . The response of the American people to the events of September 11 surely disproved these scolds. . . . Surely what post-9/11 America has shown is that those who viewed this country as socially decadent, morally confused, culturally bankrupt, and in need of drastic spiritual revival were baldly, incontrovertibly wrong.[15]

Some conservatives, it seems, are not persuaded by Sullivan's argument. The split on the Right persists—between those who justify America's response to terror based on national interest, and those who do so on the basis of a metaphysics of American exceptionalism. Those of the latter persuasion have retained their cultural pessimism, and still see the left-liberal establishment as a potent negative element in American social life.

It is hard to know what proportion of left-liberals have allowed newfound patriotic impulses to overcome their adversarial outlook in the aftermath of the September attacks. More pertinent, perhaps, it is hard to say *how long* the restraint of the dissenters will last. In any event, most responses to September 11 from the adversarial Left suggest the persistence of sentiments and attitudes traceable to the late 1960s.

Of Course They Hate Us

TWO MAJOR, closely linked arguments have been pursued among those on the adversarial Left that converge in assigning ultimate responsibility to the United States for the attacks. The first proposition is that if Arab terrorists harbored profound hatred for this country, this hatred had to be well founded; in other words, the United States must be hateful if it is hated. This proposition has provided a welcome opportunity to enumerate America's historic misdeeds, which is what members of the adversary culture seem most to enjoy. Many of those who maintain this position nonetheless believe that not all hatreds are justified. They firmly believe in the reality of irrational hate crimes committed against their favorite victim groups. They apportion guilt and advocate severe punishment for such wrongdoers.

The second proposition focuses on the alleged "root causes" of this hatred. The root causes of terrorism and the hatred of the United States (which shade into one another), adversary culture members believe, should be *understood* rather than condemned. Emphasis on root causes leads to a deterministic, therapeutic view of the terrorists who are seen as "products spawned" by compelling social-political and economic conditions beyond their control or full comprehension. They and their beliefs are held to be products of authentic grievances: poverty, inequality, backwardness and social injustice. (It is not easy to explain how bin Laden, his associates, and well-educated middle class suicide pilots fit into this argument, but never mind.[16]) The "root cause" approach also proposes that hostility toward the United States is inspired by American support for corrupt and repressive political systems such as those in Pakistan, Egypt and Saudi Arabia—as if Islamic terrorists opposed to these governments were anxious to replace them with political democracies, or as if these regimes would not be more or less as they are without U.S. support.

Responses of the adversary culture to September 11 illuminate well the persistence of the convictions of its best-known figures. Their moral indignation and anger focused almost entirely on the actions and policies of the United States, and was largely devoid of corresponding

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sentiments regarding its avowed and murderous enemies. Gore Vidal thus observed that "the USA is the most corrupt political system on earth"; bin Laden was merely "responding to U.S. foreign policy."[17] Elsewhere Vidal suggested that "You [the United States] keep attacking people for such a long time, one of them is going to get you back."[18] A particularly curious form of this argument was proposed by a speaker at a Green Party conference: "The World Trade Center Disaster is a globalized version of the Columbine High School Disaster. When you bully people long enough they are going to strike back."[19] According to Professor Thomas Laqueur of Berkeley, California, "on the scale of evil the New York bombings are sadly not so extraordinary and our government has been responsible for many that are probably worse." Frederic Jameson argued that "the Americans created bin Laden. . . . This is therefore a textbook example of dialectical reversal."[20] Susan Sontag was far more enraged by the White House, our "robotic President" and public figures who stood united behind him, than she was by the terrorists:

> . . . this was not a 'cowardly' attack on 'civilization' or 'liberty' or 'humanity' or 'the free world' but an attack on the world's self-proclaimed superpower, undertaken as a consequence of specific American alliances and actions. . . . The unanimity of the sanctimonious, reality-concealing rhetoric spouted by American officials and media commentators in recent days seems . . . unworthy of a mature democracy.[21]

Norman Mailer, always ready to outdo his peers, told a Dutch audience:

> The WTC was not just an architectural monstrosity but also dreadful for people who didn't work there, for it said to all those people: 'If you can't work up here, boy, you're out of it. . . .' Everything wrong with America led to the point where the country built that tower of Babel, which consequently had to be destroyed.[22]

There was an unmistakable discrepancy between the volume of compassion extended to the wholly unintended victims of U.S. air strikes against the Taliban and the terrorists and the expressions of compassion for the wholly intended victims of the suicide pilots. American militarism thus managed, once again, to become a major theme of the adversary culture. To the very end of the bombing campaign there was an adamant refusal to accept the possibility that the U.S. military could accomplish its purpose without wreaking counterproductive bloodshed; rather, it was viewed as another display of mindless and malicious destructiveness. Noam Chomsky, perhaps the most durable and representative figure of the adversary culture, proposed that the attacks of September 11 were eclipsed by the American bombing of the pharmaceutical factory in the Sudan and numerous other American atrocities.[23] He asserted that "the United States had killed thousands of innocent civilians in Somalia, Sudan and Nicaragua—actions far more 'devastating' than the September 11 attacks—and was now trying to 'destroy the hunger-stricken country' of Afghanistan."[24] Edward Said, similarly prominent, made clear (in the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram)*, that he sees the United States as a genocidal power with a "history of reducing whole peoples, countries and even continents to ruin by nothing short of holocaust."[25] Michael Mandel, a law professor in Toronto, believes that, "The bombing of Afghanistan is the legal and moral equivalent of what was done to the Americans on September 11."[26] Eric Foner of Columbia University could not decide "which is more frightening: the horror that engulfed New York City or

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the apocalyptic rhetoric emanating daily from the White House."[27] Michael Klare, a professor of "peace studies and world security studies" at Hampshire College (Amherst, MA) became "despondent" because "the United States was ratcheting up a strong military response to September 11." He professed to be consumed by fear "that U.S. military reprisals would set off a renewed cycle of terrorist attacks and violence."[28]

Anti-militarism has long been an attitude that adversary culture Marxists and religious pacifists could share. So it remains today. Thus the General Secretary of the American Friends Service Committee said: "[O]ur history teaches us that bloodshed leads only to more bloodshed. . . . We call upon our president and Congress to stop the bombing. . . . Our grief is not a cry for retaliation. Terrorism must be stopped at its root cause."[29] This too was the considered judgment of Vivian Gornick (author of *The Romance of American Communism*): "Force will get us nowhere. It is reparations that are owing, not retribution."[30] If force is not the answer, what is? Love and joy, apparently. Alice Walker "firmly believe[d] that the only punishment that works is love."[31] Richard Gere, the actor, similarly advised: "If you can see the terrorists as a relative who's dangerously sick . . . the medicine is love and compassion."[32] Oliver Stone, however, detected no illness; he called the September 11 attacks "a revolt." He equated the Palestinians dancing on the streets at the news of the attacks with those who publicly rejoiced at the news of the French and Russian Revolutions.[33]

Another oft-repeated theme of the adversary culture soon reappeared, as well: that of America being untrue to its own best values. Thus Russell Means, the American Indian activist who lead the 1973 uprising at Wounded Knee, said:

> It's what I used to see when I was behind the so-called Iron Curtain touring Eastern Europe. It's what I used to see in Nicaragua and Colombia . . . [namely] the ongoing deprivation of individual liberties and violations of the U.S. Constitution by the Federal Government . . . the government lost all constitutional responsibility and has become an outlaw.[34]

Terry Eagleton was equally convinced that "They [the Bush Administration] will use the crisis as an excuse to trample on our civil liberties",[35] and the cover of Gore Vidal's new book, *The End of Liberty—Towards a New Totalitarianism*, shows the Statue of Liberty gagged with a U.S. flag.

Alexander Cockburn averred, yet again, as though the Cold War had never ended, that the war was "about the defense of the American Empire."[36] Two feminists found no difference between the practices of a religious police state and the influence of fashions on portions of the population:

> Taliban rule has dictated that women be fully covered whenever they enter the public realm. . . . During the 20th century, American culture has dictated [sic] a nearly complete uncovering of the female form. . . . The war on terrorism has certainly raised our awareness of the ways in which women's bodies are controlled by a repressive regime in a far away land, but what about the constraints on women's bodies here at home . . . ? The burka and the bikini represent opposite ends of the political spectrum.[37]

Ralph Nader, meanwhile, was led to conclude that "there is an escalation of the corporate takeover of the United States. The ground and soil are ripe for a revolt by the American people."[38]

The best example of an almost purely visceral response, in this case to the flag and what it stands for, came from Katha

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Pollit of *The Nation*, who, for one, did not join the newly unembarrassed patriotic liberals. She revealed that "my daughter who goes to Stuyvesant High School only blocks from the World Trade Center, thinks we should fly an American flag out our window. Definitely not, I say: The flag stands for jingoism and vengeance and war."[39] A physics professor at the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) shared these sentiments: "To many ordinary people . . . around the globe the U.S. has done terrible things. . . . If I think about the flag, I have to think about it from the point of view of those people."[40] At Amherst College war protesters (allegedly students from nearby Hampshire College) burned the flag while chanting "this flag doesn't represent me."[41]

It was not only the celebrities of the adversary culture who found the events of September 11 an appropriate occasion for reaffirming their animosity toward American society. One would not know it from the early writings of Washington-based pundits, but there were demonstrations on nearly 200 campuses and in several major cities as a "nationwide network of more than 150 student antiwar groups . . . [emerged] holding campus vigils, protests, and teach-ins."[42] The correspondence columns of local newspapers in and around college campuses were flooded with letters expressing sentiments similar to those of the better known critics of the United States quoted above. These critics have a following.

Thus, a professor of journalism at Amherst regarded the attacks as the "predictable result of American policies . . . [which] ignored the suffering of Palestinians. . . . How can we fail to see that our policy has created zealots and suicide bombers."[43] He, too, was convinced that the adversaries of the United States are helpless pawns of social and historical forces; only the United States and its amoral leaders have alternatives to choose from and can therefore be held morally culpable.[44] A professor in the sociology department at the same university proposed that we must "find a way to reduce those alienating actions whereby we create our own enemies."[45] At a Haverford College meeting on September 14, an emeritus professor suggested that "the United States was the most violent nation on earth and ended by saying, 'We are complicit.'" At a teach-in at the University of North Carolina, "one lecturer told the students that if he were President he would first apologize to the widows and orphans, the tortured and impoverished and all the other millions of other victims of American imperialism." University of Texas Professor Robert Jensen told his students and peers that the attack "was no more despicable than the massive acts of terrorism . . . that the U.S. government had committed during my lifetime."[46] Barbara Foley, professor of English at Rutgers University, warned her students: "Be aware that whatever its proximate cause, the ultimate cause [of the attacks] is the fascism of u.s. [*sic*] foreign policy over the past many decades."[47]

Members of the Middle East Studies Association, an academic professional group, also reached the conclusion that the United States bore primary responsibility for the terrorist attacks (which, by the way, they refuse to call by that term).[48] At the 2001 annual meeting of the Association one panelist said, "We have not shown that our actions differentiate us from those who attacked us." An elderly professor in the audience declared, "'We ought to be reminded of our responsibility for Hiroshima and Nagasaki and understand that we are not so good', he received a round of applause." The moderator fully endorsed his view.[49]

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The Attractions of Obscurity

THE MEMBERS of the adversary culture, famous and not so famous, have something else in common, too, for the most part: an irresistible attraction to obscure theorizing and arcane jargon. Two explanations stand forth as to why many social critics prefer esoteric turns of phrase and opaque abstractions to concreteness and specificity. One is the parochial elitism of numerous academic intellectuals who write mainly for one another and whose inaccessible language and terminology "signifies" their vanguard status. The second explanation may be the more important, however.

The discontent that animates many critics of American (and Western) society, and that has become a major source of their sense of identity and self-esteem, is murky and shapeless. Its origins may not be clear even to those consumed by it; such diffuse and contradictory grievances, impulses, unfathomable sentiments and personal resentments are inherently difficult to express in precise and accessible language. Form follows function: lack of clarity in style reflects amorphous motives and beliefs; Jacoby calls them "postcoherent thinkers."[50] A statement of the "Transnational Feminist Practices Against War" illustrates what he has in mind:

> As feminist theorists of transnational and postmodern cultural formations . . . we offer the following response to the events of September 11 and its aftermath: First and foremost, we need to analyze the thoroughly gendered and racialized effects of nationalism and to identify what kinds of inclusions and exclusions are being enacted. . . . We see that instead of a necessary historical material and geopolitical analysis of 9-11, the emerging nationalist discourses consist of highly sentimentalized narratives that . . . re-inscribe compulsory heterosexuality and the rigidly dichotomized gender roles. . . . A number of icons constitute the ideal types in the drama of nationalist domesticity.[51]

It is among the attractions of obscurity that what people cannot fully comprehend is more difficult to criticize and refute. But it is also the case that some people are impressed by what they cannot fully understand, what promises some great, lurking, not fully penetrable revelation. A paragraph from the newly popular volume *Empire*, co-authored by an American literary scholar and an imprisoned Italian terrorist, provides further illustration:

> In the logic of colonialist representations, the construction of a separate colonized other and the segregation of identity and alterity turns out paradoxically to be at once absolute and extremely intimate. The process consists, in fact, of the moments that are dialectically related. In the first moment difference has to be pushed to the extreme. In the colonial imagination the colonized is not simply an other banished outside the realm of civilization; rather it is grasped or produced as Other, as the absolute negation, as the most distant point on the horizon.[52]

Doubtless there are connections and affinities between the attractions of obscurity, profound political misjudgments and commonsense defying beliefs. As Orwell observed, only intellectuals are capable of believing certain kinds of nonsense. Could, for example, anybody without the benefits of higher education and not living in an academic setting believe (with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, the authors of *Empire)* that the 1992 Los Angeles riots were "the most radical and powerful struggles of the final years of the 20th century"?[53]

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Then and Now

THE ADVERSARIAL generation of the 1960s holds on to a conception of America as malignant and inauthentic, and to a sense of identity as the fearless fighter for truth and social justice. This is the generation that had the opportunity and pleasure to glorify its youth by linking it to the "good causes" of the 1960s. Perhaps therein lies the key to its durability, and in the critical mass of those who came of age together when youthful idealism converged with the rise of idealistic social movements and causes of the time.

But age and mortality are taking their toll on the 1960s adversary culture; William Kunstler passed away a few years ago as did I.F. Stone and Eqbal Ahmad. Other influential representatives are well over sixty, often seventy, including the Berrigan brothers, Noam Chomsky, Ramsey Clark, William Sloan Coffin, Angela Davis, David Dellinger, E.L. Doctorow, Barbara Ehrenreich, Richard Falk, Stanley Fish, Tom Hayden, Frederic Jameson, Jonathan Kozol, Norman Mailer, Ralph Nader, Victor Navasky, Michael Parenti, Edward Said, Susan Sontag, Paul Sweezy and Howard Zinn. Even Bill Ayers, the cheerfully unrepentant Weatherman-bomber, is approaching sixty. The beliefs of this aging subculture, however, are clearly being passed on to segments of the younger generation, no doubt in part because American society since the end of the Cold War has continued to produce high expectations (which cannot be met) and the corresponding disappointments that often turn into social criticism. Some young people are consumed by the same blend of incoherent discontent and diffuse idealism that characterized the protestors of the 1960s. They, too, seem to be in the grip of the conviction that "something is terribly wrong" with this society—a conviction that precedes the identification of any specific wrongs. When subsequently identified, the specific flaws become proof of the prior, underlying belief in pervasive corruption and thoroughgoing moral decay.

This smaller generation of "peace activists" today also resembles earlier ones in that they appear to be not so much opposed to all wars but only those waged by the United States. Given their conviction that American society is a profoundly unjust system, any war its government may wage has to be inexcusable. However, should there appear on the horizon some new "national liberation movement" or militant cause that uses a congenial and idealistic rhetoric, this putative devotion to peace would vanish and be replaced by support for the new, liberating and authentic revolutionary violence (Chiapas? Shining Path? Maoists in Nepal?).

A recent sympathetic portrait of such young people in the *New York Times* Educational Life supplement demonstrates how present attitudes replicate those prevalent in the 1960s. The "typical student activist" of our times portrayed in the article is one of the leaders of "Students for Social Equality." He "is fueled by a nagging anger over the fact that there are haves and have-nots, oppressors and the oppressed." (His father is a general contractor on Long Island, and both parents are Republican.) His favorite words are "love", "unity", "solidarity" and "justice", along with "beautiful"—as in "unity is beautiful." In his conversation with the reporter "he searches for the roots of his unrest." This activist and others like him, one radicalized by the writings of Howard Zinn, radiate "an ardor not seen for several decades." The main character in the article was smitten by an anti-globalism demonstration: "It was amazing how many people were out acting on their

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beliefs and coming together. It was beautiful." A protest at the military training center at Fort Benning, too, "was a really beautiful protest, really spiritual." Union Square in New York city became a "magical place of unity" at an anti-Afghanistan war demonstration. Among the activists, the reporter observes, "there is a lot of raging against the machine."[54]

Many readers, at least of a certain age, will recall that "raging against the machine" was the main theme of Mario Savio's fiery oration during the Free Speech demonstrations at Berkeley in 1964. Then and now "the machine" stood for impersonality, lack of community and feeling, "profits above people" and the fear of being crushed by forces over which one has no control. Then and now, too, for some people the personal ultimately dwarfs and displaces the truly political. American society will continue to generate a mixture of high expectations, unease and discontent that is the hallmark of its nature and its true modernity. These sentiments have found new expression in the adversarial responses to 9/11; they have by no means disappeared. □

Notes

[1]Dowd, "Happy in Free Fall", *New York Times*, May 7, 1997.

[2]Ehrenreich, *Village Voice*, October 9, 2001, p. 54.

[3]Hertzberg, *The New Yorker*, November 5, 2001, p. 37.

[4]Kelly, "A Renaissance of Liberalism", *Atlantic Monthly*, January 2002, p. 19.

[5]Packer, "Recapturing the Flag", *New York Times Magazine*, September 30, 2001, p. 15.

[6]Roger Kimball has called this the "mainstreaming of radicalism." See his *The Long March* (San Francisco: Encounter Books, 2000), p. 26. See also Gertrude Himmelfarb, *One Nation, Two Cultures* (New York: Knopf, 1999).

[7]See, for example, James Chace, "Imperial America & the Common Interest", *World Policy Journal* (Spring 2002).

[8]Jacoby, *The End of Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1999), p. 121.

[9]Podhoretz, "Return of the 'Jackal Bins'", *Commentary*, April 2002, p. 29.

[10]Walzer, "Five Questions About Terrorism", *Dissent* (Winter 2002), p. 6.

[11]Hitchens, "Against Rationalization", *The Nation*, October 8, 2001, p. 8. See also his "Minority Report", *The Nation*, October 22, 2001.

[12]Letter, *New York Times*, November 1, 2001.

[13]Falk, "A Just Response", *The Nation*, October 8, 2001, p. 15.

[14]Kazin, "After the Attacks Which Side Is the Left On?", *New York Times* (Week in Review), October 7, 2001, p. 4.

[15]Sullivan, "Right Turn: What Conservatives Should Learn from 9/11", *The New Republic*, December 17, 2001, p. 26.

[16]Daniel Pipes refutes the argument that poverty causes terrorism in "God and Mammon: Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?", *The National Interest* (Winter 2001/02).

[17]*The New Statesman* (London), October 15, 2001, pp. 18–9.

[18]"Author Vidal Blames US for Conflict", *Boston Globe*, November 24, 2001.

[19]*Progressive Review*, October 29, 2001.

[20]Laqueur and Jameson quoted in Tony Judt, "America and the War", *New York Review of Books*, November 15, 2001, p. 4.

[21]Susan Sontag, "The Talk of the Town", *The New Yorker*, September 24, 2001, p. 32.

[22]Mailer quoted in *The New Republic*, November 26, 2001, p. 8.

[23]Quoted in David Horowitz, *The Ayatollah of American Hate* (Los Angeles: Center for the Study of Popular Culture, 2001), p. 7.

[24]Quoted in *The New Republic*, December 10, 2001, p. 9.

[25]Quoted in *The Weekly Standard*, October 8, 2001, p. 35.

[26]*Globe and Mail* (Toronto), October 9, 2001.

[27]Foner in the *London Review of Books*,

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October 4, 2001.

[28]Klare, *Hampshire Life* (Northampton, MA), September 28, 2001, pp. 8, 10.

[29]Letter, *New York Times*, October 9, 2001.

[30]*The New Republic*, October 15, 2001, p. 10.

[31]Walker, *Village Voice*, October 9, 2001, p. 54.

[32]Quoted in *The New Republic*, October 29, 2001, p. 10.

[33]"Voices of Reason? Not in Hollywood", *Boston Globe*, October 23, 2001.

[34]Associated Press Symposium, "How have we been changed?" *Daily Hampshire Gazette* (Northampton, MA), October 13–14, 2001.

[35]Quoted in Judt, "America and the War", p. 4.

[36]"The Left and the Just War", *The Nation*, November 22, 2001, p. 10.

[37]Joan Jacobs Brumberg and Jacquelyn Jackson in *The Boston Globe*, November 23, 2001.

[38]Quoted in *The New Republic*, November 19, 2001, p. 10.

[39]Pollit, "Put Out No Flags", *The Nation*, October 8, 2001, p. 7.

[40]Quoted in "How Words Spoken Sept. 10 Came Back to Haunt the Speaker", *Wall Street Journal*, October 10, 2001.

[41]"Pro-America rally upset by flag burners", *Daily Hampshire Gazette* (Northampton, MA), October 19, 2001.

[42]Lisa Featherstone, "A Peaceful Justice?", *The Nation*, October 22, 2001, p. 18.

[43]Bill Israel, "A policy of neglect and cowardice", *Mass. Daily Collegian* (Amherst, MA), September 12, 2001.

[44]Such selective determinism has been with us for a long time. See Paul Hollander, "Sociology, Selective Determinism and the Rise of Expectations", *American Sociologist* (November 1973).

[45]Jay Demerath, September 15, 2001, departmental e-mail.

[46]Quoted in "The Best and the Brightest", *Wall Street Journal*, October 2, 2001.

[47]Foley, *New Criterion* (October 2001), p. 2.

[48]The same is true of spokesmen for the major human rights organizations who argue that "terrorism" lacks clear definition. See *Commentary*, January 2002, p. 28.

[49]Quoted in *The New Republic*, December 3, 2001, pp. 15, 17.

[50]Jacoby, *The End of Utopia*, p. 141. See also Jay Tolson, "Wittgenstein's Curse", *The Wilson Quarterly* (Fall 2001).

[51]E-mail posted by Augustin Lao-Montes of the department of sociology at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, October 29, 2001.

[52]Quoted in *The New Criterion*, October 2001, p. 20.

[53]*Ibid.*, p. 20.

[54]Abby Ellin, "The Making of a Student Activist: How a Long Island boy learned to start worrying and hate the bombs", *New York Times* (Educational Life supplement), November 11, 2001, pp. 26–8. See also Andrew Hsiao, "Make Noise Not War: A Peace Movement Grows in New York and Beyond", *Village Voice*, October 9, 2001.

> While this America settles in the mould of its vulgarity,
> heavily thickening to empire,
> And protest, only a bubble in the molten mass, pops and
> sighs out, and the mass hardens,
>
> I sadly smiling remember that the flower fades to make
> fruit, the fruit rots to make earth . . . .
>
> —Robinson Jeffers, "Shining, Perishing Republic"

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The Ground and Nature of Human Rights

Another Round

William Schulz, Robin Fox & Francis Fukuyama

William Schulz:

Power, Principles and Human Rights

ONE OF THE factions in the early Christian Church, followers of the charismatic preacher Montanus, believed that only those who ate a steady diet of radishes would be saved. The women of the community, who played an inordinately powerful role in the life of the movement, especially promoted this healthy regimen. Had Montanism prevailed, Christians might be eating vegetables at Holy Communion rather than wafers and the Roman Catholic Church might suffer today no shortage of priests. But whether it was resentment of roots or of "rabble", the Church fathers of the day declared the Montanists enemies of the Church in 170 AD and that, for all intents and purposes, was the end of that.

Why did the Montanists fade into history? Did God really have no taste for radishes? Was it somehow a violation of natural law for women to assume a leadership role in the Church? Or did the Montanists simply lack the capacity to build an adequate consensus for their views? Had they been operating in China, where a saying has it that "only those who appreciate root vegetables can know the true meaning of life", might the story have been different?

Whether it be a religion, a nation or the world at large, the norms that govern reflect either the views of those who are at the moment holding the power, or the principles that have managed to claim a consensus among enough people that the powerful dare not challenge them. This is true, too, of human rights.

From the standpoint of those of us active in the human rights movement, it would be wonderful if we could prove to the satisfaction of the world that some universally recognized deity had imbued human beings with a set of rights that happened to coincide with the thirty articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). But absent that unlikely scenario, we are left with two other options upon which to base the notion of human rights, one of which—the theory of natural rights—has been the subject of considerable debate in recent issues of *The National Interest*.

In the Winter 2000/01 issue, anthropologist Robin Fox warns that if we base human rights claims on our understanding of human nature, we may end up with some pretty distasteful maxims, such as a "right" to impregnate females belonging

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to tribes whose members have killed my offspring and diminished my gene pool. Most of what we call "human rights", Fox says, "either run counter to nature or, at best, concern things about which nature is strictly neutral."[1] Francis Fukuyama takes a more sanguine approach to the doctrine of natural rights in the Summer 2001 issue. Dismissing Hume's criticism of the "naturalistic fallacy" (the idea that we can derive moral imperatives from factual indicatives), Fukuyama claims that human nature "does . . . allow us to establish a hierarchy of rights, and it allows us to rule out certain solutions to the problem of rights that have been politically powerful in the course of human history."

This colloquy reflects a widespread confusion about the philosophical basis for human rights claims. The problem is not new. It is a confusion that, while it may not have plagued the authors of the Declaration of Independence, certainly nipped at the heels of those who composed the UDHR in 1948—and has accompanied the struggle for human rights ever since. While proposals to ground the principles of the UDHR in explicit references to God and Nature were soundly rejected by its drafters, the Declaration does contain language that implies acceptance of the doctrine of natural law (e.g., the first Whereas in the Preamble affirms the "*inherent* dignity . . . of all members of the human family"; Article 1 asserts that "all human beings are *born* free and equal in dignity and rights [and] *endowed* with reason and conscience", and Article 16 refers to the family as the "*natural* . . . group unit of society" [emphases added]).[2] Other references imply a more pragmatic approach (for example, the first Whereas endorses recognition of that inherent dignity as "the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.")

Be the underpinnings of the UDHR as they may, the failings of natural law as a philosophical basis for human rights go well beyond Fox's imagination, which is why few human rights advocates cite that doctrine today in justifying human rights claims. Nor does Fukuyama successfully rehabilitate the posture; indeed, his argument illustrates exactly what is wrong with it. To get clear, then, about the grounds upon which human rights are staked, we must look again at both natural law and the third alternative source, what Fukuyama calls the "positivistic" view. We will soon see that both views do indeed, as Fukuyama argues, have profound implications for how the United States carries out its foreign policy.

Whose Rights?

"WHAT IS man", asked Isak Dinesen, "but an elaborate machine for turning red wine into urine?" The fundamental problem with natural law theory, even before we get to Hume's objection that an "ought" cannot be derived from an "is", is determining what characteristics of sufficient import to serve as a basis for the delineation of rights are common to all human beings, and who gets to decide what they are? Dinesen's observation that human beings turn red wine into urine is factually true of every person, as far as we know, but her sardonic suggestion that this is the essence of being human is one that most sober people are likely to reject outright.

But on what grounds do we reject it? The history of natural law theory suggests

[1]See my letter in response to Fox in the Spring 2001 issue.

[2]See Johannes Morsink, *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting & Intent*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), chapter 8, for a discussion of the debates surrounding issues of natural law in the drafting of the UDHR.

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that conceptions of human nature have varied wildly throughout the ages, and that those conceptions that have predominated at any one time have done so far more for political than for philosophical or scientific reasons. In the Middle Ages, for instance, the law of Nature was interpreted by the Church to condemn usury. Most church property at the time was in the form of land, and landowners, because their wealth is illiquid, need to borrow money. So "naturally" they opposed usury and conveniently found Natural reasons to do so. But with the rise of Protestantism, whose adherents were drawn primarily from the middle class (i.e., the "lending class"), Nature suddenly had a change of heart and was understood to look with favor on usury. Or to take another example: the great champion of natural law, John Locke, famously believed that the rights derived from it only inhered in the propertied classes and hence that women and peasants could make no claim to them. And what do we do with the ancient Uro people of Peru, who did not believe they were human at all and hence would *a priori* reject any notion of human nature? We tell them they are wrong, of course, just as we tell solipsists they are wrong on the grounds that the vast majority of us say they are.

Now comes Robin Fox with his claim that human nature does have a "real content" and "we"—by which he apparently means anthropologists—can tell what it is. He cites kin selection theory and suggests a series of "rights" that it implies. But quite apart from the fact that some of those "rights" he derives—such as the right to avenge the killing of a grandchild by murdering two of the killers' first cousins—are abhorrent, the fact is that anthropological theories are notoriously subject to the whims of academic fashion. Unless we are prepared to supplement the End of History with the End of (Social) Science, we rest our rights, under this approach, on intellectual quicksand. And even if we do allot to the anthropologists responsibility for seeing to it that human rights are consistent with human nature, to which anthropologists do we assign this job—the Marxists, the feminists, a subcommittee of the American Anthropological Association, or just to Robin Fox? All that we can say for sure is that whoever would land the task would be the one who at the moment is wielding the greatest power in the halls of academe.

If Fox is too specific in the rights he cites as derivative from natural law, Fukuyama is too general. To his credit he admits as much ("there is no *simple* translation of human nature into human rights"; "human nature does not dictate a single, precise list of rights"). But still he wants to maintain, almost nostalgically, it seems, the Nature-rights connection. He is reduced, therefore, to arguing that, while "violence . . . may be natural to human beings . . . so is the propensity to control and channel violence", and that

> our underlying shared humanity allows us to rule out certain forms of political order like tyranny as unjust. Those rights that speak to the most deeply felt and universal human drives, ambitions and behaviors will be a more solid foundation for political order than those that do not.

Leaving aside the questions as to whether human beings have chosen to "control and channel violence" for natural or pragmatic reasons and how we determine "our underlying shared humanity", the problem with Fukuyama's observations is not so much that they are wrong as that they are, in a philosophical sense, uninteresting. Take one of the most universally agreed upon human rights, the right not to be tortured. If all Fukuyama is arguing is that the prohibition against torture "speaks to the most deeply felt and universal human drive" to avoid pain,

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he is probably right (though even in this case the existence of genuine masochists who revel in pain may call into question the universality of the pain-avoidance "drive"). Certainly, it is not unreasonable to argue that the right not to be tortured is more consistent with "our underlying shared humanity" than would be a right to torture anybody at any time one feels like it. But having said this, have we said anything very helpful? We have, at best, identified some lowest-common-denominator-type characteristic and argued that the rights we affirm ought not to be at odds with it.[3]

Without taking the complicated step of translating these broadly construed "natural" inclinations into a clear, defensible set of rights, we are reduced to confronting agony with abstraction. Once again, to his credit, Fukuyama knows this. In elaborating upon the struggle between our propensity for violence and our inclination to channel it constructively, Fukuyama says:

> These conflicting natural tendencies do not have equal status or priority; human beings *reasoning* about their situation can come to understand the need to create *rules* and institutions that constrain violence in favor of other natural ends [emphasis added].

But what are those "rules" if not rights? And who is doing that reasoning? Just Francis Fukuyama? Just the readers of *The National Interest*? Just a select group of philosophers? If we are really to capture what is most "shared" about our humanity, the best answer will be the widest possible number of responsible agents. Otherwise we risk having the rules set by a dictator, an elite or a cabal of power-mongers. The most efficient way to see that power is controlled and dispersed is to spread it around. But that leads us to that dread perspective that Fukuyama has labeled "positivism."

"ANY SERIOUS discussion of human rights", Fukuyama says, "must ultimately be based on some common understanding of human ends or purposes." Depending on what he means by that, it is a tall order. While the UDHR was being created, UNESCO surveyed 150 intellectuals to determine the philosophical basis for human rights. Not surprisingly, those surveyed could not agree and the UN Commission on Human Rights voted not to distribute the UNESCO report.[4] Imagine how attempting to get them to agree on the "ends or purposes" of life would have turned out!

But why should they need to come to consensus on such abstract matters in order to agree that, say, torture is wrong? Any two people can be against torture even if one believes that the purpose of life is to get into Heaven and the other believes it is to avoid being bored. Despite their differences, they can agree that they would rather not live in a world in which torture is commonplace. That is because human rights are not dependent upon our sharing ontologies, teleologies or eschatologies; they are dependent upon our sharing a commitment to what makes for a civilized world, as "civilized" is defined at the moment by the vast majority of the international community. Human rights, as embodied in the UDHR, provide a set of norms or guidelines, "best practices", if you will, by which to set limits to tyranny and organize a decent society.

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[3]Paradoxically enough, those "natural" qualities of human beings upon which it would be easiest to win universal consensus, such as the biological needs for food or shelter, would imply a whole series of social and economic rights that are recognized by the UDHR and the human rights community, but which Fukuyama and many Americans would probably disavow.

[4]Morsink, pp. 301–2.

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Perhaps all that Fukuyama means by a "common understanding of human ends or purposes" is agreement on the definition of a "decent society." But one suspects that this will not be enough for him because such a definition inevitably changes from generation to generation (just as our conceptions of natural law do), and Fukuyama wants something reliable forever. Otherwise, why criticize positivism by claiming that it allows for "no universal standards for political behavior" to which to appeal against the Chinese canard that collective rights trump those of the individual? "Abhorrent practices like suttee or slavery or female circumcision" must be accepted, Fukuyama says, because positivism provides "no transcendent standards for determining right and wrong beyond what any particular culture declares to be a right." But these claims are wrong on several counts.

In the first place, though it is true that the values implicit in the UDHR derive from the Enlightenment tradition, virtually every country in the world has affirmed them. The UDHR was drafted by representatives from a wide variety of cultures, including many from Asia; voted on affirmatively by countries from every culture and corner of the world; agreed to implicitly by every country that has joined the United Nations; and is regarded today as customary international law by every international court on earth. While its affirmation is not literally "universal" in the sense that one will, of course, find people who do not agree with it and many who violate it, the UDHR can claim far more "transcendence", and hence provides a far greater "universal standard for political behavior", than does Fukuyama's doctrine that violence is a result of human nature as opposed to Divine punishment, distraction from the Eight-Fold Path, unfortunate parenting or just plain bad judgment.

One of the results of the far-flung influence of the Declaration is that in many cases human rights abuses do not just violate universal standards; they violate the laws of the very countries in which those abuses are found. Torturing dissidents in China, for example, violates that country's constitution, no matter how loudly Chinese leaders proclaim that individual rights are subordinate to social order. In that case we do not need to appeal to "universal standards"; we need only ask the Chinese to obey their own laws. Female genital mutilation, too, is against the law in almost every country in which it is found.

But what about countries whose laws or cultural practices *do* violate international human rights standards? What do we say to them? Do we really have no response to cultural relativism, as Fukuyama seems to think? Far from it. We have the best possible response: "Your practice violates the closest thing we have to agreement among the world's people as to what constitutes cruelty."

Are rights derived from such agreement apodictic? No. Like all laws and standards, they evolve. Human rights at the international level rely upon the same principle that the U.S. Supreme Court invokes when it determines that "evolving community standards", concerning what constitutes pornography or whether it is acceptable to execute the mentally retarded, influence the interpretation of justice. What if the arc of the universe does *not* bend toward justice and these standards become regressive? Theoretically that is possible, though experience seems to show that the more people involved in the standard setting (that is, the more widely the power to set standards is shared), the less likely the backsliding.

Wouldn't it be wiser to rely on *truth* rather than power or consensus? Absolutely, but then deciding what is "true" between nations has rarely been as

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simple as Clemenceau made it out to be in his reply to a question as to what historians would say was the cause of the Great War: "I do not know what they will say was the cause of the war, but I do know that they will not say that France invaded Germany." (Had Clemenceau never heard of revisionism?) Rights that are grounded in international consensus—even "semi-sensus"—and elaborated in formal treaties and conventions are far more likely to be perceived as politically legitimate than notions of what Truth or Nature does or does not justify. Is the arrangement perfect? No, but then imperfection is only "natural."

THE DEBATE we have been carrying on in these pages is not just an esoteric one, though it may seem like it at times. Indeed, its practical implications may disclose something about why all comers take the positions they do. For if human rights are not grounded in some elite's definition of natural law but reflect what the UDHR labels "a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations", then the United States, like every other country in the world, must take the values and opinions of others into account as it formulates its policies. When it comes to matters that have implications for human rights, in other words, unilateralism has no place.

This is a hard pill for some foreign policy realists to swallow. As Condoleezza Rice wrote in *Foreign Affairs* magazine during the last presidential campaign: "Foreign policy in a Republican administration . . . will proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community." But if human rights are determined by the evolving standards of the international community, it is no wonder they play such a modest part in the foreign policy calculations of those who would regard that community as an illusion.

The problem, however, is that reality itself always threatens to confound the realists. It was little more than a year after Rice wrote those words in *Foreign Affairs* that she and President Bush scrambled valiantly, and for the most part successfully, to enlist that "illusory international community" in pursuit of the common interest it shares with the United States in defeating terrorism. So, too, has the United States sometimes taken pains—in its conduct of the war, for example—to see that the human rights values of that community are not offended. And why should the United States care about those values? Because it knows that, far from being an "illusion", the opinions of our allies directly affect our national interest; the opinions of fence-sitters will be swayed by any perception of hypocrisy; and the opinions (and actions) of our adversaries can be countered by, among other things, an appeal to world opinion.

Better, then, to hammer out the details of what counts as a human right in the halls of diplomacy than in the recesses of a professor's study. Neither place guarantees a harmonious discussion, but the former makes it far more likely that those whose lives are shaped by the decisions will at least have a place at the table.

Robin Fox:

Human Rights and Foreign Policy

WILLIAM Schulz is out once again on a turf-protecting mission. His organization is a major beneficiary of the international human rights conglomerate,

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and he wants to establish its privilege to be the sole definer and defender of said rights, as promulgated in the UDHR. Since many governments behave in a pretty beastly way to some of their people most of the time, it is a good idea to let them know that someone is watching and will tell. In the unlikely event that my government should decide to torture me, I would be glad that he was around to chastise it. I also agree that about some things there is a consensus among what we take to be "civilized" nations, and if he wants to call these things "human rights" that's fine.

The trouble is that one does not have to move far from torture, lack of due process and the like to find huge areas of disagreement *despite* what governments might have signed by way of international agreements or even made into national laws. To please the Western governments that initiate these things, non-Western governments sign on to a list of values that their people do not know about, their preachers do not preach, and their jurists and scholars do not accept. If we add up China, North Korea, most of Southeast Asia, and the whole Muslim world from Morocco and Nigeria to Indonesia, we have a "vast majority of the international community" that does *not* subscribe to the liberal, democratic, Enlightenment values of the UDHR, whatever documents their governments might have endorsed. (India officially subscribes to at least the democratic ideal, but again this is not something that sits easily with the majority of its people. The caste system, which embraces the bulk of the population, is the very opposite of democracy.)

To appeal to a phantom "civilized majority" of the world community as a basis for defining and enforcing human rights could be a very dangerous illusion. I happen to like the UDHR list because I come from the tradition that created it. But I am not a Chinese communist bureaucrat, a Pashtun mullah in the Northwest Frontier Province, a Wahhabi in Saudi Arabia, a Brahmin in the Punjab, an East African or a Nigerian village chief. Their views on forced abortion, legal mutilation, due process, women's claustration, lower-caste impurity and female circumcision Schulz would no doubt find as "abhorrent" as he finds the law of talion. (This law, which seems to give squeamish critics such a problem, would be seen by any Afghan tribesman fighting as our ally to be a law of nature. And let us not forget the millions who give Charles Bronson and Clint Eastwood a standing ovation in our own cinemas, and vote regularly for the death penalty.)

In particular, we are faced with the alarmingly rapid population growth of an increasingly resentful, devoutly Muslim world that fundamentally does not accept Schulz's "civilized consensus." Rather, most of the devout within that world see that consensus as propaganda from the infidel, imperialist West, out to inflict "humiliations" (their favorite word) on the only kind of society acceptable to God. There is no room for compromise here. Our way of life is, for them, a direct offense to God; it is an offense against everything the *umma* should be. As our President keeps saying, the Islamic fundamentalists hate "freedom and democracy" and "our way of life", but not only because of material or political resentment: they know they have the better, God-ordained and therefore inevitable alternative. What we see as the pursuit of "inalienable" individual rights, they see as godless materialist corruption. The time of their being tempted, like the latter-day Atatürks who rule them, to ape the secular West has passed almost without notice. The time has also passed when we might hope that they would eventually see the light and morph

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into "moderate" pro-Western world citizens. The trend is entirely in the opposite direction. The terrorists may well be, as the President insists, a small minority of Muslims, but they enjoy widespread sympathy and support. The kind of society the devout want to live in, even if not as extreme as that of the Taliban, would have little time for most of Schulz's admirable list of consensus virtues. (Listen to our new ally, the chief justice of Afghanistan, for example, on that state's right to go on mutilating thieves.)

Unless we grasp this point, we will continue to delude ourselves with the fantasy that these are simply "backward" societies that will someday catch up with the march of history; that is, with our secular, liberal-democratic, capitalist version of utopia. Francis Fukuyama used to think this "progress" was inevitable, and that the spectrum of human rights we endorse should prevail because they are the ones compatible with our kind of society, which itself must prevail, and so lead to "the end of History." I wonder if he still believes this.

WHERE, THEN, do we go for a definition of human rights? The issue is probably moot since, as Schulz correctly observes, those with the power to enforce their version will win anyway. God forbid it should be the American Anthropological Association, whose members, sunk in postmodern, deconstructionist, self-referential relativism, would be more likely to agree with him than with me. I simply wanted, in what has turned out to have been an unexpectedly contentious essay in the Winter 2000/01 issue, to point out that there are certain basic human *needs and emotions* that even "natural rights" advocates, who pay lip service to "universalism", try to avoid. And they avoid them precisely because these needs are not pretty when viewed from the lofty heights of the UDHR. But I also pointed out that some of these basic features (including the natural rights of the collectivity over the individual—a point that gets repeatedly missed) do find their closest expression in devout Muslim societies. And the "rights" derivable from these needs are among some of those that are most "abhorrent" to Schulz and other defenders of the UDHR.

This is of importance to our conduct in the world, and is not—as he rightly sees—just a recondite quarrel among professors. Not only is there no "universal majority consensus", but the version of human rights that so appalls us in our now major competitors may be more firmly grounded in human nature than is our own version. This is not a happy conclusion; but we must start to take our opponents at least as seriously as they take us. The recent polls of Muslim countries shocked us in our naivete by showing how strongly the majority in all of them, even the most Westernized, see themselves as being in relentless opposition to us. Above all we must make an imaginative attempt to shake off our obsessive concern with the individual, and hence individual rights, and try to understand the strength of the appeal to a collectivist, theocratic, kinship-oriented society. If we do not, Schulz and his Enlightenment friends may one day end up living under the universal-consensus Muslim version of a declaration of human rights that, on his theory, he would be bound to accept.

I do not want this to happen any more than he does, but we will not prevent it by pursuing a Clinton-style (or Blair-style) human-rights-based foreign policy. Tinkering with that policy to try to make the Muslim masses love us will not work. They will not love us, so we had better make sure they respect us enough to accept our accommodation. And we should try also to get over the

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false hope that alleviating poverty, in and of itself, will "cure" the problem. The most militant are not the poverty stricken; their quarrel with us is spiritual, not material. Our pursuit of a human-rights policy will not impress them, for they do not share our vision of individual human rights, and they do not trust such a policy to be disinterested—quite rightly.

A realistic foreign policy may be occasionally hurtful to our liberal consciences, but it will be necessary if Schulz and his UDHR world are to survive. For one thing, we had better work hard to ensure that China is with us rather than against us, whatever its human rights record. A common fear of Muslim militancy may be the issue that will help to forge bonds between NATO, China, India and the former Soviet-bloc countries, especially Russia itself. Thus the NATO nations are belatedly coming to recognize publicly (they knew it all along) the deep and still enduring links between Al-Qaeda, other Islamic terrorist groups, and the Muslim militias and "liberation armies" of the Balkans and the Caucasus. The NATO powers must surely now wish in their hearts that they had Osama bin Laden in the dock at The Hague rather than Slobodan Milosevic, however much he deserves to be there. Serbia, whose infrastructure the NATO powers destroyed and whose people they bombed into poverty in the name of human rights, had not attacked or even vaguely threatened any of them. There is at least the possibility that a judicious intervention at the right time to assist the legitimate government of Yugoslavia in dealing with dissident Islamic terrorists in Bosnia and Kosovo might have prevented some of the massacres and ethnic cleansing from all sides.

What is more, if this intervention had done the job of subduing the *mujaheddin* and cleaning out the terrorist cells (instead of clandestinely arming and then overtly supporting them), it might have made us more sensitive to the dangers of Islamist terrorism. This does not mean that we would thereby have prevented the horrific events of September 11, but human affairs being the complex and unpredictable phenomena they are, we might have.

The paradox is that we may from time to time have to suspend *some* of our principles in order to protect *all* of them. (This is what we are pragmatically forced to do anyway, which is what necessarily makes an "ethical foreign policy" an exercise in pious hypocrisy.) The pursuit of morally elevated universal values is warming to our civilized consciences, but in the cold eye of history it is only survival that counts.

Francis Fukuyama:

Truth Matters, Universality Beckons

WILLIAM Schulz fails to distinguish between the practical task of building a global consensus in favor of human rights and getting governments to observe them (which is what he and his organization do), and the *philosophical* question of where these rights come from and how they are grounded. The former project depends on consensus, log-rolling and negotiation, where the opinions of large numbers of people are critical. The latter, however, is related to something called *truth*.

Philosophy and its modern off-

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spring, science, are the rational quest for truth, which always was and always will be the province of what he dismisses as "elites." What these elites think, of course, will not matter in the short run to a government seeking to torture or jail its opponents. But in the long run, they serve to establish the broad framework of ideas that eventually gets translated into practical political programs. If people today, in contrast to Thomas Jefferson and his Enlightenment precursors, believe that the truth about human rights is not "self-evident" or even humanly accessible, it is only because they have been taught a watered-down version of the thought of philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger from a few generations back.

The philosophical truth about rights is important in another way, as well, that has do to with why Schulz bothers to get out of bed in the morning. Surely he has not dedicated his life to the struggle for human rights simply because it is the majority opinion of people around the world, or even the opinion of the world's well-meaning people, that this struggle is important. If he were in the midst of an agitated crowd that suddenly decided to lynch someone who expressed an unpopular opinion, he would certainly not be content to consult majority opinion on what was right to do; he would look instead to his own internal moral compass. There must be some *principle* involved here to which one assigns a truth value.

One could, of course, consult the opinions of the larger surrounding community that may make lynching a crime, but that simply begs the question of whether those laws and the regime that promulgates them are themselves just. Why, indeed, bother consulting global "consensus" or majority opinions at all, for that already presupposes a certain moral truth about the value of consensus or democracy. And where do we get that opinion? It's turtles all the way down from there: at a certain point, we have to leave off consulting the opinions of people around us and confront the essentially *philosophical* question of the inherent truth about principles of right and wrong.

Moreover, Schulz pretends that there is a universal consensus in favor of human rights, and that the task for us is simply to get nations to enforce the norms and laws to which they have subscribed. This is plainly not the case: from radical Islamists to promoters of Asian values to leftover communists and authoritarians, there are plenty of people around the world who would object in principle and most certainly in practice to the implementation of many of the human rights norms for which he is fighting. It is true that, with the defeat of communism and fascism in the 20th century, there is greater scope for agreement in the world now over what constitutes human rights. But even the most unreflective observer must recognize that what Amnesty International promotes as human rights arises out of values born in the individualistic Western Enlightenment, with deep roots in Christianity. They are not some syncretic mishmash of global values, but the clear historical products of the values of one particular part of the world.

If these values are now spreading to other parts of the world that do not share the cultural premises of the Western Enlightenment, the question arises as to *why* they are spreading. Is this simply the result of the power and prestige of the West—the dreaded "cultural imperialism"? Is it a form of mass psychosis? If so, the promotion of human rights in non-Western societies would actually constitute a grave *injustice*, a crushing of genuine moral and cultural alternatives by the wealthy and powerful.

The alternative interpretation is that

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these values are spreading because they in fact have a universal appeal, that they respond to deeply held aspirations of people around the world regardless of their cultural background. These values would be comparable in a sense to the scientific method, which was born under certain specific cultural and historical conditions in Europe, but which then spread throughout the world because of their universal validity. And if this is the case, one must then wonder *why* they are universal. If we reject the mass psychosis interpretation, the answer can only be that there is indeed a commonly shared human essence which, despite differences in culture and environment, responds similarly to certain opportunities and injustices. And we thus arrive back at the issue of human nature, and the natural rights that arise from it.

IRONICALLY, I agree more with Schulz than with Fox about the place of human rights in American foreign policy. It is, of course, possible to promote human rights in reckless or imprudent ways, or to let them trump other important national interests. But for the United States, in particular, a moral grounding for foreign policy is essential to sustain democratic consensus behind American involvement in the world. And that moral concern, if exercised with judgment and moderation, will ultimately be of benefit to those people around the world who suffer from injustice as well. □

A Failure to Cogitate

In the *New York Times* a few weeks ago, an analysis in the Week in Review reported that 'some world leaders worried publicly that the war on terrorism was starting to look suspiciously like the last great American campaign—against Communism.' Why is that a cause for worry? Because of America's tendency to carve the world into good and bad, the *Times* said: 'Like the terrorists today . . . Communists were often conceived as moral monsters. . . .' In the article, the possibility that they *were* moral monsters is not really entertained. . . .

Among critics on the Left, the assumption that rebuilding the military and sending troops abroad is nothing but a political ploy or an imperialist reflex similarly raises questions. We have the benefit now of full knowledge of the Soviet gulag, China's man-made starvations, Vietnam's reeducation camps—we know that there were moral monsters among our adversaries. To act as though that was never true, and to assume automatically that the threat again is overblown, represents a different kind of failure to learn from history.

—Fred Hiatt, *Washington Post*, March 25, 2002

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Books

Money and Power

Pondering Economic Growth and Decline

Richard Rosecrance

Niall Ferguson, *The Cash Nexus: Money and Power in the Modern World*, 1700–2000 (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 552 pp., $18.

Liah Greenfeld, *The Spirit of Capitalism: Nationalism and Economic Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), 541 pp., $45.

Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 382 pp., $16.95.

ASIDE FROM preventing terrorism, there are two cottage industries in the policy community these days. One aims to develop Third World states—aspiring to remove at least some of the causes of terrorism. The other, somewhat less in the public eye recently, seeks to prevent the decline of major powers, particularly the United States. These two industries are linked by their concern to understand the relationship between economic structures, motives and performance, on the one hand, and political structures, motives and performance on the other. In other words, both are about the nexus between money and power.

As to the first of these industries, no one quite understands what causes states to grow economically, and if we ever knew—judging by existing outcomes—we may well have forgotten. Max Weber claimed Protestantism created an ethic that fostered capitalist development. But that religion could scarcely be responsible for facilitating growth in Japan or China, or even in Catholic southern Germany and Italy. Recoiling from sociological theory, modern economists have turned to more practical explanations. They argue that superior education, property rights, large social coalitions, abundant capital and technology have been the essential conditions leading to growth. They also stress the economic infrastructure of ports, airfields, communications facilities, canals and highways as well as investment funding by banks and governments as important foundations for development.

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But we know that these economic elements of success can be in place and growth may still not occur. What is it, after all, that motivates economic upsurge? Why do individuals in heretofore agrarian societies decide to risk their capital in what might become a foolish gamble? Liah Greenfeld, University Professor at Boston University, argues in *The Spirit of Capitalism* that "nationalism" provides the key missing ingredient: it is the spark that ignites economic growth. The English had it in the 18th century, but the Dutch did not and therefore underwent only the "commercial" but not the "industrial" revolution. As a result, the Netherlands did not achieve full industrialization until after 1870. On the other hand, nationalistic zeal drove Germany and Japan to match the achievements of west European nations: even though they started only in the mid-19th century, these two countries had become powerful industrial economies by 1914.

Greenfeld chronicles the "developers" and their thoughts in a series of countries—Japan, France, Germany, England and the United States, while also occasionally focusing on the Dutch national and economic failure. In each case she finds a constant association between economic growth and nationalism: unless economic developers were imbued with passion for the state or sought to bring all members of an ethnic group into it, they did not succeed in building an industrial society.

All the early developers were rivals with someone else—the English with the Dutch, the French and Germans with the English, and Japan with the West as a whole. The United States also measured itself against England and Germany. As Alexander Gerschenkron showed in his *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (1962), the "later" industrializers worked hard because they had the desire to catch up economically. Greenfeld, however, is not offering an economic analysis. Unlike her mentor, David Landes, she does not explain growth by economic factors, nor ask why the German, American and Russian trajectories were more rapid than the early industrializers, Britain and France. She is making a political argument.

Greenfeld does not claim that nationalism and growth were perfectly correlated in time. Sometimes nationalism peaked first (the French case), other times (as in Britain) it crowned economic change already in progress. There was a lot of growth in the German states after the *Zollverein* (customs union) was formed in 1833, even though full-blown nationalism and consolidation did not flower until later. In general, however, Greenfeld makes a good case that nationalism spurs economic development. It is unfortunate, perhaps, that she did not inquire into Ernest Gellner's conclusions in *Nations and Nationalism*, that industrialism creates the social interdependence that makes nationalism possible. The two influences may be self-reinforcing: French nationalism in the 18th century appears to antedate industrialism and British industrialism in that same century antedates nationalism. But thereafter the two went hand in hand, suggesting that in more general terms Greenfeld and Gellner share a compatible analysis.

Greenfeld is aware, too, that not all kinds of nationalism correlate with economic performance. Only a specific form of national sentiment—economic nationalism—is linked with growth. She understands that although political nationalism has surged through Africa and the Middle East, most of these newly nationalistic countries wallow in slow growth or stagnation. Thus nationalism, and perhaps even economic nationalism, needs help. It may be a necessary condition, but it is hardly a sufficient one for economic growth to occur. Here, Kenneth Pomeranz, in his

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The Great Divergence, adds an important additional element.

FOLLOWING A line of argument pioneered by Arthur Lewis, the late economics Nobel laureate from Princeton University, Pomeranz shows in *The Great Divergence* that industrial development depends upon countries overcoming the "land constraint." This means that countries must increase productivity on the land to free labor to work in factories and mines. They need a surplus on the farms to support consumption in the cities, and they also must raise capital to invest in industry.

The great divergence lies in the historical fact that England did this during the 17th and 18th centuries, but China, though relatively prosperous as late as 1750, did not undergo an agricultural revolution until the 1950s. In the 18th century, neither India nor China could enter the Industrial Revolution, for both were dependent on labor-intensive agriculture and had no surplus workers to send to the cities and their factories. There was also no demand for Asian fabricated goods in world markets. While 18th- and 19th-century England used world demand for low-cost products to power its production of machine-made textiles, Qing China and early-modern India had no foreigners clamoring for their manufactured wares. Neither was there a burgeoning middle class to buy such goods at home.

According to Pomeranz, it was not until the land constraint could be overcome—in the late 20th century—that industrialization could take off in China and India. Fortunately—for them, at least—the rest of the world today needs Chinese and Indian manufacturing capacities to satisfy its consumer demand, and this helps these rising nation-states to achieve high growth rates. The great divergence is thus becoming less great.

WHILE GREENFELD and Pomeranz both look at the causes of economic growth, Niall Ferguson, Professor of Political and Financial History at Oxford, ponders the decline of already developed countries. In *The Cash Nexus*, he asks what prevents growth—and what does not—and aims his shafts at Yale historian Paul Kennedy and the apostles of decline. Mancur Olson (*The Rise and Decline of Nations*) and Patrick O'Brien (*Imperialism and the Rise and Decline of the British Economy, 1688-1989*) also forecast industrial decline with the buildup of empire, militarization and special interest groups. Ferguson jousts with them all, claiming that it was not military spending or too many overseas commitments that held back Victorian Britain or that threatens the contemporary United States. Even as its defense budget rises and its security perimeter expands, he believes, the United States need not worry about incipient "decline."

As far as Britain is concerned, had London tried to deter Germany by amassing a large land army before 1914, World War I might have been avoided. Equally, a deterrence policy might have worked against Hitler in 1936–38. Larger military spending beforehand might have prevented war and the decline of the British economy that subsequently ensued. Britain could then have gone from strength to strength. Fortunately, too, Great Britain had deep pockets—limpid pools of capital that could underwrite any imperial or military endeavor. Low interest rates made it easier for the British (and the United States) to finance the two world wars than any of their opponents.

Nor does Ferguson believe that high military spending interposes a barrier to growth. He denies Kennedy's claim that military expenditures in excess of 5 percent of GDP are likely to translate into

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low growth or spur decline. Ferguson points out that the Reagan Administration's military spending did not hold the U.S. economy back, and that, under Clinton, American economic growth surged ahead despite still high levels of defense spending. If the United States had to increase its military spending from 3 to 5 percent of GDP, growth would probably not even pause.

The reason that neither Britain nor the United States have fit the declinist portrayal, Ferguson argues, is that the British and American bond markets have offered investors new security and guarantees of repayment. Because parliament and Congress have stood behind the public debt, attractive U.S. and British bond markets drew new sources of capital into the exchanges and ensured very low rates of interest. Under these conditions, Ferguson reasons, government financing did not "crowd out" private capital, and private investment therefore could proceed largely unaffected. From this, he concludes that the United States can undertake "imperial" responsibilities and still not pay a premium in lost economic growth. Thus the Bush Administration does not have to worry about "declinist" dangers in charting its policies in the Middle East or against terrorism internationally. In Ferguson's view, economically powerful democratic countries can have both butter and guns as long as their financial institutions and policies remain sound.

THESE ARGUMENTS are well and good, but they do not entirely come to grips with new industrial trends in the world economy. They do not observe, for example, that smaller but economically productive states are now seizing the baton from the previous great powers. The nationalism expounded by Greenfeld is grafted these days onto small, vigorous East Asian and European states. Countries such as Taiwan, Switzerland, Singapore and the Netherlands are virtual states: they design production at home but manufacture their goods elsewhere. Put a bit differently, these are state equivalents of the virtual corporation—a Silicon Valley-style offshoot that does research, development and product design, but gets another company to manufacture its goods. The virtual state similarly concentrates on high-value research and development services and allots production to other countries. It also, very importantly, coordinates the activities of virtual corporations in its midst and derives benefits from their more efficient production elsewhere. Both the virtual state and its virtual corporations within capitalize on highly educated managerial talent and workforces.

The United States is also moving toward virtual status. More than 70 percent of U.S. GDP is now derived from "services" as opposed to about 15 percent from manufacturing. Those choosing the virtual path have gained striking economic successes in recent years. The countries that have utilized far-away markets and production sites have actually fared better than the more self-sufficient economies of the past. Japan and Germany are also moving in the virtual direction, with most of their new production located abroad.

Does the advent of the virtual state mean that economic nationalism is now an outmoded strategy for gaining growth? Here the Greenfeld thesis confronts many new questions. While the original economic development of many significant states may have been motivated by nationalism, how can they now achieve the benefits of advanced technology-driven growth? Here it would seem that too much nationalism is an impediment. Instead, both advanced and advancing economies must crown their achievements in association with other nations. They need open trade and communica-

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tion routes, low tariffs, alliance protections, and secure borders to purvey their wares internationally. They need protection from terrorism. They require capital from other countries to keep up with new technologies. They particularly demand foreign direct investment to stay abreast of the latest manufacturing designs in advanced markets. Greenfeld's nationalism must be modified by a practical internationalism in its contemporary, and presumably future, application.

Yet it would be premature to write an obituary on economic nationalism as the expression of an outmoded fad. The national state is still the primary factor directing economic fortunes in most countries, not least in China. A particular culture and the Islamic resurgence may join to castigate states in the Muslim world as parochial and corrupt entities that fail to serve broader religious and social needs, but even in the Arab world the state cannot go away. And in ways that Greenfeld forecasts, it is precisely where cultural traditionalism dominates the state that economic development grinds to a halt. The Islamic movement today is thus like 18th-century Holland.

And contrary to what the avatars of globalization predict, the state is reasserting itself. In the Middle East, Turkish, Egyptian and ultimately Palestinian nationalisms presumptively offer an answer to the challenge of radical transnational Islam. Even in a "Europe without borders", Russia, as well as Britain, France and Germany trumpet national claims to influence. In China and Japan, too, as Greenfeld asserts: "nationalism shows no signs of weakening its grip on the souls of men." This leaves, however, a final unanswered question: Will the excesses of nationalism shift industrialism into an unregulated militarism, culminating in war, as they did in the past?

Rapid developers in the past—Russia, Germany and Japan—succumbed to rabid nationalism and in so doing helped to bring about both the First and Second World Wars. Even the transition toward, if not all the way to, democracy may be fraught with violence, as witnessed in Weimar Germany and Czarist Russia. Interdependence and the virtual state today direct nationalism, but they do not squelch it. Even though Japan remains in fiscal crisis at home, it contends as vigorously in its industrial strategy abroad as it did in military terms half a century ago. The Chinese state's communist leaders are as wedded to China's ethnic and national superiority as were its Middle Kingdom forebears centuries ago. But something important has changed: military and territorial expansion is no longer viewed as the means to national success. Thus, in one of the many ironies of history, nationalism does not disappear, but is instead sublimated by military as well as economic requirements. As more nations go "virtual", at least some degree of international cooperation becomes a minimum policy, as a form of insurance for economic health. As the world digests the pervasive influence of terrorism on all states, it becomes aware that cooperation is the basic solution to the problem. The violation of national security by non-state agents of terror requires international solidarity, not a hodge-podge of one-sided chauvinisms.

How, then, can emergent and residual nationalisms and necessary cooperation be brought together? To start, it seems clear that competitive urges—though necessary for economic growth—need to be reined in. This need take different forms in different situations. In the Middle East, for example, a first step would be to move away from atavistic forms of political Islam to firmer nationalisms based upon separate states. As suggested above, this is already in process. Beyond that, the new state nationalisms of the Middle East need to be confined to

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competition in the economic sphere. If this occurs, the long-term measure of success will likely be that of productivity and GDP, not the outmoded conquest of territory.

But even this will not occur, as Pomeranz shows, until Middle Eastern countries overcome the "land constraint" and shift workers from agriculture and the oil fields to urban and industrial occupations. This is possible. One forgets that Iran once had the capacity to do mid-level manufacturing. Jordan is now setting up assembly plants financed by U.S. foreign direct investment. As Greenfeld contends, a modest nationalism will assist this process and motivate a new industrialism. Pomeranz tells us where it will prevail. Ferguson suggests that in countries in which this process fails and breeds trouble in its wake, the United States can still lead an international coalition to defeat terrorism and spread general economic benefit. The three together offer new perspectives on why economic transformation has been relatively slow in the past but could still speed up in the future—and perhaps without quite the level of social and political breakage that such transformations have often caused in the past. □

Richard Rosecrance is the author of *The Rise of the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century* (Basic Books, 1999).

Islamist Bubbles

Martin Kramer

Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, translated by Anthony F. Roberts (Cambridge: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2002), 416 pp., $29.95.

Roland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood*, translated by George Holoch (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 293 pp., $18.95 (paper).

CHRISTOPHER ROSS has been in the news. After September 11, the State Department summoned the former U.S. ambassador to Syria and Algeria back into service as "special coordinator for public diplomacy and public affairs." On November 3, he appeared on Al-Jazeera satellite channel to present America's case—in Arabic. (As one former diplomat put it, "the scuttlebutt around the locker room was always that Chris was the man in terms of being able to wrap significant thoughts in good Arabic."[1]) With his many years of foreign service in Beirut, Damascus, Algiers and Fez, Ross is credited with knowing the currents of Arab opinion, and how best to navigate them.

Consider, then, this prediction Ross made at a conference of public affairs officers from the State Department's Near Eastern Affairs bureau in September 1993:

> I predict, regretfully, that the region is fated to witness a wave of Islamist revolu-

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[1]Hume Horan, quoted by Eric Boehlert, "A Failure to Communicate", Salon.com, November 7, 2001.

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tions, successful or failed, over the next decade. To me, this is a likelihood with which we must come to grips. The regimes in place lack motivation, a vision for change, and support. The democrats have vision and motivation, but lack support. The Islamists combine all three—motivation, vision, and support. . . . Left to their own devices, the region's discredited regimes are likely to try to muddle through and repress opposition, its budding democrats are likely to fall on their faces, and its extreme Islamists can be expected to become the next agents of change.[2]

There is still a year to go before the expiry date of this prediction, but the Islamists had better hurry up if it is to come true. In the nine years since Ross gazed into his crystal ball, there has been no wave of Islamist revolutions. There hasn't been even a single one.

To the contrary: the "discredited regimes" of which Ross spoke have pushed the Islamists out of the political arena. They did it in flagrant disregard of Human Rights Watch, but with meticulous regard for the basic axiom of Middle Eastern politics: rule or die. The most dangerous of the Islamists—Osama bin Laden and crowd—found refuge in remote corners of east Africa and south Asia. From there, they did unfurl terrorist tentacles into Europe and America. But Islamists no longer threaten any of the region's rulers. Secretary of State Colin Powell, writing after September 11, announced that Americans and Muslims share "a chilling appreciation of common vulnerability to terrorism."[3] This was a politic and sonorous remark, no doubt; but the truth is that no Middle Eastern state except Israel shares America's sense of vulnerability to terrorism. The Arab states solved their terrorism problem by force, notably by expelling Islamists to places like Afghanistan where they became somebody else's problem—above all, America's.

This is clear in retrospect. It was not clear at the time, and if an experienced Arabist like Ross anticipated Islamist revolutions, what must his less-knowledgeable listeners have concluded? In the media and the journals, a raft of experts beat the same drum: the United States would have to "come to grips" with an inevitable tide of Islamist revolutions, presumably by coddling those Islamists who could not be intimidated or bribed. A cottage industry grew up around this estimate of Islamism, arguing that it could be tamed through engagement, dialogue and, perhaps, selected policy adjustments. It is no small miracle that key Western policymakers never quite bought the theory. If they had, Ross's prediction might have become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

ENTER GILLES Kepel, a French scholar at the Institut d'Études Politiques in Paris. Kepel speaks fluent Arabic, acquired during years of residence and research in Egypt. Islamism has always been his forte, demonstrated in two earlier books available in English translation: *Muslim Extremism in Egypt* and *Allah in the West*. In France, Kepel is a media presence: prolific, provocative and photogenic. In the mid-1990s, he revisited Islamism on its own turf, interviewing its proponents and reading its latest texts. In 2000 he published his findings under the eyebrow-raising title *Jihad: Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*. The English translation has a less committal subtitle: *The Trail of Political Islam*. But it is the same book, with the addition of some reflec-

[2]Christopher Ross, "Political Islam: Myths, Realities, and Policy Implications", speech delivered to the Salzburg Conference of NEA Public Affairs Officers, September 21, 1993.

[3]Colin L. Powell, "A Long, Hard Campaign", *Newsweek*, October 15, 2001.

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tions on September 11. Like the original, it is a superbly written and deeply informed *tour de force*.

Kepel sets out to explain why the dire predictions about Islamism missed the mark. His argument is simple but persuasive. In the generation that followed independence in the Muslim world, education expanded dramatically, extending beyond the nationalist elites. But the ruling establishment, jealous of its powers and privileges, blocked the ambition of new social groups. Islamism is the invention of those who missed out on the post-colonial division of spoils. It is the doctrine of a frustrated intelligentsia, and their license to defy the existing order.

But nowhere have the Islamists ever been numerous enough to seize power from entrenched regimes on their own. So Islamists have turned to two potential allies: the devout bourgeoisie, to provide the means; and the masses of the urban poor, to fill out the ranks. In Iran, these three groups—intelligentsia, middle classes, urban poor—came together in one movement, producing a revolutionary explosion. Everywhere else, Kepel has discovered, at least one of the three crucial elements has been missing—and failure has been inevitable.

The clearest examples of this, covered by Kepel at length, are Algeria and Egypt. A decade ago, the pages of *Foreign Affairs* carried typically grim forecasts of impending Islamist triumphs in both countries. When the Algerian regime aborted the elections that nearly brought Islamists to power in 1991, a frequent contributor, Robin Wright, assured readers that their success had only been delayed. The regime's action was "like the abortive Moscow putsch in 1991; although the process may take longer, it will fail for similar reasons."[4] When Egypt faced Islamist terror in 1993, Stanley Reed warned readers: "For the United States it is impossible not to compare the current situation in Egypt with the one that led to the disastrous fall of the shah of Iran in 1979."[5]

The Islamists were also very full of themselves. Hadn't they just bested the Soviet superpower in Afghanistan? That victory persuaded multitudes of Islamists that they could dispense with politics altogether. *Jihad* would suffice; God would provide. (They forgot that in Afghanistan it was the CIA and Pakistani intelligence that provided.) The fervor of imminent redemption percolated through their ranks. Power awaited them just beyond the next attack on foreign tourists, the next massacre of pro-regime villagers. In Western capitals, worried diplomats thought so too, and proposed putting out lines to Islamist leaders sooner rather than later.

But the regimes held tight, and the Islamists made a fatal mistake: in their impatience, they escalated their violence in a rash lunge to overturn the status quo. They could not seize the state, so they tried to wrest society away from it. They could not kill rulers and generals, so they killed journalists and artists. They could not legislate the veil, so they enforced it by terror. Each escalation made the Islamists into enemies of the people, so that when the regimes finally mobilized to smite them, no one stood with them in solidarity—not even the pious and poor. They had spilled too much blood, and too much of it Muslim. From the mid-1990s, writes Kepel, "the Islamist movement began to unravel, and the violence hastened its decline."

And what of Osama bin Laden? After September 11, Kepel (and Olivier Roy, author of an earlier book entitled *The Failure of Political Islam*) came under a bar-

[4]Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy and the West", *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 1992), p. 136.

[5]Stanley Reed, "The Battle for Egypt", *Foreign Affairs* (September/October 1993), p. 95.

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rage of criticism in France. Had they not lulled the West into complacency with their over-optimistic and premature talk of "post-Islamism"? Kepel argues in this book that bin Laden's brand of terrorism arose precisely from the failure of Islamism writ large: Al-Qaeda, driven to the four corners of the globe, struck Manhattan and Washington because it could not touch the Arab regimes it sought to destroy. Kepel has said of his French critics that they either failed to read his book, or read too much into it.



A solicitous Yasir Arafat pays a visit to Sheikh Ahmad Yasin, leader of Hamas, in October 1997.

Some American interpreters of Islamism, by the way, have said the same about their pre-September 11 writings. The difference is that Kepel's defense is justified, and theirs is not. The French "post-Islamists" were never starry-eyed about Islamist goals, and never dismissive of the Islamist potential for terror. The American Islamophiles, on the other hand, gave the benefit of the doubt to any and every Islamist, and scoffed at scenarios of mass killing.

THE DEFEAT of Islamist movements inflicted by the rulers of Algeria and Egypt has been duplicated on a smaller scale in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan and Malaysia. Kepel covers them all. Naturally, he dwells at greatest length on the cases that confirm his thesis. The problem is that some cases don't.

There are Islamist movements, positioned at the very jugular of the Middle East, that are not at all spent. In Lebanon, the Iranian-backed Hizballah has dug itself into Lebanese politics and society, and its militiamen still parade with guns, having compelled Israel to withdraw from south Lebanon after an 18-year occupation. And from the Palestinian-controlled cities of the West Bank and Gaza, Hamas and Islamic Jihad dispatch waves of suicide bombers and openly take credit for their deeds. These movements still believe that a determined minority can change the course of history—the few thousand Shi'a guerrillas who hunted the Israeli army in Lebanon, and the one hundred Palestinians who have chosen "self-martyrdom."

These movements flourish not because they have forged a broad social coalition. Hizballah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad, as much as they serve their own followings, mainly serve the interests of certain regimes. Syria has allotted space to Hizballah because its objective of bleeding Israel coincides with the aims of Damascus. Needless to say, there is no active Islamist movement in Syria itself—the Ba'ath regime would never allow it. But Hizballah's young leader, Seyyid Nasrallah, and Syria's young president have become boon companions as they chart a common strategy. There is also room in Damascus for Ramadan Shallah, formerly of the University of South Florida, currently the leader of Islamic Jihad. Likewise, the Palestinian Authority has used Hamas and Islamic Jihad as levers against Israel. It was Arafat himself who extricated the quadriplegic Sheikh Ahmad Yasin from an Israeli

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prison, restoring him as leader of Hamas. And Islamist terrorism has become the essence of the so-called Al-Aqsa *intifada*, which Yasir Arafat is unwilling to end until he can emerge from the fire with a convincing V-sign raised on high.

The point is that these Islamist movements thrive because they are *not* "in opposition." They are proxies of regimes in a common struggle against Israel. Decline or not, there will always be space for movements that are prepared to delay confrontation and serve rulers. Such alliances offer Islamists an opening for turning national causes into full-blown holy wars. Kepel devotes a chapter to the failure of the Islamist international to turn Bosnia into an Islamist cause. But Islamists have had undeniable success in recasting the struggles for Palestine and Kashmir into *jihads*. This may not bring them to power anytime soon, but it is a safe port in a storm, and it aids prudent preparation for another bid for power in the future. In the meantime, states are more than willing to exploit the Islamist sword, especially where they hesitate to wield their own. The regular forces can lounge in their barracks while the zealots do the work.

Kepel is unconvinced. "The Islamist movement will have much difficulty reversing its trail of decline as it confronts 21st century civilization", he writes. "Muslims no longer view Islamism as the source of utopia, and this more pragmatic vision augurs well for the future." And here is an influential echo: Robert Kaplan, who has made his name by anticipating the worst, now predicts that "the new century will ultimately see the implosion of political Islam." Implosion, of course, is much more dramatic than decline, and would almost certainly require that Iran discard its revolution—something Kaplan believes is likely.[6] This is Kepel's argument drawn to its furthest conclusion, and it takes some boldness to make it.

But there is another view, spelled out in "Global Trends 2015", a report published in 2000 by the National Intelligence Council, representing the considered opinion of the CIA and "non-government" experts (including Joseph Nye and, at the time, Richard Haass). The report, after surveying the Middle East's grim combination of growing populations and economic failures, concludes that, by 2015, "populations will be significantly larger, poorer, more urban, and more disillusioned." As a result, Islamism will remain very much in play:

> Popular resentment of globalization as a Western intrusion will be widespread. Political Islam in various forms will be an attractive alternative for millions of Muslims throughout the region, and some radical variants will continue to be divisive social and political forces.[7]

The report goes on to predict this: "Islamists could come to power in states that are beginning to become pluralist and in which entrenched secular elites have lost their appeal."[8]

If you had to bet the family farm—or the country's tallest skyscraper—on one of these predictions, which would you choose? Is Islamism like a harmless soap bubble, destined to pop in a shimmer of disappearing incandescence? Or is it the kind of bubble that will explode like a gas pocket suddenly exposed to a flame? Kepel's prediction is predicated on a fundamentally optimistic assessment: Muslims, having exhausted all other alternatives, will do the right thing. "As

[6]Robert D. Kaplan, "The World in 2005", *The Atlantic Monthly* (March 2002).

[7]National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future With Nongovernment Experts*, NIC2000-02 (December 2000), p. 70.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 71.

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Muslim societies emerge from the Islamist era", he writes, "it is through openness to the world and to democracy that they will construct their future. There is no longer any real alternative." But can we be sure that "democracy" will not bring the Islamist movement back from the shadows? Do we know that, in the absence of a strong state, the prospects for democracy outweigh those of Balkan-style breakdown? Are you out of government? If you answer yes to these three questions, then place your bet with Kepel.

PRESUMABLY AT some moment before 2015, Osama bin Laden will resurface, dead or alive. In the meantime, books about him are easier to find. The entry by Roland Jacquard, president of the Paris-based International Observatory on Terrorism, is an updated version of a book originally published in French, during the very week of September 11.

Like previous books on bin Laden, this one belongs to the gray genre of the intelligence compendium. In a study of this kind, every bit of information is thrown into a mixer: original documents, press reports, intelligence leaks. Such books can almost write themselves, although readers are advised not to delve too deeply into the footnotes; this is a kitchen that will spoil your appetite.

That said, Jacquard writes a smooth narrative, navigating the familiar chapters in bin Laden's biography—the family business, the *jihad* years in Afghanistan, the creation of Al-Qaeda. To the extent anyone can tell from unclassified sources, his account is broadly accurate. But shame on the publisher for padding this book with one hundred pages of poorly reproduced "original" documents in Arabic (and French), whose English "translations" on opposing pages are hopelessly inadequate, even as summations. Better versions could have been plucked from the Internet. This is all the more inexplicable as the "consulting editor" listed on the title page is an Egyptian-born instructor of Arabic at Duke. (Her afterword, telling us that Islam is not bin Laden and bin Laden is not Islam, is a miniature sample of the pap offered by countless academics. Moreover, it contradicts Jacquard's own argument that bin Laden's "brotherhood" is everywhere, that he has "countless" followers, and that Al-Qaeda will outlast him.)

Jacquard is no academic. But let the truth be told: the terrorism experts, whom the professors hold in such low esteem, who mangle Arabic documents and assign equal weight to rumor and fact, actually have a better track record than any combination of academic Arabists. If anyone can be said to have imagined an event on the scale of September 11, it was the terrorism experts—Jacquard included. The reason is that they took Islamists at their word. And so it behooves readers to heed Jacquard's (ominously numbered) Chapter 13: "Jihad's New Weapons." Islamism may have crested; it may even be headed toward "implosion." But a fervent remnant, however small, will soldier on with one purpose: to outdo the murderous performance of September 11. Don't be deceived by the ease of the Afghan victory, warns Jacquard: "This brand of terrorism still has networks around the world, mysterious financial power, and no doubt new leaders lurking in the shadows. The threat remains intact." Extreme Islamists are already obsessed with the chemical, the biological, and the nuclear. Henceforth, the United States will be left with no choice but to wage continuous war against every last redoubt of extreme Islamism.

Clash of civilizations? That would take two, and it would not be an even contest. But there can be no doubt that the United States will have its hands full in lopping off the heads of Al-Qaeda as they grow back, and that the playing field

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is more level than most Americans imagine. "We no longer believe in the great powers", bin Laden told Jacquard in answer to a question he submitted a year ago. "Our conviction is that America is much weaker than Russia." For the Islamists, it is the United States that is in decline (along with Israel), and if Muslims by the thousands are willing to do battle as "self-martyrs" with the "right" weapons, victory will be theirs. One can only hope that September 11 is what Kepel makes it out to be: the end of an era. But one is left with the uneasy feeling that Jacquard may be right; that we are only at the beginning. □

Martin Kramer is editor of the *Middle East Quarterly* and the author, most recently, of *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America* (Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001).

Wasserstein's Jerusalem

Yossi Klein Halevi

Bernard Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem: The Struggle for the Holy City* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 432 pp., $29.95.

BERNARD Wasserstein is driven by an obsessive commitment to symmetry. His title, *Divided Jerusalem*, refers not merely to the reality of a city torn between two estranged national and religious communities, but to the moral and historical claims that reinforce that separation. Wasserstein divides these two elements of Jerusalem's division into balanced equations, priding himself on fairness. Indeed, dispassion is his passion. Yet, in his ideological commitment to balancing the centrality of Jerusalem for the Jewish people with the often ambivalent relationship of Islam and Christianity toward the holy city, he transforms a virtue into a distortion. *Divided Jerusalem* is an inadvertent warning against false even-handedness—a curse with which the Middle East conflict, often reduced by outsiders to a "cycle of violence", is routinely afflicted.

Along with a symmetry of claims, Wasserstein posits a symmetry of ambivalence: All three monotheistic faiths, he insists, not only venerate Jerusalem but, at various points, have downplayed, disparaged and even despised the holy city. And so he begins his narrative—which focuses mainly on the role of international diplomacy in determining the city's fate—with contradictory historical voices about

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Jerusalem from within each of the Abrahamic faiths. He quotes the Temple priest Ananus bemoaning the fact that he lived to see the Temple's desecration by the Romans, and then counters that devotion with a dismissive quote from Zionist forerunner Moshe Leib Lillienblum: "We do not need the walls of Jerusalem, nor the Jerusalem temple, nor Jerusalem itself." He then offers similar contradictory quotes about Jerusalem from within the Christian and Islamic traditions. The very idea of Jerusalem, he insists, is divided within all three of the faiths that profess uncompromising loyalty to her.

But compared to the frequent neglect of Jerusalem under Muslim rule and the theological ambivalence within Christianity toward the earthly Jerusalem (indeed, both Islam and Christianity, at various points, dismissed attachment to Jerusalem as an archaic "judaizing" tendency), Wasserstein offers only flimsy evidence of Jewish ambivalence. He cites the neglect and even loathing of the city by early secular Zionists, adding that the Zionist movement was prepared to live with the partition of the city and even, in the mid-1930s, with its internationalization. Yet what Wasserstein perceives as disdain for Jerusalem among secular Zionists is more likely disdain for the ultra-Orthodox who dominated Jewish Jerusalem at the beginning of the Zionist return. The mainstream Zionist willingness to accept internationalization in exchange for statehood in 1937—and partition between 1948 and 1967—more accurately reflects the movement's ability to accept the limits of the possible rather than any disinterest in Jerusalem. Indeed, mainstream secular Zionism repeatedly proved its loyalty to Jerusalem. In the 1948 War of Independence, a third of the 6,000 Israeli casualties fell in defense of Jerusalem, including the Old City. And when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion was confronted with the threat of internationalizing the city in 1949, he declared that he would rather forfeit Israel's seat at the United Nations than give up its capital—that is, forfeit Zionism's dream of transforming the Jews into a normal nation among nations, to remain loyal to the pre-Zionist dream of Jerusalem.

In his obsessive quest for symmetry, Wasserstein sometimes lapses into absurdity. "Both Israel and Palestine", he writes, "are seriously flawed democracies." Israel is an occupying power with a Supreme Court that deals with such issues as a recent suit brought by the brother of a dead terrorist who argued that Israeli police should have dismantled his explosives belt rather than shoot him. It is indeed an imperfect democracy; it is a laboratory that is testing the limits of democratic norms in a nation under permanent mortal threat. But what exactly does Wasserstein imagine to be Palestine's contribution to the democratic experiment? The summary executions of alleged collaborators, who are dragged through the public squares and then hanged by their feet from electricity poles? Or perhaps he is thinking of Palestine's controlled media, which does, after all, meet ACLU standards for allowing hate speech like Holocaust denial?

Wasserstein likewise distorts the truth in his falsely balanced treatment of the fate of holy places under Jordanian and Israeli rule. He implies symmetry between the campaign in the 1920s and 1930s of the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, to deny the Jewish right to the Western Wall with the campaign of Jewish fanatics in our time to usurp the Temple Mount from Muslim rule. But there is no symmetry here. The Mufti was the spiritual and national leader of a people, while Israel's Temple Mount activists are a peripheral group of misfits who can barely attract three dozen participants to their demonstrations.

Worse, Wasserstein fails to make the

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obvious comparison between Israeli and Jordanian treatment of the other's holy places: When the Jordanians ruled the Old City, Jews were barred from praying at the Western Wall, a critical fact that Wasserstein dispenses with in half a sentence; while Israel has granted the *waqf* (Islamic endowment) continued autonomy over the Temple Mount, including veto power over the right of Jews to pray at Judaism's holiest site. Wasserstein fails to credit Israel with that unprecedented act of religious restraint. Indeed, the only relevant symmetry here is that under both Jordanian and Israeli rule, Jews have been barred from praying on their most sacred ground. Finally, he all but ignores the Jordanians' systematic destruction of the Old City's Jewish Quarter in 1948 and the years thereafter—including the transformation of synagogues into goat pens and latrines. He blandly notes that the Jewish Quarter was a "half-ruined slum", without explaining who ruined it.[1]

Wasserstein avoids comparing the significance of Jerusalem for each of the three faiths, precisely because that would disturb the careful symmetry of his argument. He notes that Jerusalem is not explicitly mentioned in the Quran, but fails to contrast that with the fact that the Hebrew Bible evokes Jerusalem 669 times. And while he acknowledges that Jews pray toward Jerusalem and consider the entire city, and not just its holy places, to be sacred, the unique Jewish relationship to Jerusalem—a relationship that virtually defined two independent Jewish Commonwealths that together lasted nearly a millennium (but was never the capital of any Muslim country)—somehow gets misplaced in the book's relentless message of symmetry.

Perhaps the essential difference between the relationship of Judaism and Islam to Jerusalem is that, without the idea of Jerusalem, there is no Judaism, while Islam would certainly continue to thrive in its absence. Only Judaism among the monotheistic faiths has linked its very existence with Jerusalem. Unlike Islam and Christianity, which are universalist faiths, Judaism insists on defining universal values within a particularist framework: a single holy people as a testing vessel for divine intimacy with humanity, and a single holy land and holy city as intimations of the future messianic sanctification of the planet. The Jewish people completed its transition from disparate tribes into a nation under King David, in Jerusalem; and the vision of the prophets is of the future unification of humanity in messianic Jerusalem. For Judaism, then, Jerusalem is the place of unity and wholeness; without Jerusalem, Judaism would lose its past and its future, its hope and reason for being.

UNTIL RECENTLY, I shared Wasserstein's aversion to stressing the primacy of the Jewish spiritual claim to Jerusalem. Jewish polemicists who emphasize their claim tend to unfairly disparage Muslim devotion to the holy city. Islam, after all, ruled over Jerusalem for 1,300 years; its first glorious monument, the Dome of the Rock, was built here. Weighing one spiritual claim against another risks demeaning the sacred with inappropriate, even crass standards. Indeed, a spiritual symmetry in the relationship to Jerusalem among the monotheistic faiths does exist: All three venerate the holy city as the meeting place between heaven and earth. The Divine Presence descending on the Temple Mount's Holy of Holies, the Prophet Muhammad ascending to heaven from the Temple Mount, Jesus transcending death at nearby Golgotha—all evoke the theme of God reaching across the abyss to contact His

[1]For a contemporary eyewitness account, with photographs before and after, see John Phillips, *Free Spirit in a Troubled World* (New York: Scalo, 1996), pp. 464–74.

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creatures. Given that exalted commonality, why haggle over which faith regards the city as more central to its essence?

The answer, I have come to realize, is self-defense. The current Palestinian War has been accompanied by an unprecedented Muslim onslaught against the legitimacy of any Jewish claim to Jerusalem. The PA-appointed mufti of Jerusalem, Ekrema Sabri, has said that the only religious significance of the Western Wall is that it was used by the Prophet Muhammad to tether his winged steed, Buraq, during his night journey to heaven. At Camp David, Yasir Arafat insisted that the Temple had been in Nablus, not Jerusalem. The unholy war against the Jewish history of Jerusalem demands an unapologetic response, an affirmation of the uniqueness of Jewish attachment to the city—which, after all, only became holy to Christianity and Islam because it was holy to Judaism. (Initially, Muslims prayed toward Jerusalem, to woo the Jewish tribes of Arabia to Islam; when that failed, the *qibla*, or direction of prayer, was shifted to Mecca. This direction remains obligatory today even for Muslims praying on the Temple Mount.)

Despite the asymmetry of the competing claims over Jerusalem, arguably a majority of Israeli Jews would opt for the traumatic redivision of the city—were they convinced that it would end the pathological 100-year Middle East conflict that Israelis now realize threatens the viability and even the survival of the Jewish state. The problem, of course, is that most of us no longer believe that partitioning Jerusalem with Arafat's Palestinian Authority would lead to peace, only to dismemberment of the city. The one tangible achievement of Arafat's war for Jerusalem has been to convince the pragmatic Israeli center that under no circumstances should the Palestinian Authority be entrusted with governing any part of Israel's capital. Even many on the Left who advocate the desperate solution of unilateral Israeli separation from the territories concede that, for now at least, there is no possibility of dividing Jerusalem, which would only further entwine Israelis and Palestinians. The untenability of "sharing" Jerusalem with Arafat is the fatal flaw at the heart of all the current Middle East peace initiatives. For the first time since the Oslo process began, the old Israeli consensus on united Jerusalem has re-emerged—this time based not on historical or religious sentiment but on a combination of experience and fear.

In truth, many of the city's Palestinians share the same fear of Arafat's regime. It is hardly coincidence that, unlike the first *intifada*, few Jerusalemite Palestinians have participated in the current violence. In conversations with Palestinians living in the city, I have repeatedly heard dread expressed at the notion of "bringing Gaza into Jerusalem", as more than one Palestinian has put it. A Palestinian journalist who lives not far from me in northeast Jerusalem told me, around the time of the Camp David negotiations, that if Arafat comes to his neighborhood, he will move to mine.

ARGUABLY THE preferred option of Jerusalem's Palestinians is neither Arafat's rule nor Israel's rule but internationalization. In principle, that would seem to be the fairest and least dangerous solution. If Jews and Arabs cannot govern this world city together, then let the world do it. Yet as Wasserstein reveals—and here he is at his best—the sordid history of international meddling in Jerusalem's fate has only exacerbated its religious and national passions. Worse, no international forum exists that would provide Israelis with confidence in its fairness. Given the Durban "anti-racism" conference that degenerated into an anti-Jewish frenzy, and the UN's recent obsession with uncovering a nonexistent massacre in Jenin while all but

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ignoring the massacres of Israelis by Arafat's terrorist militias, Israelis are hardly likely to entrust Jerusalem to the international community.

If Arafat's rejectionism makes sharing Jerusalem inconceivable, and the UN's one-sidedness negates internationalization, that leaves as the only option the continued Israeli rule over an admittedly divided city. But for Israel to maintain effective control will require a re-evaluation of its policy toward the Arab population, in particular the policy of restricting housing permits for Arabs and then demolishing their illegally built homes. That policy has failed to contain Arab demographic growth in the city and has embittered many who might otherwise favor Israeli rule, or at least acquiesce to it as the least noxious of all evils. Given Arab fears of Arafat's regime, the time is right for Israel to renew its offer of citizenship for any Arab resident of the city who requests it. Nothing is likely to undermine Arafat's claim to legitimacy in Jerusalem more than a massive request among its Arab residents for Israeli citizenship. As for adding a quarter of a million Arabs to Israel's voter registry, that is the price the Jewish state must be willing to pay for Jerusalem.

That possibility does not even warrant Wasserstein's consideration. The disaster of the Oslo process, and Arafat's betrayal of Israel's overtures, has had no evident impact on him. He remains committed to partitioning Jerusalem, even if that means inserting Arafat and his militias into the midst of the Old City. Indeed, for Wasserstein, *Divided Jerusalem* is not just a title to describe a tragic reality, but an ideal. He has approached this story intending to offer historical justification for partition. The result is an account as unworthy as the political agenda it seeks to serve. □

Yossi Klein Halevi is the Israel correspondent for *The New Republic* and a senior writer for *The Jerusalem Report*. His most recent book is *At the Entrance to the Garden of Eden: A Jew's Search for God with Christians and Muslims in the Holy Land* (Morrow, 2001).

Forgetting about Jerusalem ...

Muslim and Christian sources agree that [Patriarch] Sophronius took Umar on a tour of the Holy City, and that Umar, who visited many fine churches, including the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, was really interested in one site only: the Temple Mount. At the time of the Muslim conquest [638] the Temple Mount was the city dump. Whether this was a deliberate insult to the Jews is unclear, but in spite of Sophronius' attempts to dissuade him, this was where Umar insisted on going.

The first thing the Muslims did was to clean up the Temple Mount. Since 692, it has been graced by the Dome of the Rock, the oldest Muslim monument and Muslim civilisation's first great work of art, a building that looks today almost exactly as it did when it was completed. The evidence suggests that it was not built for the reasons Muslims now give, but rather to celebrate and revere a Jewish holy site, the last remaining vestige of the Temple of the Jews. . . . But all this has now been forgotten by both Muslims and Jews, erased from their historical traditions.

—Kanan Makiya, "Whose Jerusalem?", *The London Review of Books*, February 7, 2002

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TNI Summer Reading Guide

The editorial board of The National Interest *and selected associates of it hereby proffer some summer reading recommendations. For the most part, the suggestions constitute not light but enlightening fare. The editors will be pleased to learn in due course what our readers gain from them.*

THERE COULD be no more foolhardy an undertaking than to name a candidate for the most important novel of Henry James—something I shall now all too incautiously do. The novel I wish to name is *The Bostonians*, in essence the story of a war for the soul of a charismatic young woman. The combatants are, on the one side, a fierce suffragist who wants to possess her completely as well as to exploit her powers for the cause of women's rights, and, on the other, an intelligent and serious man who wants to make her his wife. *The Bostonians* was published in 1888, and yet nothing need be added to James' account in describing the emotional duplicity of the movement nowadays known as women's liberation, or the terrible tug-of-war in the hearts of young women between what they want and what they are now told it is their duty to believe. Great novels illuminate permanently, which is why we call them great.

MIDGE DECTER

MY UNDERSTANDING of the current issues in the Middle East and of the terrorism against the United States was greatly enhanced by reading Bernard Lewis' *The Middle East: A Brief History of the Last 2000 Years*. Lewis is professor emeritus at Princeton and the outstanding historian of the Middle East and its relations with the West. I read the book with the confidence that I was in the hands of someone who was both accurate and deep in his analysis. Since the book was written in 1995 it brings a perspective that might be missing in something that looks at the Middle East just in the context of the recent events. The book is very readable and is meant for those of us looking for an introduction to the thinking and culture of the region as well as the historic record.

MARTIN FELDSTEIN

AMONG THE books that made a profound impression on me when I first read it twenty years ago was Christopher Sykes' biography of Orde Wingate (London: Collins, 1959), which is a great book not by virtue of the writing so much as of the subject matter. Wingate—founder of the Haganah and organizer of the Ethiopian resistance against the Italians, who ultimately died fighting the Japanese in the Chindit raid in Burma—had to be one of the most remarkable individuals of the 20th century. Compared to our own colorless bureaucrats and orientalists, Wingate was an eccentric who liked to meet in the buff and eat raw onions, and inevitably ended up siding passionately with the people he was sent to help to the point of imagining vast conspiracies on the part of his own government. Great preparation for a life in international politics.

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA

WHEN ERIC Hoffer published *The True Believer* in 1951, his masterwork on the social psychology of fanatical mass movements, we may safely assume that fundamentalist Muslims were not the believers he held foremost in mind. But anyone with knowledge of fundamentalism and neo-orthodoxy in Muslim societies today is certain to shudder with recognition at Hoffer's observations. Aside from his conclusion that poverty and misery as such are false

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sources of violent fanaticism, consider only this one remark: "There are many who find a good alibi far more attractive than an achievement. For an achievement does not settle anything permanently. We still have to prove our worth anew each day. . . . But when we have a valid alibi for not achieving anything we are fixed, so to speak, for life."

ADAM GARFINKLE

RECENTLY, I finally got around to reading Robert K. Massie's *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany and the Coming of the Great War*. It is an example of popular history at its best: a gripping story beautifully told; and a tremendous cast of characters (from Bismarck and Salisbury to Tirpitz and Churchill). Perfect summer reading, and not irrelevant to what is happening in the world today. As an accompaniment, try Chapter XIX of Raymond Aron's magisterial *Peace and War*, entitled "In Search of Morality: Idealism and Reality." Among other things, it lucidly explains the difference between the prescriptive, value-laden *Machtpolitik* of Wilhelmine Germany, and the (mainly) descriptive form that realism assumed in America after making the journey across the Atlantic.

OWEN HARRIES

THE CURRENT massive wave of immigrants has made their assimilation a central issue for the future of American society, culture, identity and unity. Milton Gordon's *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins*, published in 1964 just before the new wave began, remains the most thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of the assimilation process. Gordon identifies four types of assimilation: cultural, structural, marital, identificational. He argues that cultural assimilation is the easiest and most prevalent form but does not necessarily lead to structural assimilation. Structural assimilation, however, does promote the other forms of assimilation. Gordon was unduly pessimistic about the prospects for structural assimilation of the offspring of the pre-World War I immigrants, but experience has shown him absolutely right on the positive effects of structural assimilation on the overall integration of newcomers into American society.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON

FOR A GOOD whiff, alternately amusing and depressing, of present-day anti-Americanism in Europe, you must read Henryk M. Broder, *Kein Krieg, nirgends: Die Deutschen und der Terror* (Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 2002). You'll find such luminaries as Nobel Laureate Günter Grass plus a nice cross-section of Germany's chattering classes stereotyping and demonizing America in the post-9/11 era—in a language that can be heard up and down in Europe these days. Broder is such a trenchant observer because he is the classical outsider-looking-in. The son of Polish-Jewish survivors and a journalist at *Der Spiegel*, he started making a name for himself in the early 1980s when he cast a merciless light on the German Left's neo-anti-semitism masquerading as "anti-Zionism." He is sharp-eyed, polemical and funny as he dissects a mindset that defines much of the current public discourse on America, terrorism and Islam in Western Europe. Alas, you have to be able to read German.

JOSEF JOFFE

IT IS called *What Went Wrong*, but it might have been called *Why They Are Angry*. Bernard Lewis's rumination on the decline of Islamic civilization over the last 500 years is brilliant, authoritative and short (as all good books should be). This tour through Islamic history, reviewed by David Pryce-Jones in the Spring 2002 issue, manages to be both piquant and elegant. The sections on the Ottomans are

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particularly fascinating. Required reading for anyone who wants to understand why some are trying to kill us.

CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER

IF YOU wish to understand the French better than they understand themselves, read Adam Gopnik's *From Paris to the Moon*. The fancy, pseudo-literary title is misleading. Gopnik not only writes very well, but he has insights into the French mind, the French way of life, the French approach to politics, child-rearing, even foreign policy. It really is perfect summer reading.

IRVING KRISTOL

IF THE United States is, as observers from Tocqueville to Kennan have thought, constitutionally ill-designed and temperamentally unsuited to conduct a steady, coherent foreign policy, how did it become the world's pre-eminent power? How did the Inspector Clouseau of the international system attain a dominant status unmatched since the days of imperial Rome? The answer, according to Walter Russell Mead in his book *Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World*, lies in the multiple traditions of foreign policy on which the nation has been able to draw, mixing and adapting them to suit the various circumstances it has encountered in its two hundred-plus year history. There are, Mead believes, four such traditions: the Hamiltonian, which prescribes an expansive international role emphasizing commerce; the Jeffersonian, for which the protection of democracy at home is the primary concern; the Jacksonian, which can mobilize the considerable energies of the American public against any individual or group unwise enough to provoke it; and the Wilsonian, which seeks to spread American values and institutions to those beyond America's borders who need them, even, sometimes, when they do not recognize the need. Like Walter McDougall's similar and similarly admirable 1997 book *Promised Land, Crusader State, Special Providence* distills the elements of American foreign policy's past that are pertinent to its present and its future.

MICHAEL MANDELBAUM

MICHAEL Gordon and Bernard Trainor published *The Generals' War* in 1995, by which time it was clear that Desert Storm, also known in some places as "Kuwaitus interruptus", was one of history's greatest near misses. With Saddam's Republican Guard in the crosshairs of American forces, we let them—and him—get away. We are still paying for that blunder and, if President Bush meant what he said in the State of the Union message, we will go on paying until we finish the job begun 11 years ago. This fascinating account reminds us that Colin Powell, now the chief architect of American foreign policy, had it wrong back then, just as current reporting of his views suggests he has it wrong now. It was a war General Powell did not wish to fight then just as the war to remove Saddam is one he does not wish to fight now. Gordon and Trainor, in their careful, convincing account, report Powell as understanding the importance of destroying Saddam's ground forces. But when it came to it, he wanted even more to end the war as soon as Saddam was driven from Kuwait—and well before his army could be destroyed. It is still there. And *The Generals' War* is still worth reading.

RICHARD PERLE

THE MIDDLE East remains enigmatic and much-discussed. Why do the leaders and peoples of that region see everything so differently from Americans? For example, they were simultaneously joyous at the events of September 11 and unwilling to accept that Middle Easterners had perpetrated them.

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The best explanation of this profound chasm is found in a book not written by someone deeply immersed in Middle Eastern studies but a many-talented journalist—David Pryce-Jones. After finishing his *Closed Circle: An Interpretation of the Arabs* (Harper Collins, 1991), I for the first time had a sense that I knew what was going on politically in the Middle East. Other readers will no doubt have the same sense upon completing his very readable analysis (republished in 2001 by Ivan Dee).

DANIEL PIPES

IF ONE wishes to grasp America's faceoff with terrorism before 9/11—as well as to capture the atmosphere and ethos of DO [Directorate of Operations] officers—one can scarcely do better than to read the gripping experience of Robert Baer in *See No Evil* (Crown, 2002), particularly the segments on the Middle East. It demonstrates that fighting terrorism is not an intelligence black hole, as sometimes portrayed. We know (and if we energetically dig we can know far more) about its perpetrators. Our failure before 9/11 was not the absence of clues, but a reluctance to act on available information. One need not embrace Baer's strictures on Washington, its bureaucrats or its policymakers. This is not a high-level policy perspective, but the distinctive view of a (good) operator in the field—though in some sense, a worm's eye view. What it does make clear, if only indirectly, are the dilemmas of a society based on openess and "a decent respect for the opinions of mankind" in taking the most effective measures in countering terrorism.

JAMES SCHLESINGER

IF YOU want to understand how quickly "new world orders" can come to grief, try John Maynard Keynes' insider indictment of Wilsonianism at Versailles. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, first published in 1920, is one of those books that almost everybody has heard of and very few have read. To take it on vacation, you needn't feel like Mike Dukakis at the beach with those big Swedish land-use studies; this is a high-class, briskly argued kiss-and-tell book. Keynes is funny; his portrait of Wilson will embarrass you more than you expect. He is mean; Wilson's advisors he dismisses as "dummies." He is brilliantly clear in explaining how the pre-1914 world really worked ("trickle-down" economists will enjoy his approving analysis of how the rich promoted economic growth). In his gloom, Keynes was wrong about how long it would take for the lights to come on again in Europe, but he understood that the Great Powers' exhaustion was spiritual as well as physical—and would have terrible consequences. "We have been moved already beyond endurance, and need rest", he concluded. "Never in the lifetime of men now living has the universal element in the soul of man burnt so dimly."

STEPHEN SESTANOVICH

"IT IS QUITE in keeping with man's curious intellectual history that the simplest and most important questions are those he asks least often." This statement of Norman Angell serves as the frontispiece for Glenn Gray's now classic 1959 book, *The Warriors: Reflections of Men in Battle*. In the midst of yet another war, this is a book well worth reading, or re-reading (particularly Chapter 2, "The Enduring Appeals of Battle"). Gray, an intelligence officer during World War II and subsequently a professor of philosophy at Colorado College, asked the "simplest and most important questions" about men in war. The answers he gave seem to me to be as relevant today, despite the vast changes that have occurred in the conditions of war, as they were when written. □

ROBERT W. TUCKER

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Letters

Law in Order:

William Wechsler and I have worked on many of the issues he writes about in the Spring 2002 issue of *The National Interest* ["Law in Order: Reconstructing U.S. National Security Policy"], he from the last administration, I working in the U.S. Senate. We were then "friendly adversaries", divided more by the nuances of our agreements than over fundamental differences. It is in that spirit that I would quibble with his generally excellent and timely piece dealing with the underside of globalization and what we need to do about it.

There is much in what Mr. Wechsler says about problems in Federal law enforcement as a component in national security thinking. But, to be fair, Federal law enforcement for years took the threat of international crime seriously when the national security apparatus did not. Now that national security policymakers have seen the problem, they tend to act as if they discovered it. Few administrations have ever made money laundering a priority, for example, and few Treasury secretaries have ever dealt with it seriously. If that is now changing, it is not because law enforcement agencies did not perceive the problem; they just had trouble making anyone up top pay attention to it.

The real problem for law enforcement is how it defines success. Winning for law enforcement is prosecuting bad guys. Winning a war, however, does not always mean bringing bad guys to justice. There needs to be a shift in focus, consistent with civil liberties, that seeks to disrupt criminal or terrorist enterprises when prosecution is less of an option or less optimal. Such a shift will not be met necessarily with reorganization. I have been through too many reorganizations to have the faith in them that Mr. Wechsler seems to have. They are rarely on target and too often work on paper while creating havoc in practice. It is not simply the case that agencies or efforts are uncoordinated. The problem lies more in the fact that the core missions for different agencies are different and only overlap at the margins. We cannot wish away those realities or the political ones that excel at making hash from roast beef. Take the residency of the Coast Guard in the Department of Transportation as just one example. Mr. Wechsler focuses on the Coast Guard's law enforcement mission. But its core constituency in Congress sees its core mission as maritime safety with a law enforcement component. That will not change by rearranging the deck chairs.

Mr. Wechsler is certainly right that the events of 9/11 enlarged our perspective on a hostile world and what exactly is hostile about it. We need a dialogue of willing listeners and able doers. Mr. Wechsler reminds us of our responsibilities.

WILLIAM OLSON
Republican Staff Director,
U.S. Senate Caucus on
International Narcotics
Control

Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge might have been able to accomplish something as the nation's first "Homeland Security Director" if he had demanded and achieved a restructuring of Federal law enforcement along the lines recommended by William Wechsler ("Law and Order", Spring 2002) as a prerequisite for taking the job.

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But the "if" is a very big one. While Congress' recent vote to abolish the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) suggests some desire for change, it is not yet clear that either the administration or the Congress has an attention span long enough to do more than move around the deck chairs. A reorganization that restructures our existing baker's dozen of Federal law enforcement agencies into a mere trinity requires strategic imagination. But it also would require Federal law enforcement to respond to policymakers in a fashion that has been unprecedented since J. Edgar Hoover anointed himself America's cop-in-chief-for-life some 75 years ago.

Wechsler's plan suffers from the flaw of rationality. It would require parts of the government that have refused to work well together to join up bureaucratically to create a seamless network that marries and integrates national security, law enforcement, economic security and foreign policy goals. It would create a defense-in-depth to assist Federal investigations in operating within cross-border reality; make border enforcement an integrated whole; and give the security issues involved in protecting America their own much needed independence and focus. It would also require every part of existing U.S. law enforcement to share its existing sovereignty with others, a task only marginally more difficult than securing shared sovereignty in the West Bank.

During my six years working on international law enforcement issues for the State Department under the Clinton Administration, the hodge-podge of Federal departments and agencies working on transborder drugs, thugs, and terrorist issues spent as much energy fighting one another as they did fighting the bad guys. The Justice Department refused to tell the State Department when it was extraditing major drug kingpins, the FBI refused to tell Justice what it was doing against Russian organized crime, the Treasury Department refused to tell anyone what it was doing on money laundering in Mexico, Customs refused to tell Treasury what it was doing on anything, and the local offices of all of the above worked equally hard to keep their own headquarters out of the loop whenever possible.

For the Wechsler proposal to have a chance, the President would need to take on the mattress mice and announce a team even before securing the reforms. He might, for example, name the heads of the new three agencies on the day he announces the initiative to create them, relying on people who have already proven they can do the work. One effective team, for example, might consist of FBI Director Robert Mueller to head the new FIA, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge at BEA, and General Wayne Downing, currently the NSC's counterterrorism chief, at the FPA. The President would present his restructuring as part of an emergency authorization to respond to terrorism, ask the Congress to vote it up or down in a fast track, and then use his anti-terrorism credentials to get his initiative through the ensuring bureaucratic food fight. No one should imagine, however, that reforming Federal law enforcement will be as easy as merely overthrowing the Taliban.

JONATHAN M. WINER
Washington, DC

Wechsler replies:

I share Bill Olson's dissatisfaction for what has passed for law enforcement reorganization, and can understand Jonathan Winer's pessimism at the prospects for real change. Every Federal law enforcement agency has a narrow but strong incentive to keep things as they are, even if that means that the country as a whole is poorly served. Nevertheless, I hold out hope that leaders in the Executive and the Legislative branches will rise above parochial interests and political concerns, and begin a serious debate on the organization of Federal law enforcement—as previous generations did with the U.S. armed forces.

Sadly, however, neither branch currently seems up to the job. The Congress appears

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to be focusing its investigation into "what went wrong" almost entirely on the foreign intelligence community despite the fact that the perpetrators of the September 11 attacks planned and committed their crimes here, at home, within the purview of the domestic law enforcement agencies. And on the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, President Bush has sat quietly by while his homeland security chief Tom Ridge has lost bureaucratic battle after battle to the law enforcement community. The American public is left to wait for real leadership on this issue to emerge—perhaps after the next terrorist attack....

The Other Orientalism:

Charles Horner has written an excellent piece introducing the separatist problem in Eastern Turkestan (Xinjiang), and noting the possible limits of what Samuel Huntington once feared would be a Confucian-Islamic alliance against the West. While the Tibet issue is rightly raised by human rights groups and the mainstream media, Eastern Turkestan is likely to evolve into the knottier international headache, since it is a place where aggrieved ethnicity, Islamic neo-traditionalist ferment, China's uncertain ability to contain violent dissent, and the fate of China's nuclear proving grounds all come together. Chinese official discourse has adopted Chinese equivalents of the term "fundamentalist" to describe this ferment, and has tried to link it to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda network in order to justify its severe policies in the area.

But important as China's problems with its Turkic minority are, a fuller picture of China's relations with the Islamic world requires something about the situation of the Hui people scattered over most of intramural China (although concentrated in Ningxia, Gansu, Qinghai, Nei Menggu, Sha'anxi, Henan, and Yunnan). These people, usually Chinese-speaking but of an Islamic religious tradition, have a history of dissent and revolt at various periods of Qing, Republican and Communist Chinese history. Before 1949, the Republic of China estimated its population as being as much as 10 percent Muslim, the majority being Chinese-speaking Hui.

Since then, the percentage of China's population identified with historically Muslim ethnic groups has dropped noticeably. Yet in the 1990s there were rumblings of dissatisfaction in several Hui areas of China, accompanied by the revival of Islamic practice and belief. Given the anti-religious history of the Chinese Communist regime, this is surely as significant a development as the rising ethnic consciousness of Tibet and Eastern Turkestan, and the development of unregistered Christian churches in central and eastern China. I hope Mr. Horner or others might enlighten us on these things in the future.

PETER J. HERZ
Carbondale, IL

America the Despised:

Takis Michas' "America the Despised" (Spring 2002) is less about reporting reality and more about a not so carefully constructed polemical piece in what could pass as liberal narrative composed during the Clinton years. It sets up a straw man and then proceeds to destroy it using "facts" that are distorted or even invented. Certainly anti-Americanism existed in Greece in the 1980s, more often as pose than as substance. Today it is but a ghost of its former self in a country, in a geopolitically pivotal location, that is bustling forward. To seek to raise the ghost tells more about the author and the agendas he may be promoting than about the phenomenon itself.

Michas informs us that a "visceral" anti-Americanism has come to the fore in Greece that is based on nationalism, and that it has adherents not only on the Left, but also on the Right. This anti-Americanism is unlike that of the 1960s and 1970s that "was essentially benign" (sic!) because "it did not challenge the essential principles upon which American society rested—namely, the principles of liberty, rule of law and individ-

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ual rights." This certainly represents a new reading of the Marxist and Communist critiques of America, which abounded during that period not only in Greece but also in much of the rest of the world. One of the tangible residues of these critiques was the left-wing (and neo-Fascist) terrorism that plagued Europe and Latin America, and of which the Greek November 17 organization is an example.

The Right in Greece, according to Michas, is anti-American because it is offended by the "values that define the United States", such as multiculturalism. This is news to most Americans, who also reject this controversial concept. Its variant of "societal pluralism" was used to justify the Clinton Administration's policies in the Balkans, including intervention in the Yugoslav civil wars. However, not only did the vast majority of the Greek people oppose such intervention, but so did large constituencies in the United States and in other NATO countries. Witness the fact that over one hundred twenty members of the U.S. Congress felt strongly enough against it to file suit in court. . . .

Michas reserves special venom for the Greek Orthodox Church and its popular leader Archbishop Christodoulos. He takes words and sentences out of context. Thus, in quoting the Archbishop on the World Trade Center attack, for example, he fails to mention that the words he twists out of context were uttered (on September 14, 2001) in a sermon commenting on the Pauline Epistle reading of the feast day of the Holy Cross (1 Corinthians 17–31, which reads, in part, "God hath chosen the weak things of the world to confound the things that are mighty."). The passage has been read during this feast for over 1,500 years.

In Greece, Archbishop Christodoulos has been in the forefront in the condemnation of terrorism. He has announced a major Inter-Religious Conference (to be held in September 2002) to address this phenomenon. In recognition of his stand the U.S. Embassy in Athens asked the Archbishop to lead the memorial service for the victims of September 11, as he had done in the past for victims of the November 17 assassins. In the same spirit the Church of Greece has actively supported its sister Orthodox Church of Serbia, and all the peoples of former Yugoslavia, regardless of religious or ethnic identity, who were victims of the civil wars.

No matter how hard Michas tries, he does little to define what he means by the term "anti-Americanism" other than to use it as a brush with which to tar whole segments of Greek society. He suggests it encompasses those who may criticize aspects of U.S. policy, or merely have a cultural identity that is different than what liberal extremists hold to be politically correct. For those of us who grew up in the Vietnam War era, Michas' article evokes, *mutatis mutandis*, the kinds of critiques of the United States by Americans who threw their lot with Hanoi; i.e., alienated individuals who compensated for their existential angst by ascribing terrible motives to their own country and people.

Contrary to Michas' view, Greece today is maturing, developing a growing sensitivity to and understanding of other peoples, societies and polities. America is held in high esteem, but it is also held to account, especially by its thinking friends. To represent otherwise simply is to misinform.

ARISTIDE D. CARATZAS
New York/Athens

Takis Michas' analysis of the anti-Americanism that permeates Greek society relies primarily on observations that relate to recent developments in the area. There are, however, some deeper motives that elucidate the behavior of the Greek Right *vis-à-vis* the United States and its policies.

Greek conservatives use anti-Americanism as a psychological refuge from the loneliness caused by a long absence from power. For several decades after the end of the Greek Civil War the political

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Right had relied upon the approval of the American "paragon" (a foreign power exerting influence in the internal political scene) to perpetuate their tenure in office. When Andreas Papandreou's PASOK came to power, however, the Left-Right combination of Papandreou as Prime Minister and Konstantinos Karamanlis as President put forth a feeling of security and stability to the wider Greek public. Therefore, the United States decided to work smoothly with the new government in Athens. This dramatically offended Greek conservatives, who felt like unjustly deserted children. This let to increasingly vitriolic attacks on Karamanlis and the gradual distrust of the Americans and their policies from Greek conservative circles. The leaders of the New Democracy party have gradually distanced themselves from the United States, and—on a number of issues—their rhetoric and behavior was reminiscent of the hard liners of the Left.

The anti-Americanism of the Right revolves around issues of preserving national identity abetted by an embrace of conspiracy theories. Unable to develop an alternative ideological platform to combat the simplistic anti-imperialist slogans of the Left, many Greek conservatives have rallied behind the Orthodox Church to blame the Americans for "purposively" subverting all indigenous culture in their drive to pursue globalization. Likewise, the Americans are portrayed as plotting behind the scenes to keep the socialist government in power, because, it is whispered, they would rather prefer a nominally leftist but docile administration than a "nationally proud" and "unbending" rightist regime. Failure at the polls is thus explained as a result of dark machinations of a foreign power and not as a genuine product of the Greek people's free choice.

It appears plausible now that New Democracy may win the next elections. Its new leader Kostas Karamanlis—nephew of the former President—appears to be moderate and pragmatic. Whether he will finally appease the nationalist fanatics of his party and treat fairly with the West, and the United States in particular, remains to be seen.

ANDREAS
ANDRIANOPOULOS
Athens, Greece

Michas replies:

In his comments on my article, Aristide Caratzas, an advisor to Archbishop Christodoulos, raises several objections.

First, he declares that "America is held in high esteem in Greece. . . ." That's really news! After all, I only based my argument on the results of the opinion polls that have been published in Greece on the subject of anti-Americanism during the last few years, as well as on the interpretation of the polling data provided by leading Greek analysts such as Theodore Skylakakis and Takis Kafetzis. On what evidence does Mr. Caratzas base his assessment that "America is held in high esteem"?

Then, he seeks to castigate the messenger for the message, writing: "[T]o seek to raise the ghost (of anti-Americanism) tells more about the author and the agendas he is promoting. . . ." I thought that this kind of talk disappeared with Stalinism. It is interesting to see it being resurrected by an advisor to the Orthodox Church of Greece.

Then, he says that I take Archbishop Christodoulos' "words and sentences out of context. . . ." But the entire Greek media came to the same conclusions in interpreting the Archbishop's statements in the aftermath of September 11. So did the newswires (Agence France Press, Associated Press) as well as other international media outlets (such as the BBC and *The New Statesman*).

Caratzas says that my piece "is less about reporting reality than about what could pass as liberal narrative composed during the Clinton years." Well, at least here Mr. Caratzas is on to something! Yes, I do admit that I find Mr. Clinton's liberal internationalism more congenial to my worldview than the ethno-totalitarian views of Radovan Karadzic, General Mladic and their ilk—views so popular among the Holy Trinity of America-haters in Greece: the

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nationalist Right, the communist Left and the Orthodox Church of Greece.

To reply to Andreas Andrianopoulos: I find that I agree with most of the points he raises. However, I part company with him in one area: I cannot share his optimism that there is even the slightest chance of Greece developing, in the future, a rational, humanistic, and Western political culture. Regretfully, when even today, seven years after the massacre at Srbrenica, not a single Greek politician, cleric or reporter has felt the need to apologize to the Bosnians for Greece's wholehearted support for the perpetrators, how is it possible for anyone to seriously entertain any hope for the *Gestalt*-switch that Andrianopoulos envisions?

Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis:

Henri Barkey's and Philip Gordon's article, "Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis" (Winter 2001/2002) was timely and contained many excellent points on this complex topic. I have no doubt that it has already stimulated considerable discussion aimed at preventing this predictable crisis. Until just recently, there was no particular urgency attached to the Cyprus problem. Highlighting and explaining why a Cyprus crisis is now on a potential time-line was the single most important contribution of the Barkey/Gordon article.

Especially important was that the article placed Cyprus within a regional perspective, which better highlights broader U.S. interests affected by this problem, including: NATO cohesion in the southern region, Greek-Turkish bilateral relations, and Turkey's EU aspirations. Moreover, no one can ignore the role Cyprus plays in affecting U.S.-Turkish relations. From Washington's viewpoint, any solution to the Cyprus problem that might also damage U.S.-Turkish relations is simply not worth it, which is why the problem—over the course of several decades—has been viewed as an issue to manage and not necessarily resolve.

A comprehensive settlement in Cyprus based on the Clerides-Denktash discussions would be the ideal solution, but it is not necessarily the most likely. Therefore, alternate, interim adjustments must be considered as well.

Turkey, for one, needs to come to terms with the fact that Cyprus will meet EU criteria and gain membership many years before Turkey does. Rather than annex the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC) when this happens, Turkey must begin to seriously contemplate a way to include Turkish Cypriots within the accession process in a manner that protects its interests. Moreover, Turkey—and the other interested parties—must redefine what constitutes "success" *vis-à-vis* Cyprus.

Instead of adopting an "either/or" approach to a comprehensive political settlement, all parties should identify steps based on the "art of the possible", such as modifications in the international trade embargo against northern Cyprus, as a way to encourage further progress.

One way in which this might occur is to be flexible regarding the basic EU tenet that all citizens of an EU state can move freely, with the right to acquire private property, within any member country. Obviously, this greatly concerns Turkey, which envisages Greek Cypriots simply moving north, buying the TRNC parcel by parcel, and relegating Turkish Cypriot workers to unskilled labor and farming while Greek Cypriots become the primary entrepreneurs across the entire Cypriot republic. This EU tenet, however, is not absolute and arrangements—even at a transitional level—can be considered for Cyprus that would limit its applicability in Cyprus to assuage the fears of Turkish Cypriots.

Most promising is the prospect of a new security architecture for the region that could be built now, to be implemented either before or after an overall political settlement is achieved. At its heart should be an expanding Greek-Turkish rapprochement in the military arena. A new security arrangement could create the needed impe-

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tus to move forward on the political, economic, legal, and social dimensions of the Cyprus problem. By eliminating the offensive military capabilities on both sides on the island; equalizing Greek and Turkish mainland units in Cyprus at brigade level, replacing UNFICYP, the UN peacekeeping force in Cyprus, with a European or NATO-like unit; and putting all forces in Cyprus under a single commander from a NATO country—conditions could be created in which the regular Turkish Army units could be withdrawn from the island. Disbanding the Greek Cypriot National Guard would allow the security focus to shift to expanded police protection of all Cypriots, which would assume greater importance in the post-settlement phase.

My compliments to *The National Interest* and Messrs. Barkey and Gordon for focusing on the Cyprus crisis before it happens. I hope the article is widely read, understood, and that it has a positive affect on the future of the eastern Mediterranean.

COL. STEPHEN R. NORTON, USA (RET.)
Senior Policy Advisor,
Western Policy Center, and
former U.S. Defense
Attaché to Cyprus

God and Mammon:

Daniel Pipes' "God and Mammon—Does Poverty Cause Militant Islam?" (*Winter 2001/02*) presents such persuasive authority in favor of a "yes" answer to the question, that one is left somewhat puzzled at his own "no." Much of the problem may be due to his failure to distinguish between leaders and followers: for any mass base of followers to arise, the answer to the question whether poverty is a necessary, or at least customary, antecedent is almost assuredly "yes", and without such a mass base, there is likely to be only a Baader-Meinhof Gang or an Aum Shinrikyo, rather than a movement with real staying power.

Surely the author would see this, if he reflected upon the implications of his own statement: "Like fascism and Marxism-Leninism in their heydays, militant Islam attracts highly competent, motivated, and ambitious individuals." As leaders, perhaps so, but Mao would have gotten nowhere without his army of impoverished tenant-farmer followers, to whom he promised (a promise ultimately betrayed) ownership of the land. The same was true of Ho Chi Minh and of Castro. Nor were the Nazis anything more than a fringe party receiving less than 3 percent of the total vote in 1928. This skyrocketed to 33 percent by 1932—enough to put them in power—directly as a result of the mass following created by the Great Depression.

Pipes' own favorable quotation of Martin Kramer gets it pretty much right: "Islam is particularly useful to these people [as the vehicle of counter-elites], in part because *by its careful manipulation, it is possible to recruit a following among the poor, who make valuable foot-soldiers*" (emphasis mine).

ROY PROSTERMAN
Professor of Law,
University of Washington
President, Rural
Development Institute
Seattle, WA

Pipes replies:

Hats off to Professor Prosterman for the clever extraction of quotes from my own article to array against me. But the many proofs and quotes in that article showing the lack of connection between poverty and militant Islam do still hold. To take just one: how does the professor explain the paucity of militant Islam in Iraq, the Muslim country that has undergone the most catastrophic decline in income in our time?

What Victory Means:

In his article "What Victory Means" (Winter 2001/02), Conrad Black refers to the "murder" of the Israel tourist minister, Rechavam Zeevi. Israel has singled out any number of Palestinians for summary execution, on one of two grounds. Either they have been accused of committing crimes against the Israel people—or they have been identified as intending to do so. The late Mr. Zeevi was a

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strenuous advocate of expelling the Arab population of Palestine from its homeland. That would constitute a crime against humanity. Would it not be more appropriate, then, to apply Israel's standards and declare his death an "execution"?

NORMAN BIRNBAUM
Georgetown University
Law Center

Black replies:

The answer to Mr. Birnbaum's question is negative. "Execution" implies the carrying out of some sort of judicial process and not an assassination. In no civilized jurisdiction is the mere advocacy of anything a capital offense, so his implicit justification of Mr. Zeevi's murder is spurious. Israel's killings of Palestinians are usually in revenge for murders allegedly committed by those Palestinians, or out of self-defense against violent mobs. Excesses and injustices have certainly occurred in these activities, as any moral evaluation conducted on a case by case basis would reveal, but they have not been "summary executions." Where one people claims to have been wrongfully dispossessed by another and conducts what amounts to a guerrilla war against it, fatalities are tragically predictable. That does not excuse the premeditated murder of public officials whose offense is to advocate unacceptable policies, or immunize the assassins from reprisals. □

A Short, Liquid History of Happiness

Coffee . . . originated in Ethiopia, probably taking its name from the province of Kaffa, where coffee grows wild. One can only marvel at the ingenuity of the people who discovered how to make coffee from the coffee bean. . . . But it happened, fortunately for all of us. . . . A famous English book, Robert Burton's *Anatomy of Melancholy*, written in 1621, offers this comment:

> The Turks have a drink called coffa (for they use no wine), so named of a berry as black as soot and as bitter . . . which they sip still of, and sup as warm as they can suffer. They spend much time in those coffa houses, which are somewhat like our ale houses or taverns, and there they sit chating and drinking to drive away the time, and to be merry together, because they find by experience, that kind of drink so used helpeth digestion and procureth alacrity.

—Bernard Lewis,
"In the Finger Zone",
New York Review of Books,
May 23, 2002

After its creation in Constantinople in 1560, the coffeehouse proliferated in all European cities from the mid-seventeenth century. It first appeared in London in 1660. By 1663, London had 82 coffee houses; by 1734, 551. Because of their free talk and virtuosi, they became known as 'tattling universities.' They also served as centers for political cabals, for they provided pamphlets and newspapers as well as drink. The first London daily began publication in 1702—long after the first daily newspaper in Germany (Leipzig, 1660) but long before the first in France (Paris, 1777). Print, talk, and coffee combined to create a powerful new force everywhere in Europe: public opinion took a radical turn in all the great cities.

It took many forms, and came from many sources, but it converged around one idea that resonated everywhere: happiness.

—Robert Darnton,
"A €uro State of Mind",
New York Review of Books,
February 28, 2002

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Moscow Nights, Eurasian Dreams

Nikolas Gvosdev

IN 1918, sitting amid the ruins of the Russian Empire, the poet Alexander Blok symbolically expelled Russia from the Western community of nations, renouncing Russia's claim to be the heir and successor to Rome:

> We shall abandon Europe and her charm.
> We shall resort to Scythian craft and guile.
> Swift to the woods and forests we shall swarm,
> And then look back, and smile our slit-eyed smile.
> Away to the Urals, all!

Blok must have struck a chord, for three years later, a group of émigré intellectuals urged an "Exodus to the East." They had in mind lands between the Vistula and the Amur that to them were neither Europe nor Asia, but a distinct "Ocean-Continent" they called Eurasia. Genghis Khan, the unifier of the steppes, was their hero; Peter the Great, the man who tried to "open a window onto Europe", they despised.

The so-called "Eurasianists", however, never found a receptive audience among ordinary Russians. When Charles de Gaulle visited the Soviet Union in 1966 to proclaim a Europe stretching "from the Atlantic to the Urals", most Russians were more than happy to think of themselves as belonging within a common European home. The lands beyond the Urals (Siberia, Central Asia, and the Caucasus) were instead dragged symbolically toward the west, becoming "European" through their association with Russia—especially so after the signing of the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

With the disintegration of the Soviet Empire, however, the non-Russian republics once referred to as "the Soviet Union in Asia" found themselves spinning in a geopolitical void. Time-sensitive designations (former Soviet republics, "newly-independent states") lose relevance with each passing year. Thus, the term "Eurasia" is being revived, sometimes to refer to the entire ex-USSR, but often to designate only the Caucasus and Central Asia—those countries lying beyond the pale of any realistic prospects of being included in NATO or the EU.[1] An old term has met a new history head on.

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[1]President Nursultan Nazarbaev of Kazakhstan has been a staunch proponent of the "Eurasian" idea. He named the university in the new capital of Astana for Lev Gumilev, the historian and geographer who propounded the notion of Eurasia as a shared cultural and environmental space uniting Turk and Slav, Orthodox and Muslim. See, for example, his speech (December 15, 2000) at the VII session of the Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan.

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Blok prophesied that Eurasia would be the host for a major clash between civilizations:

> Quick, leave the land,
> And clear the field for trial by blood and sword,
> Where steel machines that have no soul must stand
> and face the fury of the . . . horde.

And so, in the aftermath of September 11, Eurasia has become the principal front in the war against terror—the crucible where Islamist terrorism and a far more ecumenical system of organized crime merge. Two well-traveled smuggling routes for all types of contraband—drugs, weapons, dirty money, and illegal migrants—crisscross the region. The north-south corridor runs from Afghanistan into European Russia via the Central Asian republics; the trans-Caspian route connects Central Asia with Georgia and Azerbaijan, with further extensions via Chechnya and Dagestan (into Russia and northern Europe) and through Turkey and the Balkans (into southern Europe). Call them, for short, the Sleaze Road and Grifter Avenue. Russian law-enforcement sources estimate that the drug trade alone in Eurasia generates up to $12 billion in income and assets. In places like Uzbekistan (where the average monthly wage is $20) or Georgia (where 60 percent of the population lives below the poverty line), that kind of money buys about as much political "access" and police "protection" for all sorts of nefarious activities as anyone could reasonably require.

Seen in this light, the optimism radiating from the Oval Office about the "deepening of regional integration" as the *sine qua non* for the security of the entire region—as a joint U.S.-Kazakh statement in December put it—seems a little misplaced. The weak post-Soviet successor states of the Caucasus and Central Asia are in no position to develop effective multilateral regional institutions capable of effectively meeting the challenges before them. Over the past decade, several organizations have been created with much fanfare—the Central Asian Union, the Collective Security Treaty of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community, GUUAM [Georgia-Ukraine-Uzbekistan-Azerbaijan-Moldova] and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization among them. They have accomplished little beyond providing work for underutilized diplomats who excel at making speeches and penning declarations. The newest contender—the Central Asian Cooperation Organization, whose charter was signed on February 28, 2002—is unlikely to break the mold.

Strengthening the states that lie along the southern periphery of Eurasia, especially those that abut centers of Islamic radicalism in southwest Asia, will take time and hard work. Such strengthening would nevertheless appear to be a logical course of action that is in the interest of both Washington and Moscow. How to do this is less clear. Secretary of State Colin Powell envisions a joint effort: "We know that this is something we cannot do without the Russians and something that increasingly they realize can't be done without us, and without the full participation of the countries in the region."[2] The Secretary assumes, however, that Moscow, Washington and the governments of the "Eurasian" republics share a common interest in pursuing such cooperation. Alas, things are not so simple.

Russia finds itself in a Eurasian quandary. For the past decade, it has ben-

[2]Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, February 13, 2002.

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efited from the weakness of the post-Soviet successor states in order to maintain its influence within and among them. Facing internal unrest or external threats, several post-Soviet states (notably Tajikistan) have requested the continuing deployment of Russian troops on their soil. Separatist movements in places like Abkhazia or Trans-Dniestria have given Russia the opportunity to deploy its forces in other republics under the guise of peacekeepers. Moscow has played both ends against the middle by giving refuge and succor to political opponents of existing regimes (such as the former president of Azerbaijan, Ayaz Mutalibov and the former foreign minister of Turkmenistan, Boris Shikhmuradov), while cultivating links with dissatisfied ethnic minorities (the Lezgins of Azerbaijan, for instance) and regional politicians often at odds with their own central government (such as Aslan Abashidze, the leader of Achara, an autonomous region within Georgia). The Russian special services have also been accused of fomenting coups and assassination attempts against leaders inclined to move their states out of Moscow's orbit.

This, then, is the paradox of Russia's Eurasian policy: the unconsolidated states to the south have been unable to act as an effective barrier between Russia and the maelstrom of Islamic radicalism emanating from southwest Asia, but that same weakness makes these regimes susceptible to Moscow's own reduced means of influence. In the wake of September 11, therefore, any significant financial and security assistance extended from the United States to the nations of the Caucasus and Central Asia, while it would stand to enhance Russia's own security, could also undermine Russia's Eurasian sphere of influence.

That is why the Russian political elite is anxiously trying to divine American intentions in the region. Washington, however, is sending contradictory signals. Last October, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld assured Central Asian leaders that it was "safe to be associated" with the United States, since the administration was prepared to be engaged for the long term. This view was reiterated from the Democratic side of the aisle by Senate Majority leader Tom Daschle during his visit to Tashkent in January, when he declared that "our presence and our relationship with . . . the countries in the region is one that we look upon in long terms." And yet, barely a month later, on February 11, Assistant Secretary of State Elizabeth Jones stated that "we don't want U.S. bases in Central Asia" since "our goal with the Russians is to make sure that they understand we are not trying to compete with them in Central Asia, we're not trying to take over Central Asia from them." If, as Secretary Powell has observed, the "way we are approaching Central Asia is symbolic of the way we are approaching the [U.S.-Russia] relationship as a whole", then America's inconsistent behavior thus far is disconcerting news indeed.

DISREGARDING Blok's advice to "keep our distance and . . . observe the deadly conflict raging on the field", Vladimir Putin pledged full and enthusiastic support for the anti-terrorism coalition that Washington assembled after September 11. The Russian political elite was initially ecstatic, for it assumed that the United States would task Russia, as a "regional superpower", to keep order in Eurasia. Instead, the United States has opted for direct aid to the post-Soviet republics—including the deployment of its own military forces into Eurasia—rather than asking, and funding, Russia to act as America's proxy.

Georgia is a particularly sore case in point. For years, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze rebuffed Moscow's

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requests for joint military operations to secure the Pankisi gorge, or for Russian troops to operate on Georgian territory to combat Chechen rebels. After 9/11, Moscow assumed that, as Washington's partner in the war on terrorism, the United States would support Russia's demands *vis-à-vis* Georgia. On February 18, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov called for a Russian-led counter-terrorist operation against suspected terrorist training camps in the Pankisi gorge. Three days later, the chief of the Russian General Staff, Anatoly Kvashnin, said that the likelihood of any American involvement in such an operation would be "very small", and reiterated Moscow's position that "Russia and Georgia should jointly eradicate this terrorist center in the Pankisi gorge." Then came the announcement that the United States would dispatch a mission to train and equip Georgian forces, which the Russians claim took them unawares. This forced the Russians to backpedal. On February 27, the Speaker of the Duma, Gennady Seleznev, tried to spin American aid to Georgia as an extension of the "international antiterrorist coalition." He reiterated, however, that any "decision on what should be done in the Pankisi gorge can and must be made only within the framework of tripartite consultations between Georgia, Russia and the United States of America."

So far, however, the administration has shown no inclination to involve Russia at all, even in a symbolic fashion, in its Caucasian deployment—though the Russian complaint about the lack of prior U.S. consultation is much exaggerated. The U.S. posture has led two prominent members of the Duma, Dmitry Rogozin (chair of the International Affairs Committee) and Boris Pastukhov (chair of the CIS Affairs Committee) to warn that the administration's unwillingness to involve Russia in the plans for the deployment of U.S. advisors in Georgia would have "a negative impact on bilateral cooperation in the fight against terrorism."

Some in Russia—and not only in Russia—have concluded that the Bush team views "partnership" with Russia along the lines outlined by Zbigniew Brzezinski in these pages two years ago: namely, that the United States must help Russia divest itself of imperial baggage so that it can be join Western institutions as a major, if not a predominant, actor.[3] The continuing eastward expansion of NATO as well as other post-September 11 developments—from the basing of American forces in Central Asia to the announcement of new aid packages for the post-Soviet states of the region—look to many in Moscow like Brzezinski's recommendation in action: the incipient American "encirclement" of Russia via deployments in the south and NATO expansion to their west.

IF THIS IS THE case, then why has Putin reacted so dispassionately to this turn of events? It is not simply to cultivate goodwill in the West—although he keeps a portrait of Peter the Great in his office—and it is not only for the enjoyment that annoying his own chattering classes brings. Rather, it is because, in his calculation, the entry of the United States into Central Asia and the Caucasus, far from representing a defeat or a threat, actually constitutes a no-lose situation for Russia.

Take the "train-and-equip" mission to Georgia. The Bush Administration has reportedly given private assurances to the Russian government that U.S. assistance will not be diverted by the Georgians to compel a military solution to the separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both of which maintain close

[3]Brzezinski, "Living with Russia", *The National Interest* (Fall 2000).

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links to Russia. If the mission is successful—and the Georgians clear the Pankisi gorge—a major transit point for the Chechen rebels will be shut down and rear recuperation areas will be lost to them. If the Georgians fail to act, however, the United States, having verified the presence of Al-Qaeda operatives in the region, risks damage to its credibility in the war on terrorism. The United States would then have to contemplate a front-line combat role for itself, something it is loath to do, or compel Tbilisi to permit Russian forces to deal with the threat. For Putin, at least, U.S. involvement in Georgia is not, in his words, a "tragedy" for Russia.

Putin apparently views George W. Bush (in terms of his administration, not on a personal level) as an overbearing yet wealthy uncle whose tedious holiday visits can be endured because he presents a lucrative gift at the end of the day. Consider this: the United States did in a matter of weeks what years of Russian aid to the Northern Alliance was unable to do—decapitate the Taliban regime. Washington removed a major threat to the stability and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation. Russia cannot afford to state-build in Eurasia, while the United States can offer one country, Uzbekistan, long-term financial aid, loans and investments that could easily reach $8 billion—a sum equal to Russia's entire annual military budget. Therefore, while the United States takes on the lion's share of the costs to revamp Eurasia's security architecture, "we are increasing our security, saving the lives of our soldiers, and gaining time for our own rearmament", declared Putin advisor Gleb Pavlovsky.

Putin is gambling that U.S. guarantees, such as the one extended to Uzbek president Islam Karimov during his visit to Washington this past March, will be of short duration, especially as the threat from Al-Qaeda recedes and the United States seeks to extricate itself from the region. Even though the United States can easily outbid Russia, Washington's concerns about how its assistance might be misused—either by authoritarian regimes seeking to crack down on opposition movements, or by corrupt local officials to improve the quality of the protection they extend to criminal organizations—means that tensions between Washington and its new "partners" are inevitable. The United States will not endure them if the reward for doing so is already paid out.

For the locals, post-9/11 developments are simply one more set of steps in the "Eurasian shuffle", as regional leaders dance between Moscow and Washington to secure maximum advantage. Karimov himself is most adept at this waltz. When it appeared that the United States was prepared to play a more active role in Central Asia, especially in the energy sector, he declared, in 1995: "The presence of the United States in Central Asia is a guarantee of stability in [this] part of the world." When no large-scale Western investment materialized, and when Washington intensified its criticisms of his unreconstructed authoritarianism, Karimov made the pilgrimage to the Kremlin, where, in May of last year, he pronounced: "We favor Russia's presence in Central Asia. This is a fundamental guarantee of security and stability in the region." Karimov may be America's new best friend but when the relationship with the United States cools (whether over human rights, lack of democratization or corruption), Moscow will be waiting to receive the prodigal back into the common Eurasian home.

Even if the United States intends to establish a long-term presence in the region, the naval base at Guantanamo Bay is a telling example of how a military presence in an area can have virtually no impact at all on events in the host country.

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Given the U.S. penchant for "freezing" conflicts indefinitely rather than expending its own treasure and energy to craft final solutions, Russia can retain its forward "enclaves" in the region (such as peacekeepers in Abkhazia or Tajikistan, or the base at Akhalkalaki in southern Georgia) to counterbalance any American presence.

Moreover, the lack of substantial Western investment in the region, other than in the hydrocarbons sector in certain areas, allows Russia to retain a considerable degree of economic and political leverage in the new Eurasia. The Russian economy remains underdeveloped by Western standards, but Russia is an El Dorado for millions of legal and illegal guest workers who send remittances back to their families in the Caucasus and Central Asia.[4] After years of decline caused by the Soviet breakup, trade between Russia and its former Soviet republics grew by more than 40 percent in 2000, totaling over $25 billion. Finally, several years of continuous growth in the Russian economy—not to mention the enormous profits obtained by Russian corporations, especially in the energy sector—have enabled Russian firms to buy up assets, at bargain prices, in other Eurasian countries (as well as in eastern Europe) where Western investors still fear to tread. An influential Ukrainian newspaper thus opined, "Moscow will not go anywhere. The old debts and old links that determine mutual dependence will stay."[5]

Putin has thus revealed himself as the consummate pragmatist. While the United States fixes its gaze on the open-ended, idealistic task of rooting out global terrorism (and dispenses its largesse in pursuit of that lofty goal), Russia has kept its eye firmly on the more earthy objective of resurrecting its power and influence among its neighbors. One result of the Russo-American "partnership" in the war on terrorism is likely to be a revived and strengthened Russia as the dominant power in Eurasia, and this will cost Russia not a single kopeck in the coin of its institutional advance toward Europe. Putin can thus be both "Peter" (opening Russia to Western investment and technology, and further integrating Russia into Western institutions) and "Genghis" (rebuilding the groundwork for a Russian-dominated Eurasia)—if we let him. □

[4]This explains in part why an April poll conducted by "M-Vector" found that more than 60 percent of residents in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital, oppose the basing of U.S. military personnel in the republic, fearing a potential deterioration of relations with Russia.

[5]*Holos Ukrainy*, December 4, 2001. Consider how Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev rushed to proclaim that the U.S. presence in Central Asia must not "conflict with Russian interests"—after Russia indicated it might not restructure Kyrgyz debt. Ahmed Rashid, "Russia, China Warily Watch for American Intrusions in Central Asia", *Eurasia Insight*, May 3, 2002.

> The Russians are not a sentimental people.
>
> —Maxim Litvinov

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
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"A PALESTINIAN journalist who lives not far from me in northeast Jerusalem told me, around the time of the Camp David negotiations, that if Arafat comes to his neighborhood, he will move to mine."

—Yossi Klein Halevi

"IF PEOPLE TODAY believe that the truth about rights is not 'self-evident' or even humanly accessible, it is only because they have been taught a watered-down version of the thought of philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger."

—Francis Fukuyama

"AMERICA, LIKE Rome at the end of the Second Punic War, seems to be turning into the kernel of a world empire."

—Charles Fairbanks

"HOLLYWOOD'S unpleasant images of America enable the rest of the world to temper inevitable envy with a sense of superiority. The violence, cruelty, injustice, corruption, arrogance and degeneracy so regularly included in depictions of American life allow viewers abroad to feel fortunate by comparison."

—Michael Medved

"THE IRA'S reluctance to renounce the armed option—which they could easily do with crossed fingers, Arafat-style—suggests that honor, after a fashion, does matter to these terrorists."

—Jonathan Stevenson

"RUSSIA CANNOT afford to state-build in Eurasia, while the United States can offer one country, Uzbekistan, long-term financial aid, loans and investments that could easily reach $8 billion—a sum equal to Russia's entire annual military budget."

—Nikolas Gvosdev

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